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FOREWORD 
This report includes papers presented and discussed at a seminar on demand 
for farm products, The seminar was sponsored by the Center for Agricultural 
Adjustment of the Division of Agriculture, Iowa State College, The seminar 
met for two hours per week for three months during the spring quarter. The 
seminar was organized to include about 60 members formally designated by 
the committee. These seminar members, as well as a formal discussant for 
each topic, evaluated the presentation at each session. 
The subject of demand was selected for the seminar because of its importance 
to the income and adjustment problems of agriculture. Demand for farm 
products has grown less rapidly, relative to supply, than demand for many 
non-farm goods and services. This is true even though farm and non-farm 
industries exist in a common environment of growth in population and national 
income. What are the factual prospects for increasing demand for agricul- -
tural products under further national economic growth? What are the prospects 
in foreign markets? 
Many persons have expressed the hypothesis or hope that the surplus and farm 
income problems might be solved through expansion of demand. The papers 
presented at the seminars represent an attempt to summarize current know-
ledge in respect to demand magnitudes and prospects for farm products. Given 
the current situation in respect to surplus stocks and income prospects, it is 
important that demand opportunities be evaluated objectively. Only then can 
an appropriate choice between courses of action be taken for sound alleviation 
of the commercial farm problem. 
The papers presented at the seminar represent an attempt to summarize current 
knowledge in respect to demand and to interpret opportunities in expanding 
markets for farm products. The papers represent a fairly comprehensive 
coverage of the subject. Hence, it seemed desirable that they be published as 
a group. The report or collection of papers should be useful to educators, farm 
leaders, research workers, legislators and other persons concerned with 
problems of demand for farm products. 
The seminar committee which formulated the program and designated speakers 
included: 
John Ayres 
Francis Carlin 
Leonard Eggleton 
Karl Fox 
Iver Johnson 
Edwin Kline 
George Ladd 
Wilbur Maki 
Richard Phillips 
Geoffrey Shepherd 
Earl 0. Heady, Director Geoffrey Shepherd, Chairman 
Center for Agricultural Adjustment Seminar Committee 
ll 
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SEMINAR ON THE DEMAND FOR FARM PRODUCTS 
Spring Quarter, 1959 
Genter For Ag.ricultP.ral Adjustment 
Divis ion of Agriculture 
Iowa State College 
I. Existing and projected pattern of demand for agricultural output in 
relation to supply 
A. Current domestic utilization: food use, industrial uses, government 
purchases. 
B. Exports 
C. Imports. 
D. Trends· in ea:ch of the above and causes. 
E. Prospective supplies including CCC stocks. 
F. What are the prospects or projections if nothing is done beyond present 
programs? Population, per capita income, price-elasticity of demand, 
etc. 
G. List of types of programs for expanding demand, setting the stage for 
the later papers o 
Chairman: Louis Thompson, Associate Dean of Agriculture, ISC 
Speaker: Harold Breimyer, USDA 
Discussant: Francis Kutish, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC 
II. Increasing the domestic demand for farm products by government programs o 
A. Can we eat our way out of the surplus? 
B. Subsidized consumption: food stamp plans, relief distributions, school 
lunch programs, etc. Present size of programs and prospects, and 
effects o 
C. Effects of nutritional education; effects if low-income families 1 incomes 
were increased; effects if all families had adequate diets or liberal diets o 
Chairman: Leonard Eggleton, Poultry Husbandry Department, ISC 
Speaker: Herman Southworth, Pennsylvania State College 
Discussant: Margaret Liston, Head, Home Management Department, ISC 
III. Increasing the domestic demand for farm products by advertising and 
promotion. 
A. Consumer sovereignty - how real? 
B. Current expenditures on advertising and other forms of promotion. 
C. Effects: Does "eat more pork" mean "eat less beef"? Informational ad-
vertising; predatory advertising. Who gets the benefit, and how much? 
Chairman: George Ladd, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC. 
Speaker: Robert Walsh, USDA 
Discussant: Lee Kolmer, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC. 
iv 
IV. Increasing the demand for f·arm products by improving quality to 
meet consumer demand. 
A. Example: Broilers replacing farm hens . 
B.. Beef.: What is quality, for household consumption and for the restaurant 
trade-? 
Are the answers different for these two groups? How to satisfy them 
both. 
C. Pork: What is quality in pork? How much fat, what size, etc'? Are the 
answers different for the different cuts? 
D. Problems of reflecting quality price differentials through the trade. 
E. Sale on the bas is of carcass weight and grade. 
Chairman: Emmit Haynes , Animal Husbandry Department, ISC 
Speaker: V. James Rhodes, Universityof Missouri. 
Discussant: Wilbur Maki, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC. 
V. Increasing the foreign demand for farm products by government export 
programs - P. L. 480, etc. 
A. Existing and prospective size of programs. 
B, Effects on patterns of international trade in farm products. 
C. Effects upon recipient countries - on consumption, economic develop-
ment, economic and political stability, local producers of the 
commodity, attitude toward the United States. 
D. Effects on competing exporting countries . 
E. Effects on our own domestic agriculture. Does it solve problems, 
or only postpone solutions? 
Chairman: Donald Ka.ldor, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC. 
Speaker: Lawrence Witt, Michigan State University. 
Discussant: Erik Thorbecke, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC. 
VI. Changes in the percentage of consumer income spent for food. 
A. Income-elasticity of expenditures for food in the United States. 
Engel's law. 
B. Income- elasticity for different foods. 
C. Recent changes in the percentage of consumers 1 income spent for 
food, and for different foods. 
D. Reasons for the changes. 
E. Recent changes in the farmer 1 s share of consumer expenditures for 
food. 
Chairman: Gordon Bivens, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC 
Speaker: Geoffrey Shepherd, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC 
Discussant: Elizabeth Hoyt, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC. 
v 
VII. Farm vs. factory: Effects of chemical industry on the demand for farm 
products - plus or minus? 
A. Trends in the use of farm products for industrial purposes. 
B. Competition from non-farm raw materials - petrochemical, synthetic 
fibers, detergents, etc. 
C. Depletion of natural resources. 
D. The farm as a factory. 
E. Integration of farm and chemical industry. 
Speaker: Morton Smutz, Head, Chemical Engineering Department, ISC. 
Potentials for new crops to meet new and existing demands. 
A. Pulp and cordage fibers. 
B. Non-food oils. 
C. Waxes, tanning agents, insecticides, etc. 
D. Need for research. 
Speaker: Iver Johnson, In Charge of Farm Crops, Agronomy Department, 
ISC. 
Chairman: Joseph Walkup, Head, Industrial Engineering Department, ISC. 
Discussant: J. C. Ayres, Dairy and Food Industry Department, ISC 
VIII. Effects of Point IV on our exports of farm and industrial products. 
A. Short-run and long-run effects. 
B. Are we creating future competition for our own agriculture, or 
increasing the foreign demand for our farm products? 
Chairman: R. E. Buchanan, Dean Emeritus, Graduate College, ISC 
Speaker: 'Slj.erwood Berg, University of Minnesota. 
Discussant: Carl Malone, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC 
IX. Effects of institutional changes in market structure and marketing pro-
cedures on marketing margins and the demand for farm products. 
A. Changes in productivity in agriculture. 
B. Changes in productivity in the food processing and distributing industries. 
C. Changes in the structure of the market - number and size of super-
markets, voluntary and other chains, etc., and their effects on buying 
practices and demand. 
Chairman: Gene Futrell, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC 
Speaker: Bob Holdren, Economics and SoCiology Department, ISC 
Discussant: Richard Phillips, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC. 
vi 
X. Summary of seminar. Supply - demand balance for agriculture under 
different alternative conditions. 
A. Production and consumption projected from past trends. 
B. Estimated consumption on optimistic assumptions. 
C. Estimated consumption on pessimistic assumptions. 
Chairman: Verner Nielsen, Economics and Sociology, ISC 
Speaker: Karl Fox, Head, Economics and Sociology Department, ISC 
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EXISTING AND PROJECTED' PATTERN OF DEMAND FOR 
AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT IN RELATION T.O SUPPLY 
Harold F. Breimyer 
I am pleased to have been invited tp present this first lecture in a series 
scheduled by the Agricultural Adjustment Genter. 
The title can be paraphrased in simple terms: "How do demand and supply 
in agriculture match up, now and for the future?" 
But first, why do we concern ourselves with the question? 
Values in economics. The study of economics always concerns two seta of 
values. The first is impersonal, aggregative, materialistic. It is directed 
toward obtaining the largest total production of goods and services of which 
the e:conoll).y· is :c~pable. The second is just the opposite. It is personal, 
individual~ non-materialistic. It has to do with achieving equity in the 
economic system. Strangely, many economists seem to avoid facing these 
latter values and their implication. Some take equity for granted. They 
do so by assuming absolute equality in pricing of the factors of production. 
But it is precisely the lack of equality between cer~in farm factors and 
comparable non-farm factors that is the occasion for this seminar. For the 
charge that disturbs and motivates us all is that labor aitd Jlll.a.nagement on 
farms is rewarded less well than that of other employments. Inadequate and 
unequal labor incomes in agriculture are the substance of the farm problem. 
Yet it is pointless to address ourselves to a subject, aside from the value of 
intellectual exercise, unless we feel we can do something about it. 
There must be an avenue for improvement. Specifically, our hopes are two: 
that demand for farm products can be expanded; and that supply will not 
be so readily expansible as to offset all the gain in demand, but rather 
that a benefit from greater den1and will accrue to farm people. 
Demand: Definition. Demand as a concept is hard to, define and to under-
stand. This is especially true of demand in the aggregate. 
Demand was not a conspicuous concept in early evolution of economic doctrine. 
Smith and Malthus wrote chiefly about factors of production. Demand came 
to the fore when social reformers observed imperfections in economic affairs. 
They p·ointed an accusing finger at it, alleging that it was the misllrehaving 
agent in business crises. J. B. Say set the record straight insofar as 
aggregate demand was concerned when he introduced the idea of a co-
determinancy of demand and supply. Keynes declared Say held full emplo-Yment 
Harold F. Breimyer is Head, Livestock, Fats and Oils Section, Statistical 
and Historical Research Branch, AMS, USDA. 
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to be implicit in his law, and he disagreed. Yet Keynes also thought 
in terms of a production base to aggregate demand. 
Later scholars developed the idea of demand in dollar terms. There still 
is conflict between the"'at:nooJ.s that prefer the 'real product' and those 
that favor the money income approach to measurement of demand. The 
monetary group usually dominates during a time of a sharply swinging 
business cycle. When gradual growth is the major trend, the real product 
analysts tend to thrive. They are in the ascendancy just now. These 
scholars who nowaday sketch demand as derived from the real product of 
the economy are essentially of the same school as Say and K~ynes. 
Clearly, the real product approach has the advantage that it is free of the 
price level factor. It is a purer methodology. The current dollar income 
approach is more complex. For when, for instance, a demand analysis 
is built on an increase in national income that is due in whole or in part 
to inflation of the price level,· its results must be corrected immediatley 
for the higher price level. The higher prices for the product being 
analyzed must be related to the higher price for all competing products; and 
the higher income indicated must be adjusted for rising cost of living. 
Blessing of a high price from such an origin are gossamer indeed. Increase 
of national income that only reflects price inflation is specious and deceiving. 
This is not to deny two weaknesses in use of the real-product technique: 
(1) Modern money is credit and is even more subject to 
hoarding than was the Jilpecie of. old. Money does 
introduce a significant variant to the real-in~ 
co.ric;ept of demand. Disregarding the monetary and 
price level factor can be misleading for a shorter run. 
(2) Price level changes do not influence all kinds of commodities 
alike. Farm product prices especially are subject to 
the impact of inflation or deflatiqn. However, the 
significance of marked price level change had best be 
treated as a phenomenon of its own. Demand analysis should 
not be relied on to accommodate all convulsions in the 
economy .. 
Demand Versus Utilization. Let1 s now turn away from the question of 
monetary vs. real aspects of demand, even though we have left it largely 
unanswered. 
Whenever a choice must be made, the real approach is the better one, at 
least as a starting point. 
Although "real" data usually are thought of as dollar values deflated by a 
price level index, a great many analyses related to agriculture,.. emplpy 
physical quantity data. Sometimes they are in terms of common physical 
3 
units, as feed units or animal units. At other times they are price weighted 
a calculation that does not entirely escape the influence of price. 
One such physical quantity series is that of aggregate utilization of farm 
products. An ingeniously devised series, constructed from supply and 
distribution data for individual products as weighted by farm-level prices, 
it adds a lot to our kit of tools for analysis. 1 I Data from this series will 
be presented later. 
Nevertheless, utilization is not demand. That it is far from an identity 
with demand is seen from this proposition: that except as there is pro-
vision for exceptional year-end storage, utilization in any year equals supply 
for that year. Thus time-series utilization analysis would constitute 
supply analysis fully as much as demand analysis. 2/ The one exception 
occurs when government storage is afforded to all takers. When this is 
done, Uncle Sam presents the clearest case of pure demand to be found 
in our economy. (The issue of whether U. S. government storage demand 
is itself to be subject to the influence of supply has dominated farm policy 
debate for 20 years, and is not yet fully resolved.) 
Supply Itself Helps to Make Demand. The popular term 1demand' often 
brings the image of a housewife buying her weekly supply of groceries, or 
selecting a dress or hat somewhat less frequently (all husbands hope). 
Demand in this sense is conceived as a psychic entity, so personal as to 
represent the ultimate in expression of individual rights in an economically 
free society. Madison Avenue long ago disabused us of the purest form of 
this notion, for consumer wants are surely subject to influence if not 
manipulation. This subject will be dealt with at a later seminar. Suffice 
it to be said here that demand even in the psychic sense is not formed 
entirely independently of supply. The mere availability of a good or service 
has an effect on the demand for it. "Invention is the mother of necessity" 
is a juxtaposition of an adage that is meaningful to analysis of economic 
development. We needed cake mixes and vitamin tablets aluminum 
baking foil only after they became available. 
Demand at Successive Distribution Levels. One of the most serious problems 
facing all analysts of demand for farm products is that of the distribution 
level of demand formation. Consumer sovereignty, however perfect or 
imperfect, is exclusively a retail-level function. Not long ago farmers sold 
an appreciable part of their produce directly to final consumers. They sell 
very little now. Almost all "demand" at the point of farm sale is now that 
of a marketing intermediary. 
How to translate demand at retail to demand at the farm is a question that 
haunts all responsible analysts. Often a certain behavior offarm-to-retail 
1/ Measuring the Supply and Utilization of Farm Commodities. USDA, AMS, 
Agr. Handbook No. 91, 1955 
2/ It would include foreign supply analysis. 
supply that exerts economic influence in the 
However, the great bulk of 
U. S. is of domestic or gin. 
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margins is assumed. Inasmuch as those margins rep!]sent 60 percent 
of the retail food dollar, the practice is questionable. 
Some of the foods that have grown most in popularity are those for which 
distribution channels are shortest, and the percentage of consumer's 
dollar returned to farmers is highest. This applies especially to the 
meats. Nevertheless, increasing specialization in marketing, pro-
cessing and distribution, and increasing amount of processing applied 
to foods, serve to remove the producer ever farther from the final 
consumer. The economic links between producer and consumer are 
becoming longer and more complex. 
That is to say, the Carmer· is becoming more and more a producer of 
raw materials. And the economics of raw materials are distinctly 
different from the economics of consumer goods. 
Demand for farm products at the farm is a derived demand. It is "a 
long way•• _derived. 
It is no coincidence that most of the farm products that have consistently 
received price support are those which are more clearly of the nature of 
raw materials -- ones for which the percentage of consumer1 s dollar 
returned to farmers is low. Detailed speculation on indifference curves 
of final consumers has little application to farm-level demand for them. 
Demand Subject to Price-Making Mechanism. It follows that effective 
demand at the farm is not a clear and perfect reflection of the foibles, 
fancies and felicitations of consumers, but is affected to high degree by 
the institutional arrangements in which demand is expressed. Not even 
the most naive traditionalist would assert that prices are now made in 
the milieu of the perfect competition that was a conceptual model for 
theorists some years ago. Prices simply are not arrived at that way. 
Monopolistic competition is the key word in a description of the present 
pricing mechanism. 
As every student of Chamberlin knows, monopolistic competition affects 
not only the price at which (differentiated) products are solQ., but also the 
kind of product produced and sold. It leads both to prices that are different 
than would exist under perfect competition, and to expenditure of resources 
in devising differentiated products and in promoting demand for them. 
These characteristics of monopolistic competition cannot be disregarded 
in an appraisal of demand. 
3/ Cf. my 11 0n Price Determination and Aggregate Price Theory." Jour. 
Farm Econ., Aug. 1957. See especially pp 689-693. 
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Demand and EngeP s Law. In these days of universal optimism, all 
projections of demand for farm products are made in the context of 
arising national income. But even this sanguineness leaves farm partisans 
chilled. For, according to the precept of Engel, only a pittance of the 
marginal buying power of consumers goes to products that are farm-
produced. 
Professor Boulding finds this a cause for gloom. "· •. in a progressive 
society, ... agriculture must always be declining relative to the other 
occupations ... (It) must always be in the uncomfortable position of being 
'squeezed'. 11 (Economic Analysis, second edition, p. 219.) 
Events of the last few years have given little occa.sion to dispute this view. 
The vibrant industrial prosperity of the 1950's passed agriculture by, 
except as the U. S. government lent an expensive hand. Economic analysts 
found their farm income analysis to be faulty; current income data 
consistently fell below their regression value. 
Findings of the 1955 household food consumption survey reinforce the 
generalization of Engel's law. Data for meat are relevant. Taken in 
a year of plentiful meat supplies, the survey showed that higher income 
consumers failed to use their buying power to buy much more meat. 
To large extent they use it to buy better meat -- or at least to pay a 
higher price per pound. The following are the percentage changes in 
meat price and use associated with a 10 percent difference in income. 
Data for beef are given by regions. 
Quantity 2er 12erson Price 12er :eound 
Pork -0.3 1.6 
Beef 
Northeast 1.2 1.6 
North Central 1.0 1.5 
South 3.8 1.2 
West 2.1 1.9 
Veal 2.7 0.3 
Lamb and mutton 6.2 1.2 
For pork, high income consumers ate less but paid higher prices. For 
beef, Northeastern and North Central consumers gave more attention to 
price than quantity. Southern and Western consumers, however, used 
extra income more for added quantity. Veal and lamb consumption is still 
largely associated with income. 
The higher price per pound probably reflected in part a higher quality 
of meat, and therefore embodied a larger use of agricultural resources. 
Another part may have involved only more associated service, or even 
higher retailer profits. 
6 
Income Elasticity Gf Demand. Barton and Daly, in a paper given here at 
Ames, set Jorth some coefficients of income elasticity of demand for farm 
products. 4 The authors show contrasts in results of demand studies: 
"Statistical analyses covering the long run as a whole indicate an 
elasticity of expenditures (for food) with respect to income around 0. 9 ... 
But for the prewar years alone (1929-1941), this elasticity was around 0. 7 
and in the postwar years {1948-1957) it may be as low as 0.35." They also 
derived coefficients at the farm level using the farm-price-weighted supply 
and utilization series referred to on page 3. "For farm-produced food, 
price elasticity of demand is indicated around -0.15 to -0.2 and a positive 
income elasticity of about the same size. During the post-War II years, 
1948 to 1957, these elasticities may be even smaller. 11 
Of course, for individual comrJodities or commodity groups, the income 
elasticities are much higher. 5 
As is demonstrated by the data for meat given above. much of the effect 
of higher consumer incomes appears in a greater demand for high s,uality 
food than for more food. Agriculture has adjusted quite well to changing 
consumers' wishes as to kind and quality of food. Resources have been 
shifted within agriculture to produce more livestock products and less potatoes, 
for instance. The sucess story of beef is not only that consumption per 
person has been stepped up 25 pounds in the last 25 years but also that older, 
grass -fattened beef has been substantially replaced by a younger, grain-
fattened product. 
Food Major Output of Agriculture. Historical growth in United States 
agriculture has not been spectacular. It has been substantial, but certainly 
not extremely large. As is well known, growth in output during the 1950's 
has exceeded demand at support price, and stocks have accumulated despite 
vigorous export programs. 
A chief reason is that the more expansive parts of the economy do not touch 
greatly on agriculture. U. S. agriculture continues to be devoted primarily 
to production of food for the domestic population. Only cotton and wool rank 
very high among nonfood uses, and exports are relatively not large except 
when expanded by government action. Moreover, those two fibers have not 
enjoyed any big increase in popularity. Tobacco, being habit-forming, has 
_done better, but it accounts for only a small part of farm resources. 
4/ "Prospects for Agriculture in a Growing Economy." G. T. Barton and 
R. F. Daly, address, Conference on Problems and Policies of American 
Agriculture, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, Oct. 27-31, 1958. 
5/ Ibid. , p. 6. 
7 
In 1957, for example, utilization of all farm products was as follows: 
Food 
Feed for workstock 
Fibers and leather 
Tobacco 
Alcholic beverages 
Industrial oils and soap 
Other nonfood use 
Commercial exports and 
shipments 
USDA exports 
Percent 
75,5 
0,7 
5,6 
2.0 
0.8 
1.2 
0.6 
12.8 
0.8 
100.0 
The table on page 8 sketches trends in these proportions since 1"925. 
Chief observations from the table are that the big increases in share of 
total utilization have been in food use and in tobacco. Tobacco, however, 
is a small part of the total; and its quantity has not increased further since 
1952. Most other nonfood uses of farm products have not covered them-
selves with glory, for they have generally declined relative to food use. 
The biggest reduction has been in feed for workstock. Disappearance of 
horses and mules has increased to a sizable degree the resources within 
agriculture available to produce food and fiber, This trend is now almost 
ended -- a fact that could be one of the hopeful signs for the future. On the 
other hand, entry of tractors and gasoline into agriculture was merely one 
item in a long run displacement of farm by non-farm resources in 
agriculture. This displacement continues. 
Prospects for the future, Based on the foregoing, prospects may be 
outlined as follows: 
1. Demand for farm products is hardly likely to expand at a fast 
pace. Its increase will be determined more by the growth in population 
than in income per person. Barton and Daly estimate a 41 percent increase 
in farm output in 1975 compared with 1956-57. Most of the increase results 
from a projected gain of 35 percent in population. Output of farm products 
per capita is calculated at only 4 to 5 percent hi~Tr than in 1956-57, despite 
a 40 percent increase in real income per capita. 
6/ Ibid, p, 11. 
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2. Potential production appears large enough to provide the 
necessary output without difficulty. Barton and Daly data are as follows: 
Use of farm products 
Necessary output 
Potential yield per acre 
~ use of presently known practices 
Economically attainable use of 
presently known practices 
To be added from new practices 
Potential incre-as-e in fe-ed conversion 
Relative to 1956-57 
1965 1975 
+18% 
+13% 
+50% 
~41% 
+50% 
+25% or more 
? 
?10% 
The economically attainable increase in yields combined with increase 
in efficiency in use of feed would virtually meet the full necessary rise in 
output, without any new achievements in technology. New achievements are 
certain. Hence, Barton and ~Daly conclude, "1975 production needs can 
be met without any great difficulty. Moreover, there is a strong possibility 
that major problems of adjustment in production and in resource1use may 
continue to face agriculture over the longer run period ahead. 117 
3. Notwithstanding the above, any progress in expanding demand 
would be highly beneficial. After all, the difference between rate of growth 
in demand and in supply is narrow. Only a slight gain in demand might be 
sufficient to close the gap, or at least to narrow it to a point that is 
manageable . 
Brightest prospects are in stepping up demand for products of high 
quality. An example is the possible benefit from selling pork by a quality 
or grade distinction. To do so would tap the market for highest -quality 
(and highest priced) pork better than is done now. 
4. On the other hand, some of the benefits of increased demand 
are fleeting --more so than previously. Increasingly, productive capacity 
in agriculture is not fixed and pred,etermined, but is responsive to current 
conditions. Land alone is not the controlling factor it once was. Non-farm 
inputs have become more important, and they are more mobile, more 
elastic, than in:puts of farm origin. 
7/ Ibid. , p. 14. 
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Moreover, while supply of farm products has thereby become 
more elastic, demand for them has become more inelastic. Inelastic 
demand -- characteristic of a period of high consumer incomes -- creates 
a severe penalty for over-production in agriculture. It provides a bonus 
for well ordered production. 
Consequently, the policy decisions as to where relief will be sought 
fall into these three categories: 
(a) how much to depend on measures to 
expand demand, 
(b) whether to control the quantity of mobile 
non-farm inputs used in agriculture 
(presumably through allotments or quotas 
on quantity of farm products produced); 
(c) or whether to rely on making farm labor 
more mobile, 
Summary and Conclusion. In focusing a cold eye on economic projections 
this article may appear somewhat more negative and pessimistic than is 
intended. It is a sign of boundless confidence in our ability to increase farm 
output that we look forward to the future in agriculture with something less 
than unqualified enthusiasm. Food will continue to be the main use of farm 
products. Aggregate food demand is not easily lifted. Any larger percentage 
gains in nonfood outlets, although more spectacular, would not require large 
resources. And although food and nonfood needs will increase, resources 
are becoming ever more fully available to agriculture from non-farm sources. 
Yet most surplus problems involve marginal quantities -- relatively small 
ones. Consequently, marginal achievements in stepping up demand could 
have significant results. 
Any measures to tap the high-income market for high quality foods that 
hold promise of success should be undertaken. At the other income extreme, 
our still great unmet needs for food -- needs largely outside the commercial 
market -- could perhaps be converted to demand through devices such as a 
food allotment or food stamp plan. We can only hope for and support all 
effort toward building a larger demand, and applaud all positive achievements. 
Beyond that, I have only two general concluding observations: 
(1) Agriculture remains highly concerned with how successful 
we are as a nation in achieving steady real economic growth, 
as the extent of that growth is more important than any narrow 
11 
concern with agriculture's share of it; and rate of 
growth of population is of primary cons ide ration. 
(2) Expansion of demand for farm products will not 
be of a scale to relieve agriculture of its own economic 
problems. As our economic society becomes more 
and more complex; as more and more marketing 
functions interpose between the farmer and consumer; 
as farm and non-farm resources become more freely 
interchangeable in farm production; as our pricing 
system becomes more distant from one of free 
competition: as all these happen, farm problems of 
the day will need to be dealt with daily, not postponed 
to a millenium described at the right hand edge of our 
charts. 
12 
DISCUSSION OF THE BREIMYER PAPER 
Francis A. Kutish 
The first part of Mr. Breimyer's paper is concerned with a definition 
of Demand. With this, there can be little quarrel. 
Mr. Breimyer then launches into an evaluation of prospects for the 
future on the last three pages of his paper. His evaluation of both the 
agricultural production potential and demand potential follow the lines 
of most of the thinking of today -- and again there can be no quarrel. 
There are one or two points I would like to raise however: The 
percentage of the consumer's income spent for meat has remained between 
five and six percent. Income elasticities are low, and income has been 
rtstng. This might lead us to expect that the percentage spent for meat 
would have been declining. What is the prospective increase in demand 
for meat in the future? Is it proportional to income as in the past, or is 
it much less than this as indicated by your income elasticities? I would 
like also to ask what is the estimate of rapidity of the de-cline in the per 
capita demand for pork? Is it as rapid as the increase in the population 
in the United States? Is the total demand for pork in the United States 
increasing, stationary, or decreasing? 
While presenting the paper, Mr. Breimyer strayed from the printed copy 
to make the observation that the ability to improve quality and to separate 
products into different products as a result, might offer a means by which 
farm income could be increased. Mr. Breimyer referred to the case of 
General Motors: The demand for automobiles could be satisfied by 
constructing nothing but Chevrolet automobiles. But by separating the 
market into demands for Buick, Cadillac, Oldsmobile, Pontiac automobiles 
as well as for Chevrolets, General Motors has been able to extract more 
money in total from consumers. Much of the improvement in quality in 
farm products might likewise result in possibilities of separating into 
different markets. 
The question is this: how much of the improved quality in agricultural 
products would involve additional non-farm resources and how much would 
involve the production of a higher quality product from the farm? If the 
improved quality is largely the former, most of the additional income that 
is brought in will accrue to the providers of non-farm resources who 
incorporate this additional quality. If it is a result of higher quality products 
Francis A. Kutish is professor of economics, Department of Economics and 
Sociology, Iowa State College. 
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coming from the farm, this then would result in more of the returns 
reverting back to the farmers. For example, prime beef sells to a 
different market and for more money than does good beef. The farmer 
is the beneficiary of the higher price obtained for the higher quality 
product. But steel producers do not get any more returns from the steel 
which goes into Cadillacs than they do for the steel that goes into Chevrolets. 
The main difference is the result of changes which are made in the 
manufacturing process (the addition of chrome and a few other coverings 
of this nature). Benefits from the separation of the market and the pro-
duction of the higher quality market here go entirely to the processor of 
the product. Much the same result prevails when market agencies process 
meat and other farm products into higher quality products. On the other 
hand, if farmers produce a higher quality product and the market expands 
as a result of this, then the producer is more apt to benefit. 

15 
INCREASING THE DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR FARM PRODUCTS 
BY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
H. M. Southworth 
Our topic this morning is government programs to increase domeBtic 
demand for farm products. However, I understand that next week's 
speaker will discuss advertising and other forms of promotion for farm 
products, and a later speaker new and expanded industrial uses. This 
limits us this morning chiefly to what have been referred to as "distribution 
programs'': actual purchase and distribution of commodities by the 
Government, sometimes referred to as "direct distribution"; and subsidies 
to their movement through ordinary marketing channels, like the present 
School Lunch Program and the former Food Stamp Plan. 
With regard to such programs, I shall argue that they do not appear to me 
likely under present conditions to contribute importantly to solution of the 
farm surplus problem -- a conclusion in which I agree with the position taken 
by Willard Cochrane in his paper given here last fall. 
In this connection, I recommend to you the study by Cochrane 1 s group at 
Minnesota, a report of the first part of which is nearing publication. 1/ 
An advance draft of this report was made available to me. You will find tn 
it a much more rigorous and searching analysis of this morning's topic than 
I am able to present. 
As background for today' s discuss ion, however, I should like first to 
summarize briefly our experience with programs of this kind in the United 
States: the chief types that have been used or proposed, and the circumstances 
that gave rise to them. Then I should like to suggest certain economic 
characteristics that seem to me important for understanding how they operate 
and what effects they accomplish. 
Historical Origins of Distribution Programs. Historically, the so- called 
"distribution programs" were a phenomenon of the Great Depression of the 
thirties -- a response to the paradox of unmarketable surpluses of foods at 
the same time that large numbers of people were hungry. With nearly 25 
percent of the labor force unemployed in 19 33, the federal government bought 
H. M. Southworth is professor of agricultural economics, Department of 
Economics and Sociology, Pennsylvania State University. 
1/ Wetmore, John M.; Abel, Martin E.; Learn, Elmer W.; and Cochrane, 
Willard W. "Expanding the Demand for Farm Food Products in the United States. 
Part I- -History and Potential". Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station 
Technical Bulletin. 
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up surplus foods and gave them to the prople in the bread lines and on the 
relief rolls. This emergency purchase and distribution program was 
initially carried out by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. In 
19 35, Section 32 of Public Law 320 made available 30 percent of customs 
revenues as a continuing appropriation to be used to encourage the export-
ationand the domestic consumption of agricultural commodities, and 
operation of distribution programs was shifted into the Department of 
Agriculture as the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation. 
Unemployment in the late thirties continued chronically in the neighborhood 
of 8 to 10 million. Farm prices continued low in spite of production controls, 
and efforts to support farm prices continued to require removing substantial 
surpluses from the market. Considerable interest and ingenuity in the 
Department was directed towards devising broader and better approaches 
to the problem of subsidizing fhe consumption of farm surpluses by people 
of low income. The two most important programs adopted were the 
School Lunch Program and the Food Stamp Plan, 
The School Lunch Program began as a special outlet for the surplus foods 
that were taken off the market by the federal government. During the war 
it was made a permanent program with the basis of operation shifted partly 
to cash grants instead of direct allotments of surplus foods. It continues 
as a separate program today. 
The Food Stamp Plan was designed from the start as a means of subsidizing 
food purchases through regular commercial channels, rather than the purchase 
of surpluses and their distribution through public welfare agencies. Initiated 
in 1939 as an experiment, it received wide public acceptance and spread 
rapidly, but in 1943 it was discontinued as wartime conditions largely abolished 
the need for it. 
A number of minor programs also were undertaken before the war for the 
expansion of domestic consumption, including a low-cost milk program, a 
cotton mattress program, and a (Cotton Stamp Plan. Of these, the low-
cost milk program has its counterpart today in the Special Milk Program 
conducted in connection with school lunches. It is the one of chief interest 
for our present analysis from the standpoint of its mechanics of operation. 
Operations under the various food distribution programs at the start of the 
war are summarized in table 1, along with costs in a recent year for compari-
son. The prewar programs included in addition various cotton distribution 
programs, estimated to have cost in 1941 around $40 million. Inclusion of 
this amount would bring total expenditures at that time to around $200 million, 
or about half of the current-dollar amount of the 1957 programs. 
The Food Stamp Plan at its height replaced much of the direct :purchase and 
distribution of surpluses. The latter program was kept in operation throughout 
17 
the war, however, as a market support device, expecially for perishables, 
and continues in this role today. The dominant importance of school 
lunches among the present programs is evident from the table, both in its 
right and as an outlet for surplus purchases. 
Economic Analysis of Distribution Programs. How does one go about the 
comparative analysis and appraisal of these various measures for subsidizing 
increased consumption of agricultural commodities, or of new proposals 
that may be offered along similar lines? We should recognize at the start 
three aspects of them that are relevant: the political, the administrative, 
and the economic. My direct concern here will be with the economic; to 
the extent that I do turn to the other two aspects it will be chiefly as they 
condition or limit the operation from an economic standpoint. 
From an economic standpoint, a chief distinguishing characteristic is how 
alternative programs deal with what has been called the "problem of 
substitution.' 1 To what extent does consumption under the program really 
Table 1. Food Distribution and School Lunch Programs: 
Federal cost, fiscal years 1941-42 and 1957. 
Program 
Direct distribution to institutions 
and welfare cases 
Food stamp 
School Lunch 
Direct distribution 
Indemnity plan 
Low cost milk 
Relief milk 
School milk 
TOTAL 
1/ Special Milk Program 
Source: Agricultural Statistics 
Year ending June --
1941 1942 1957 
66.7 
82.8 
13.1 
1.5 
0.6 
164.7 
(million dollars) 
26.1 
111.6 
21.9 
2.4 
1.5 
163.5 
104.4 
146.6 
83.9 
6o.5 1/ 
395.5 
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constitute an increase? To what extent do the beneficiaries merely 
substitute it for what they would have consumed anyway in the absence of 
a program? 
The same question is argued currently in connection with some of our 
foreign-aid programs. What assurance do we have that wheat supplied to 
India, for example, free or at a reduced price, is actually over and above 
the wheat that India would have bought from us without such a program? 
An analogy closer to home is provided by the Soil Bank. It is often asserted 
that acreage put into the Soil Bank is in land that the farmer did not intend 
to plant anyway, or is at least in his poorest land, or in land that seemed 
doomed to crop failure; so that the program does not begin to achieve its 
objective of cutting down production until it passes the size at which such 
land has been taken out. Similarly, a program that distributes surplus 
apples or grapefruit to people is not likely actually to increase consumption 
much until they are given more apples or grapefruit than they would have 
bought anyway. 
A program that consists simply of Government purchase of commodities 
and distribution of them to people has no adequate means ci. dealing with 
this 11 substitution problem. 11 Recipients can be required to swear or 
certify that the commodities will not be substituted for "normal" purchases. 
This is perhaps most likely to be effective in the case of distribution to 
eleemosynary institutions and the like. We customarily require assurances 
of this sort in connection with the foreign aid programs referred to. But 
even with institutional outlets it is difficult to set up realistic tests of what 
the "normal" purchases would be. 
Particularly is this true with a continuing program under which the distri-
butions through the program are received year after year and come to be, 
as a practical matter, part of the 11 normal11 source of supply of the recipients. 
To determine in such a case what consumption would have been without the 
program becomes not only difficult but somewhat irrelevant -- it does not 
involve a realistic alternative. (Unless, of course, discontinuance of the 
program is actually contemplated, in which case the shoe is on the other 
foot.) 
School Lunch Program. 2 1 Analysis of the School Lunch Program reveals 
the difficulties that arise. School lunches were originally promoted, as 
previously indicated, through making rfoods available under the direct 
distribution program. Since at the start schools serving lunches were 
the exception rather than the rule, most of the distribution was to new lunch 
programs, in schools where lunches had not been served before. Hence 
there was an a priori case that the distributions constituted an increase in 
consumption of the foods that were supplied -- and, even, indeed, that they 
brought about increased consumption of other foods,· in :that ·a satisfactory 
lunch program could hardly be operated solely with the free surplus foods. 
2/ Southworth, H. M. and Klagman, M. I., "The School Lunch Program and 
Agricultural Surplus Disposal 11 Mise. Publ. No. 467, U. S. Department of 
Agriculture, 1941. 
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The question was raised, of course, to what extent the lunches at school 
merely substituted for lunches that the children would otherwise have been 
provided by their families. But the program began in a time of economic 
depression, when it was evident that quite a number of children simply had 
no lunch at home, and that for many others lunch was most meager o Emphasis 
was placed upon requiring that the lunches be served free or at a reduced 
price to children lacking the money to pay the regular price. And it was, 
I think, generally agreed that the expenditure under the program did represent 
at least in large part an increase rather than a substitution in consumption. 
Meanwhile, the lunch program fit in with the currect educational trends. 
With larger schools, and especially with consolidated schools serving 
children from an extensive district, many of whom come by bus, organized 
provision for the children's lunches is obviously a necessity. The program 
that helped meet this necessity was immensely popular o It grew rapidly, 
and it came soon to be looked upon not just as a means for disposing of 
surplus foods but more as a program important to the general social welfare o 
With the onset of the war, the problem of surpluses diminished, and the 
decline of unemployment did away with the free WPA Labor that State 
Welfare agencies had depended upon to man their food distribution facilities. 
Beginning in 1943, the program was shifted increasingly to a cash indemnity 
basis, and in 1946 it was given independent legislative authority in the 
National School Lunch Act (PoLo 396, 79th Cong. ), with responsibility for 
it shared between the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Office of 
Education. 
Eligibility for payments was made dependent upon serving lunches meeting 
specified quality standards, thus making the federal aid an incentive to a 
higher level of food consumption that might 'otherwise prevaiL But basically 
the program has become an integral part of an accepted and enduring institu-
tional pattern, within which the question of continuing it is not, in my 
judgement, likely to turn on its effectiveness in expanding the consumption of 
agricultural commodities. 
Low-Cost Milk Program. 31 Associated with the School Lunch Program 
currently is the Special Milk Program, initiated in 1954, through which extra 
milk is made available to children at a reduced price, either at lunch or at 
''milk breaks" at other times during the day. This is a revival of the prewar 
Low-Cost Milk Program. That plan, operated' from 1940 to 1943 in several 
large cities under Federal Milk Marketing Orders, made milk available at 
a reduced price both to school children and to public assistance families - the 
3/ Sullivan, W. G. "The Relief Milk-Distribution Program". U 0 S 0 Department 
of Agriculture, Bureau of Agriculture Economics, Nov 0, 1942. (mimeo) 
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latter, in most cities, through special depots. The reduced price 
was made possible by producers' accepting less thanfhe established 
Class I price for milk, by dealers' contracting to handle it at less 
than their customary margin, and by a federal subsidy to close the 
remaining gap. 
In such a program the ''substitution problem" turns upon the extent to 
which participants increase consumption in response to the lower 
price -- in economic language, upon the "elasticity with respect to 
price" of their demand. Most studies have indicated that the general 
demand for fluid milk is relatively inelastic with respect to price --
that the chief response to price reduction is reduced expenditure 
rather than increased consumption. Surveys made in connection with the 
low-cost milk program, however, found substantial increase in 
participants' consumption in most cities. Many people who previously 
bought no milk were induced to buy it at the low price. The results 
suggested that demand among the low-income group was perhaps elastic, 
and certainly much less inelastic than for the population at large. 
General Price Subsidies. If this is generally true, it is a significant 
fact for programs to increase consumption. The simplest way, of course, 
to subsidize consumption of a product is for the government to make 
payments at some convenient point in the marketing channel that permit 
a reduction in the price to all buyers. Such subsidies were used for a 
number of foods during the war as an adjunct of price control or as an 
incentive to increased production. The much-argued Brannan Plan, 
likewise, involved essentially this approach. 
Such a plan has the great merit of administrative simplicity. But from 
the standpoint of the increase in consumption that can be achieved with a 
given government expenditure, a general price subsidy is quite inefficient 
for any commodity or group of commodities with highly inelastic demand. 
The subsidy will result chiefly in consumers' saving on expenditures, rather 
than increasing their consumption. (The similal;."ity of this to the "substitution 
problem" is apparent.) The domestic demand for all farm products, or 
for all food products, as well as for many individual farm products --
including some of those in serious surplus, like wheat -- is probably in 
this category. A large supply brings less in the market than a small supply. 
But if one can separate out particular groups of consumers -- such as 
those of low income -- whose demand is more elastic than the average, and 
can devise a subsidy that reduces the price to them only, the government 
money is much more efficiently spent. The advantage works in two ways 
The beneficiaries of the reduced price will respond chiefly by consuming 
more, thus increasing the market demand. And in the process they will 
be helping bid up the price to the rest of the consuming public, who (their 
demand being inelastic) will respond chiefly by spending more rather than 
the curtailing consumption. Through this effect upon the general market, 
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a well designed discriminative pricing scheme can increase returns 
(including subsidy) by more than the amount spent on subsidizing the 
reduced price to the favored group, 
Food Stamp Plan.4 / This was the aim of the low-cost milk program, It 
was likewise, in essence, the basic principle of the Food Stamp Plan, 
The idea of the low- cost milk program was orignially suggested not just 
for milk but as a general plan for use with any surplus commodities, It 
was proposed that persons on relief or other public assistance be per-
mitted to buy such products at a reduced price, the difference to be made 
up through government reimbursement of the sellers. This ''two-price" 
proposal met a hostile public reception, and was quietly dropped, Some 
months later the Food Stamp Plan was proposed, and apparently was 
popular from the start, 
The Stamp Plan was not a "two-price" plan as such, But it had, to the 
economist, striking similarity; At any rate, it was designed specifically 
to deal with the 11 substitution'' problem, 
In fact-' persons whose chief interest in it was as a welfare, rather than 
an agricultural, measure objected to it for this very reason, The plan 
undertook, through a device that I shall describe in a moment, to make 
sure that the subsidy made available to participants should be spent 
solely for food, and indeed for specific foods designated as being in surplus, 
Social welfare people objected that for many of the recipients increased 
food consumption was not the only crying need, and that cash grants that 
recipients would be free to use also for better housing, better clothing, 
or more of other necessities would make a greater contribution to their 
welfare, The likelihood that comparable appropriations could be obtained 
for a system of cash grants appeared small at that time" however, whereas 
the Stamp Plan had the tangible support of agriculture and the food trades, 
So such objections were largely ignored -- a case, perhaps, of political 
considerations over-riding economic ones, 
The essence of the Food Stamp Plan was the following device, Persons 
eligible for participation were offered the opportunity to obtain, free of 
charge, blue-colored stamps good for the purchase of specified foods at 
their local grocery store, To avail themselves of this opportunity, 
however, they had to buy orange-colored stamps, likewise redeemable in 
foods (in this case any foods) at their grocery, Only people of low income 
usually those on public relief or WPA employment rolls - ,_ were eligible 
4/ Gold, Norman Leon; Hoffman, A. G,; and Waugh, Frederick V, "Econ-
omic Analysis 6f the Food Stamp Plan, 11 Special Report, U, S, Department 
of Agriculture, Oct, 1940, 
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to participate. And the amount they were required to invest in the 
orange stamps was calculated to correspond to the amount of money that 
persons of low income would normally spend for food. 
The orange-and- blue-stamp device provided means of assuring that partici-
pants in the program would continue to spend money out of their own pockets 
for food - an amount as near to their previous level of expenditures as could 
be specified through the orange- stamp purchase requirement. Thus partici-
pants were prevented from substituting the grants for their own "normal" 
purchases. (This was reinforced by requiring communities in which the Plan 
was introduced to guarantee that their own relief allowances would not be 
curtailed.) 
The restriction on the commodities that could be bought with the free blue 
stamps was further intended to direct the subsidy chiefly to those foods speci-
fied as being in surplus. Here, however, politics again intruded upon 
economics. For such a restriction to be effective, obviously, the list of 
foods purchaseable with the blue stamps would have needed to be kept small, 
else recipients would be able to spend all their blue stamps without going 
over the quantities of the specified commodities that they would have chosen 
to buy anyway without the restriction. But a great many industry groups 
were successful in insisting that their products be declared in surplus, with 
the result that during much of the Plan's operation so many different foods 
could be bought with the blue ·stamps that it is doubtful the restriction had 
much effect. 
The Food Stamp Plan was initiated in Rochester, New York, in May of 1939. 
Within three years it had expanded to areas that included over half the 
population of the United States, and expenditures on it had come to exceed 
those for direct distribution, including the distribution to school lunches 
(see again table 1). 
There was some experimentation with variations of it. One involved varying 
the orange-stamp purchase requirement 1D more closely represent "normal" 
expenditure levels of different classes of participants -- taking account 
expecially of family size -- with a view to closer control of the 11 substitution 
problem". Another was to offer participants additional free blue stamps 
if they bought more than the minimum requirement of orange stamps --
with the object of multiplying the increase in consumption. I have mentioned 
that participation was in general limited to persons on relief or other 
public assistance. Another experiment was to open it to all persons below 
a specified standard of income. 
A proposal discussed but· never attempted was to redeem the: stamps to 
retailers at less than face value -- on the ground that the stamp business 
represented an increase in volume that the retailer should find it worth his 
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while to handle at less than his regular margin. Such an arrangement was 
used, as I indicated, in the low-cost milk program, as a device to make the 
government expenditure go farther. 
Growth of the program, and elaboration of it along lines such as I have 
indicated, brought administrative headaches. Ingenious persons found ways 
of chiseling, requiring a policy system. Managing the stamps presented 
increasing problems as their volume grew. Banks became less gracious 
about handling them without making a special service charge. 
Thrtrermore~ some agricultural people suspected that the program was more a 
welfare than an agricultural device, and as such should not be charged wholly 
against the agricultural appropriation. Not all of them were convinced by 
the economists 1 explanations that the Plan was an efficient use of funds for 
expanding markets and supporting prices o Actual purchase of a farm product 
by a government buyer in a primary market is a tangible act that a farmer 
can see and believe -- regardless of arguments that the price effect of the 
purchase may be largely nullified because of the ''substitution problem. 11 
Food Allotment Plan. S/ Wartime disappearance both of food surpluses and 
of unemployment, however, was the reason for discontinuance of the 
program in 1943, There simply was no longer sufficient need for it. 
Following the war, the question was raised of reviving the Food Stamp Plan, 
and an improved version of it was proposed: the National Food Allotment 
Plan, legislation for which was recurrently introduced by Senator Aiken, of 
Vermont, and others. This proposal was designed to enable everyone to 
afford an adequate diet at a cost commensurate with his means. It provided, 
first, that the cost of such a diet be determined periodically, on the basis 
of the nutritive standards of the National Research Council interpreted in 
terms of customary consumption patterns, which might be varied by locality. 
Then it provided that any person ~should be permitted to buy stamps or 
certificates, good for the purchase of foods, equal in value to the cost thus 
determined, but paying for them a specified percentage of his income. This 
got away from the necessity under the Food Stamp Plan of requiring a means 
test as the basis of participation. Obviously, participation would have no 
appeal to people whose income was high enough that they were already 
buying an adequate diet for less than the certificates would cost them. But 
for lower-income people it would offer an opportunity to increase their food 
consumption. And at the s arne time it offered similar protection to that of 
the Stamp Plan against the substitution of grants for the participant 1 s normal 
expenditure. 
5/ SeeS. 1151, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (June, 1945) and similar bills in 
subsequent sessions o 
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The Allotment Plan would also be self-adjusting to changing economic 
conditions. With spreading unemployment, such as was experienced last 
year, more people would find it worthwhile to participate, and the program 
would automatically expand to cushion the reduction in food-purchasing 
power. (It might also, of course, tend to accentuate inflationary forces 
pushing up food prices, in that the level of benefits under the program would 
go up correspondingly; but such an "escalator" arrangement can be argued 
for in terms of the need to protect the diets of low-income people againsLthe 
impact of inflation. ) 
The proposal was intended chiefly as a general expander of food consumption, 
rather than a device for moving specific surpluses. But it could obviously 
be made to serve the latter end by earmarking certain of the certificates 
for specific commodities, to the extent that for-ced increase in consumption 
of them could be reconciled with the nutritional objectives. Dairy products, 
for example, would seem a likely candidate for such favored treatment. 
A program of this kind would appear in principle to have considerable merit, 
both from the standpoint of agriculture and from the standpoint of general 
welfare. Yet it has never, so far as :I know, been in imminent prospect of 
enactment. Even proposals for limited experimentation with such a plan 
have not been considered seriously. 
The first reason why the proposal has aroused little interest was indicated 
by Cochrane in his presentation last fall: at the levels of consumer income 
and food consumption that have prevailed since the war, it is hard to make 
out a convincing case for it on welfare grounds. Cochrane stated last fall, 
and the study that his group is about to publish will further document, that 
the people of the United States could all be provided an adequate diet at a 
''moderate-cost" level -- one using "food combinations consistent with food 
expenditures and preference of middle income families 11 -- without increasing 
the index of all food consumption, nor the demand for farm resources to 
produce the food. In fact, his calculations result in some decrease in both 
these items. This finding is consoling for the longer view that anticipates 
population growth as ultimately outrunning food supplies. But it is hardly 
promising as offering short-run hope for demand expansion through programs 
to improve nutrition. 
If everyone ate a "liberal- cost diet'', Cochrane 1 s group finds, this would 
"come close to eliminating the current level of agricultural surplus." This, 
however, is not a "better" diet from a nutritive standpoint. It means 
getting the same nutritional intake as with the moderate-cost diet, but from 
sources higher on the hog. Educating the public to a luxurious standard of 
food consumption might be an acceptable goal of adverti~ing and promotion, 
which you may wish to discuss next week. But in the present state of public 
morals it would hardly be acceptable as the goal of public subsidies to food 
distribution that are justified in the name of welfare needs, which is what we 
are concerned with this afternoon. 
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Here ,we have, I think, the basic difficulty with programs to subsidize food 
consumption as solutions to the present agricultural problem. These 
programs were born in depression, and in depression they made sense. 
Large numbers of people were hungry, yet farm products were going begging 
in the markets. Distribution had broken down. The situation cried out for 
ways of bridging this gap, of getting the fuod into the hands of the people who 
needed it. Welfare aims and agricultural aims went hand in hand. Restrict-
ing farm production could be justified only as a temporizing measure. 
Increasing consumption obviously was the basic need. 
Since the war, this has not been the situation. We have surpluses. But we 
do not have any large number of hungry people in the United States who 
are in obvious urgent need of them. 
And even in case depression should again strike there would not be the 
justification for food distribution programs that there was in the thirties. 
We now have extensive programs of benefits to cushion the effects of 
unemployment. How effective they are was demonstrated last year, when 
consumer purchasing power remained high in spite of a sharp increase in 
unemployment. And politically it seemed clear that had the recession been 
prolonged additional ana more vigorous measures would have been adopted 
for supporting the purchasing power of consumers. 
The social workers who, back in 1940, futilely objected to the Fpod Stamp 
Plan on the grounds that the poor should have cash grants rather than 
subsidies earmarked for foods seem to have won their point in the final 
outcome. 
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INCREASING DOMESTIC DEMAND FOR FARM PRODUCTS 
BY ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION 
Robert M. Walsh 
I. Two questions immediately are raised by the topic, 11Increas ing the 
Domestic Demand for Farm Products by Advertising and Promotion, 11 The 
first question is, can demand be increased by promotional activities? The 
second, can such increase in demand, if any, be measured precisely? 
On the basis of evidence now available, the answer to both questions is a 
qualified and partial yes, For single commodities, and for ahort-term 
promotional activities, as will be demonstrated later, a positive but fairly 
short-lived response can be shown, But little evidence is available on the 
effects of sustained promotional activity on the demand for farm products, 
either singly or in the aggregate, 
One phase of the problem may be defined as that of shifting the demand curve 
to the right; that is, increasing demand, either for a short time or for a 
longer period through advertising and btheh promotion. Some economists 
have stated an alternative requirement -- making the demand for a product 
more inelastic, so that conaumers will make repeat purchases almost 
without regard to the price and income situation. The latter requirement 
appears to have particular application to brand products where unique product 
differentiation is sought. But complete product differentiation is rarely 
achieved, except for very short periods, 
A second phase of the problem is to determine the magnitude of coats in 
relationship to the benefits of advertising and other promotional activities, 
Even this phase is more complicated than it sounds. There is a real 
possibility that expenditures for advertising and other promotion may bring 
social gains in addition to gains in sales -- aocial gains measured not solely 
in terms of employment but in terms of improvement in living standards for 
society as a whole, 
As a special case to the general requirement of inducing a shift in the demand 
curve to the right, we may have no apparent shift in the demand curve, or a 
negative one, where the force of advertising andothe'r promotion for competing 
products may be as great as or greater than that for the product or product 
group being studied. Yet, even under these circumstances, the advertising 
and other promotion for product A, let 1s say, may have been quite successful, 
Robert M. "'WaTsh is Chief, Market Development Branch, Agricultural Market-
ing Service, U, S, Department of Agriculture, 
28 
for without it the demand curve for A might well have shifted to the left, 
even disastrously so. Our domestic society is highly competitive, and 
the special case may occur so frequently that it tends to become the 
general rule. This is primarily what makes the determination of advertising 
effectiveness so difficult. Either we must accept the benefits on faith, as 
most adherents do, or we must diligently seek out and measure all the demand 
factors and counterfactors operating in the domestic market on the product 
or product group with which we are concerned. 
Let's pause for a moment to define what we mean when we talk about 
advertising and other promotional activities. We mean to include every 
phase of promotion. Thus we include paid advertising for newspapers, 
magazines, radio, television, billboards, car posters, direct mail, and so 
on. We also include public relations activities with handouts to such media 
as newspapers, radio and television, and the creation of newsworthy events. 
Further, we include the use of dealer-service agents to contact and assist 
retailers in pushing products or product groups; and the furnishing of in- store 
promotional materials such as display cards and banners, recipes, and 
shelf-talkers. Educational groups, such as agricultural extension agents, 
home economists, and human nutritionists, frequently are found in support-
ing roles, though not included in our definition of advertising and other 
promotion. 
The development of new or improved products for introduction in the market 
is definitely a dynamic merchandising activity. The demand for citrus 
products, to cite an example, probably has been increased in the past 
several years, particularly during the 1940us, fully as much by the intro-
duction of frozen concentrated orange juice, frozen concentrated lemonade, 
and other processed products as by all promotional activities combined. 
In fact, it would be almost impossible to segregate the effects of advertising 
and innovation. 
For simplicity, let's refer to advertising and other promotion as "advertising," 
"promotion," or "promotional activities, 11 including everything above 
except new-product introductions and strictly educational efforts. 
IL So, we talk about ''advertising" or ''promotion." How important is it 
in the domestic ecoromy? According to the magazine Printers u Ink1 I, the 
total advertising bill in the United States was $10.3 billion in 1957, and 
in 1958 it was 1 to 2 percent less, or in round numbers about $10 billion. 
These figures purport to cover all advertising expense, including the cost 
of advertising departments and point-of-pu-rchase promotional materials, as 
well as amounts paid to agencies for advertising through newspapers, 
1/ Printers u Ink Advertiseru s Guide to Marketing for 1957, 1958, and 
1959 (separate issues). 
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magazines, farm publications, business or trade papers, radio, 
television, direct mail, outdoor signs, car posters, and other media. The 
figures apparently do not, however, include expenditures for dealer-service 
agents (not salesmen) or for public-relations activities. No firm estimates 
are available as to the total cost of dealer-service and public-relations 
activities, but, if an additi.onal 10 percent can be accepted as a reasonable 
guess, another billion dollars would be added to the annual advertising 
bill. 
Printers' Ink gives a breakdown of the approximately $10- billion advertising 
bill for 1957 (excluding dealer service and public relations) as follows: 
Newspapers, 32 percent; direct mail, 14 percent; television, 13 percent; 
national magazines, 8 percent; radio, 6 percent; business papers, 5 percent; 
and outdoor, 2 percent. An additional 20 percent is grouped under the 
heading, "miscellaneous." This evidently includes expenditures in some 
of the minor media and, more importantly, cost of advertising departments 
and point-of-purchase materials. 
Significantly, no estimate is available of the cost of developing and 
introducing new consumer products into the market. This cost must run 
into several billion dollars annually. 
Expenditures for promotion of agricultural products, including those by 
manufacturers, distributors, and farm groups, represent a substantial 
part of the total bill. Food and food products accounted for 21 percent of 
the total media expenditures by "millionaire advertisers" in 1957, according 
to Printers 1 Ink . Advertising firms or groups spending a million dollars 
a year or more probably are not completely representative of all advertisers, 
but in 1957 they did account for nearly two-thirds of total time and space 
costs in major media. Consequently, it may be said that total advertising 
expenditures for foods, food beverages, and confections in 1957 were in 
the neighborhood of $2 billion. Nonfood agricultural products, such as 
textiles, tobacco products, alcoholic beverages, and soaps, would boost 
this total by at least a billion dollars. 
The bulk of agricultural-product advertising is sponsored by manufacturers 
and distributors. However, farmers themselves are taking an increasing 
interest in the advertising game. The Agricultural Marketing Service of 
USDA is now tabulating results of a survey covering 1958 advertising 
expenditures of farmer- sponsored groups, such as volunteer promotional 
associations, farmer cooperative marketing associations, and State 
advertising commissions and boards. Preliminary and unofficial returns 
at this time indicate a total advertising expenditure for all agricultural 
products by such groups of around 74 million dollars in 1958. Included in 
this total were sums spent by agricultural groups for dealer- service and 
public- relations activities, amounting in the aggregate to about 42 million 
dollars. These rough indications are based on returns from over 900 
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respondents, representing possibly 85 percent of total expenditures by 
farmer- supported groups. The final tabulations will include returns from 
some additional respondents, and the estimated expenditures may be revised 
somewhat in the official report from those given here. 
Here, then, are the magnitudes of the advertising venture, expressed in 
dollars. Total advertising, as reported annually in Printers' Ink, has 
increased twice as rapidly as the Gross National Product since 1940. 
Advertising is an established institution in our economy. 
IlL Manufacturers and distributors of brand items obviously must continue 
to advertise if they are to survive. What is not obvious is the position of 
agricultural groups wishing to enter the advertising field. Can it be said, 
either on theoretical or on factual grounds, that product advertising on a 
broad scale, as for beef, lamb, apples, grapefruit, or potatoes--without 
brand-name differentiation--is necessary or desirable? 
Advertising may be SEparated into two broad categories: brand-name and 
product. It is possible to measure the effects of brand-name advertising 
through such simple devices as the cash register (where the company keeps 
close watch of sales); through retail sales reports such as those furnished 
by the Nielsen service; and through consumer purchase reports. In the last 
two, it is possible to compare sales results for brand A, for example, with 
results for other leading brands of the same commodity. Ups and downs in 
brand A's share of the market can usually be measured and compared with 
advertising activity. 
Product advertising, without brand or other major differentiation, is 
primarily what we are concerned with in this discussion. Not many studies 
have been made in this field, although two recent papers illustrate an 
awakening interest in it. Z/ One paper has to do with consumer attitudes 
toward food advertising, and the other is a mathematical treatment of the 
subject of sales response to advertising. In the latter, three concepts are 
used to build a mathematical model. These are ( 1) the sales decay constant, 
(2) the sales saturation level, and (3) the sales response constant. The 
authors state that test promotions, under specified conditions, give results 
that are significant and reproducible, though the degree of accuracy attainable, 
they state, is smaller than ordinarily cons ide red acceptable in many other 
fields of research. This is an interesting report, but unfortunately it fails 
to give results of the experimental work described. Much additional work 
combining theoretical and statistical approaches would appear desirable, 
2/ "Consumers Believe They Are Influenced by Newspaper Food Advertise-
ments," James Duncan Shaffer, Michigan State University. (5 pp. mimeo.), 
Ag. Econ. 740, Dec. 1, 1958. Also, "An Operations-Research Study of Sales 
Response to Advertising," M. L. Vidale and H. B. Wolfe, Operations 
Research, pp. 370 - 381. 5: 3, June, 1957. 
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The Market Development Branch of the Agricultural Marketing Service, 
USDA, is doing some work in this areao For purposes of discussion, 
that work is described in some detail below o 
IVo Such work has been going on for three to four years o Yet the surface 
has barely been scratchedo One could hardly expect broad principles to 
emerge in that time, particularly where many factors other than supply, price, 
income, advertising, and competitive forces must be consideredo Such 
other factors might include the number, kind, and quantities of substitutable 
products available, the newness or oldness of the product, past and current 
trends in consumption, the effects of innovations (as changing the form of 
the product), retail merchandising practices, and variations in quality factors 
and their effects on consumer preferences o 
Such surrounding, or ecological, factors often condition the effectiveness of 
advertising, and it is evident that a given advertising effort may have quite 
different results on different products or at different times o Trend, for 
example, can have an important influence. I£ consumption is trending upward, 
advertising may have more influence in shifting the demand curve to the 
right than if consumption is static or trending downwardo It may not be 
possible, in general, to say why this is so; each case must be examined in 
detail before conclusions can be reached o So it is probable that a large 
number of cases must be studied before general principles will begin to 
emerge. 
Five cases will be describedo Three of these relate to advertising in 
connection with new agricultural-product introductions, and two relate to 
intensified advertising efforts for established products. In each case, 
the advertising is essentially a "one-shot deal," representing a single 
promotional effort without sustained followup o This is not to say that the 
agencies sponsoring the advertising did not conduct followup campaigns; in 
some cases they dido But the study effort, in each case, was cut off follow-
ing the initial promotiono There is no doubt in the minds of those conducting 
the studies that evaluation of sustained programs is equally as important, if 
not more so, and as time goes on it should be possible to make such evaluations o 
One such followup study is now being undertakeno It must be remembered, 
however, that results will not come quickly, since observations covering 
many months and perhaps years will be neededo 
Essentially the same study techniques were used in the three cases concerned 
with testing market acceptance of new forms of agricultural products o The 
study techniques combined retail-store audits of sales and prices of the new 
and closely associated products with followup homemaker interviews to 
determine the incidence of awareness, purchase, and repeat purchase of the 
new product as well as like-and -dislike attitudes toward iL 
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The introductory campaigns also were conducted essentially in the same 
way in each case. A city of 100, 000 to 200, 000 population was chosen; 
retail stores were 11 saturated" with the new product (that is, as many 
stores as possible were induced to carry it, usually representing 90 percent 
or more of the total retail food trade of the city); a fairly intensive 
advertising campaign of 4 weeks was carried out, using newspaper ads, 
radio announcements, television demonstrations, in-store promotional 
materials and displays, store demonstrators in a few of the test stores, and 
publicity materials for newspapers, radio, and television. The advertising 
and merchandising activities were the responsibility of the trade and not of 
the study group. Nevertheless, the advertising and merchandising efforts 
were coordinated with the study plan. 
The new products studied were frozen grapefruit sections 3 /, 7anned 
precooked short-grain rice4/, and dehydrated potato flakes. 5 The first of 
these products was developed by the citrus processing industry, and the last 
two by utilization researchers of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. 
One result of the promotional campaign was clearly and abundantly 
demonstrated. And that was the phenomenal effect on sales of using in-store 
demonstrators. In every store where a demonstrator was present, even 
only one or two days a week, sales of the new products were several times 
higher than in other test store;s. And the higher sales tended to persist in 
such stores in the post-promotional periods studied. The use of demonstrators, 
obviously, is expensive. But under certain circumstances, where high 
initial consumer acceptance is desired, at least in a limited number of 
markets, the extra cost may be justified. 
There was no doubt that advertising aided in gaining consumer awareness of 
and initial acceptance of the new products. Sales of all 3 products shot up 
during the advertising period, but tapered off during succeeding weeks. 
Nevertheless sales were in "commercial quantities 11 during the post-
promotional period studied. 
By commercial quantities we mean sales per store equal to or better than the 
average of other frozen-food or grocery items. Sales of precooked rice in 
22 nondemonstration stores, having no special in- store displays, for example, 
were about as large as sales of other grocery items over the 19-week study 
period, including the 4 weeks of citywide promotion. That is, sales averaged 
3/ Frozen Grapefruit Sections - Evaluating a New Product by Retail Sales 
Audit and Household Survey, AMS, MRR No. 110, Dec. 1955. 
4/ Canned Cooked Rice - The Market Potential for a New Food Product, AMS, 
MRR No. 249, July 1958. 
5/ Potato Flakes - A New Form of Dehydrated Mashed Potatoes: Market 
Position and Consumer Acceptance in Binghamton, Endicott, and Johnson City, 
New York, AMS MRR No. 186, July 1957. 
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about one-third case (of 24 cans) per store per week., which was nearly 
the same as the average sales reported by Progressive Grocer for over 
4, 000 ite_ms in 6 supermarkets in Super Valu stores in the North Central 
region in 1957,6/ Average sales of the precooked rice in Fresno were almost 
identically equal to average sales for 11 dry-rice items in Super Valu stores 
in the North Central region. 
In the case of potato flakes, the entire quantity available was sold out in 
the fifth week, 1 week following promotion. 
The household surveys showed that consumer awareness of the product 
amounted to 50 percent in the case of frozen grapefruit sections, in Erie, Pa., 
in a period following the promotion campaign; '27 percent in the case of 
canned precooked rice in Fresno, Calif.; and 50 percent in the case of potato 
flakes in Binghamton-Endicott-Johnson City, N. Y. 
At the time of the surveys, about 30 percent of the aware consumers had 
bought frozen grapefruit sections, and about 70 percent of those had made 1 
or more repeat purchases. A third of the aware respondents had purchased 
precooked rice, and about 40 percent of those had made repeat purchases, 
And nearly 30 percent of the aware consumers had bought potato flakes, 
with a 60-percent repeat-purchase pattern. Potato flakes were on the 
market for only 5 weeks, whereas frozen grapefruit and precooked rice 
were available for considerably longer periods. Potato flakes were not 
available to consumers for a period of 3 weeks prior to interviewing. This 
probably expla'ins the slightly lower incidence of purchases for potato flakes 
compared with the other 2 products o 
The primary purpose of the advertising including the in- store demonstrations, 
was to make consumers quickly aware of the availability of the new product, 
so that the commercial feasibility might be evaluated in a comparatively 
short study period. About half of the householders were made aware of the 
new products in a period of 8 weeks from their introduction in the market, 
except for precooked rice, where only slightly more than a fourth were aware 0 
This indicates that the advertising, generally speaking, was successfully 
used as a study tool o 
In fact, one might say that advertising is an absolute essential in new 
product introductions. Retailers as a rule are reluctant to stock new 
products without assurance that the distributor will promote the products 
in an effective way. 
It may be of interest to note that frozen grapefruit sections are now being 
produced and distributed commercially, in competition with hot-pack canned 
sections and with chilled sections. The precooked rice tested is not in 
6/ Super Valu Study, published by the Progressive Grocer, New York, 1957 
(pp. 17-32). 
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commercial production; further work to improve the product is under way 
at the Western Utilization Research and Development Division of USDA. 
About 8 firms are producing potato flakes, using a number of varieties of 
raw potatoes, One firm is distributing the product -- a new form of instant, 
dehydrated mashed potatoes -- on a national basis, Another national 
distributor is making further market tests of the product. 
Additional studies of the effect of advertising on demand for farm products 
have been conducted by USDA, on sour cream and on lamb. The so-called 
surplus of dairy products has been concentrated chiefly in butter, evaporated 
milk, and nonfat milk solids. As shown in the accompanying slide -- AMS 
6506-58 ( 1) -- consumption per person of evaporated milk, cream, and butter 
declined significantly in a recent 1 0-year period. Consumption per person 
of cottage cheese, nonfat dry milk, cheese other than American, and 
condensed milk, on the other hand, increased by a third to three-quarters, 
Little change per person was shown in use of fresh whole milk, American 
cheese, and frozen desserts, 
In cooperation with the American Dairy Association, the Milk Industry 
Foundation, and local dairies, a study of the effectiveness of special 
promotion in increasing sales of cultured sour cream was carried out in 
Des Moines, Iowa, in August 1957. As shown in the slide -- AMS 4713-57 
(12) -- sales of sour cream attained a peak 59 percent higher than the base 
week in 1 of the 4 promotion weeks, and averaged perhaps 40 percent higher 
for the entire period. Subsequently, part of the gain was maintained, but 
it appears that much of this increase resulted from secular trend. After. 
adjustment for trend effect, the net gain attributable to advertising in August 
1957 was approximately 33 percent, and there apparently was a slight net 
gain in subsequent months. 
We may conclude that special promotional efforts will move additional 
quantities of good-quality, cultured sour cream. But what is the cost? And 
what is the longer-term effect on consumer demand? 
The dollar cost of the special promotion in the Des Moines metropolitan area 
in August 1957 apparently was between $5, 000 and $6, 000. On the other hand, 
the gross value of additional product sold was under $1, 000. Therefore, if 
the promotional program is to be considered a financial success, it must be 
in terms of consumer education in developing new tastes and new ways of 
usage, and hence in terms of long- run effects. Unfortunately, measurement 
of the long-run effects is a difficult undertaking for which analytical tools are 
not yet perfected. 
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Considerable effort has been expended to date in evaluating the effectiveness 
of promotio/1 programs for lamb and mutton, both in Sacramento 7 / and in 
Cleveland. 8 The promotional effort in Sacramento occurred at a time when 
lamb supplies were unexpectedly short -- both locally and nationally -- and 
prices of lamb were high in relation to prices of other meats. This is shown 
in the slide -- AMS 4380-57 (7), As a consequence sales of lamb declined. 
In the evaluation it was concluded that sales would have declined more than 
they did if it had not been for the promotion, This was based on an imputed 
price-elasticity of demand ranging from -4, 0 to -2. 0, As indicated in the 
slide -- AMS 4381-57 (7) -- sales might have been expected to decline around 
60 percent, with an elasticity of demand for lamb of -4,0, attributed to 
Ezekiel in the late 1920's, 9/ or to decline around 30 percent, with an 
elasticity of demand of -2. 0, attributed to Fox, 1953, 10/ Retail- store sales, 
as audited, actually declined about 20 percent during the promotion period 
from a pre-promotion benchmark, The promotion, therefore, was judged to 
be successful in shifting the demand curve for lamb. 
We can still have doubts, however. New methods of statistical analysis, 
in particular the method of simultaneous equations, might well yield different 
elasticities of demand for lamb, which pass ibly is in the neighborhood of 
-1.0 rather than ranging from -2 to -4. Moreover, one cannot be sure that 
a measure of elasticity for the country as a whole can be applied without 
misgiving to a single community. 
A different analytical technique was used in evaluating the special promotional 
campaign for lamb in Cleveland, carried out by the American Sheep Producers 
Council in July and August 1956, As in Sacramento, retail audits were made, 
as well as surveys of household consumers. These yielded interesting pieces 
of information, But the chief reliance was placed on a multiple correlation 
analysis based on 40 months of data covering the period before the special 
promotion. This analysis included wholesale sales of lamb in Cleveland as 
the dependent variable, and retail price of lamb, composite retail price of 
other meats and poultry, consumer earnings, seasonality, and retailers' 
newspaper advertising activities for lamb relative to all meats, as indepen-
dent variables. The composite retail price of other meats and poultry was 
found not to contribute significantly to the results. 
7/ Results of a Promotion Campaign for Lamb in Sacramento, Calif,, 
AMS, MRR No. 200, Oct. 1957, 
8/ Promotion of Lamb, Results of a Campaign in Cleveland, Ohio, AMS, 
MRR No. 292, Dec. 1958. 
9/ Ezekiel, Mordecai, "A Statistica~ Examination of Factors Relating to 
Lamb Prices," Journal of Political Economy, XXXV, 1927, 
10/ Fox, Karl A., The Analyses of Demand for Farm Products, USDA Tech. 
BuL 1081, 90 pp. 
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The equation was used to predict sales, as may be seen in the next slide --
AMS 8534-58 (9). Sales beyond the correlation period, those in May, June, 
July, August, S~ptember, and October, also were predicted. 
Actual sales and predicted values were compared for May and June 1956, the 
pre-preomotional months, with good results; and as indicated in the next slide, 
for the two promotional months, July and August, and the first .two post-
promotional months, September and October-- AMS 6525-58 (9). 
The results were rather curious, July, the first full month of special 
promotional activities, showed no significant difference between estimated 
and actual sales, at the 95 percent confidence leveL August, the second 
month of promotion, showed a significant increase of 14 percent of actual 
over estimated sales, In September, the first post-promotional month, an 
offsetting decrease in sales took place, But in October actual and estimated 
sales were again not significantly different. It was concluded that temporary 
large supplies of lamb might be disposed of profitably by an intensive 
promotional campaign. It is evident nevertheless that heavier-than-usual 
consumption, or purchasing, in one month was followed by lighter-than-u.sual 
consUlnption in the following month. Possibly this is a characteristic of the 
demand pattern for lamb, but the evidence is rather thin for even this 
conclus iori. 
It is possible that the effects of the special promotion were underestimated. 
This arises from the fact that the newspaper ads of retailers were considered 
in developing 11 estimated sales," on the assumption that such activity was 
normal and was not influenced by the special program. Retailer advertising 
was heavier than usual during the special promotional period~ and this may 
in fact have been associated with the special program, 
Today over 2 1/2 years later, the USDA is undertaking a followup study in 
the Cleveland market. It is planned to bring the monthly sales and related data 
up to date in an effort to appraise the longer-term effects of the special 
advertising efforts for lamb, which have been continued by the American 
Sheep Producers Council. 
It is obvious that, in making studies of advertising effectiveness, the problem 
of method or technique is paramount. Before concluding, we might describe 
another technique which is presently under test. 
The USDA, in <cooperation with the Washington State Apple Commission, is 
carrying on an experimental study of the effectiveness of advertising in 6 
midwestern cities, Three "treatments" are being tested, (a) a general 
health advertising theme, {b) an apple use advertising theme, and (c) no 
advertising. These three treatments are being tested in each of the 6 cities 
over 4-week periods, with an experimental rotational design in such manner 
that each city will receive each treatment at lec;tst once, and all 3 treatments 
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will be conducted simultaneously in 3 pairs of the 6 cities. It will be 
possible to analyze for significance of difference between treatments, and 
for carryover effects at least in the short run. For measurement purposes, 
audits of apple sales and prices, and related data including volume and 
prices of competing fruits and extent of competitive advertising efforts, are 
being made in 10 or 12 retail food stores in each of the 6 cities. 
In conclusion, we refer again to the general theme of this seminar paper 
that, right now, it is difficult if not impo,asible to say what effect 
advertising and other promotional efforts may have on the demand for 
specific farm products, and for farm products as a whole. Further, it is 
necessary, in developing a body of general principles, or theory, to test out 
a fairly large number of specific advertising programs so as to develop a 
broad basis of fac1lllal information. Some studies have been described, but 
it is evident, a~ least to this writer, that much more work needs to be done 
before conclusive evidence may be set forth. 
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INCREASING THE DEMAND FOR FARM PRODUCTS BY IMPROVING 
QUALITY TO MEET CONSUMER DEMAND 
V. James Rhodes 
The impact upon aggregate demand of improving the quality of various farm 
products is not likely to be large, However, impacts of such quality 
improvements upon particular products may be of consequence and may have 
considerable regional significance 0 The brief topic outline provided by 
Professor Shepherd emphasizes improvement of animal products o I suppose 
that emphasis assumes some validity in the 11 multiplier analysis" that animal 
products require more resource expenditures than cereals, vegetables and 
fruits. 
The phraseology of the title is worthy of examination. 11 To increase demand" 
means to shift the demand curve to the right, Merchandisers of manufactured 
consumer products talk knowingly about the complementary roles of price, 
product and package in projecting a "product image. 11 Quality improvements 
in this context must be accompanied by prices which testify as to the 
validity of the quality promoted. In the roller-coaster world of farm product 
prices, it is an important question whether increases in demand .through 
quality improvement represent movement of the entire demand curve to the 
right or only certain portions of it. 
What does it mean to improve quality? These four d~finitions as applied to 
a product each have their proponents o 
(I) 11 Cost 11 -- quality is measured by the amount of resources 
expended in production 0 
(2) 11Standards 11 -- quality is measured by absolute standard applied 
by experts in nutrition or husbandry or technology, 
(3) 11 Sales 11 -- ceteris paribus, the better quality product is, the 
inferior one, 
(4) 11 Preferences 11 -- ceteris paribus, the better quality product is, 
in some sense, 11 preferred11 to the inferior one 0 
It should be apparent that these definitions may sometimes conflict. 
An examination of the broiler case illustrates the type of definitional 
conflicts which can arise o Consumption of broilers in 1958 greatly exceeded 
the consumption of farm chickens for, say, 1940 o By the sales definition the 
V. James Rhodes is Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Missouri. Contribution from the ::.Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station, 
Journal Series No o 1896 o Approved by Director o Helpful criticisms by 
Professors Jerry West, Charles Cramer and Elmer Kiehl are gratefully 
acknowledged 0 
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broiler is a quality improvement although the relative decline in price 
violates the ceteris paribus proviso. I rather suspect the standards of the 
nutritionist and poultry husbandryman might differ as to whether the broiler 
is a quality improvement. The wcosts" definition would not describe the 
broiler as a quality improvement. What about preferences? I feel confident 
that the cut-up, tray-packed broiler is visually preferred to the New York 
dressed fryer. I doubt that for equivalent sized birds, there is any 
pronounced difference in eating quality as perceived by consumers. Thus, 
we have observed a tremendous increase in the .sale of broilers which is 
associated -- depending upon your definition -- to a great or small degree 
with a quality improvement. 
I shall generally adhere to the preferences definition. I interpret the 
seminar topics to mean that I should be concerned with farm products as 
such and not with packaging or promotional changes. 
Product Design and Grading. The improvement of quality of farm products 
by whichever definition -- is related to the problems of grading and product 
design. The diversity in quality of many agricultural products has very often 
been considered a positive benefit to consumers and/or producers. Diverse 
qualities are supposed to match the supposedly diverse preference maps 
of consumers, so that community satisfaction exceeds that which would 
prevail with a uniform quality. Other authors emphasize -- also, or instead--
the potentialities of dividing markets and practicing effective price 
discrimination by means of natural diversity in quality. 
Since farmers are rarely in a position to benefit from price discrimination 
we shall be little concerned with that argument. 
I think it useful to our thinking -- and no farther from the truth -- to argue 
that wide diversity in quality is not of benefit to consumers nor producers. 
Corollaries are these propositi~ 
(1) Grading is the process of making the best of a poor situation; 
(2) Design of "an optimum product" of general acceptability will 
satisfy more consumers and sell more units than the best possible 
grading of units into "Good", "Pretty Good," ''Almost Good'' and 
"Poor". 
These propositions appear to be true for milk sold to consumers in fluid 
form. I suspect that they are true for eggs and broilers. On the one hand, 
modern production and distribution methods promise to so reduce the cost 
differential between egg grades as to threaten the price appeal of the inferior 
grades . On the other hand, broiler grades appear to be based on rather 
inconsequential factors and can hardly be expected to be superior to a simple 
USDA "Quality Approved" label. As technological innovations and good product 
design bring increasing product homogeneity in other farm products, these 
propositions will apply to them. 
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The case for beef may appear much stronger than for milk or broilers. 
The argument for the usefulness of beef grades was recently stated as 
follows: 
11 0ne of the principal functions of grades is to channel each 
unit of a commodity- into its highest valued use, that is into 
the form and use for which it is best suited. The Federal 
grades for beef appear to have contributed to the effective-
ness and precision of this channeling and distributing process. 
The Prime grade, for instance, is channeled into high valued 
use ·in the restaurant trade; Choice is sold predominately by 
retailers in medium and high income areas; the Good and 
Standard grades are sold principally to retailers in low and _ 
medium income areas and to highly price conscious customers 
while the remaining grades are directed primarily to 
processors and manufacturers of prepared meats. 11 1/ 
While this socially desirable process of channeling each unit into its highest 
use is similar to price discrimination, it is not price discrimination 
because the production costs of these units vary widely and, in the same 
direction as their prices. Suppose that some tremendous feat of processing 
(at nominal costs) could make uniformily acceptable all the beef from the 
various grades. On the demand side, the more elastic segments would no 
longer have to accept beef of widely varying and sometime unsatisfactory 
quality. Surely, quality improvement would increase sales in these important 
market segments. On the other hand, as a consequence of our assumption, 
the more inelastic segments could continue to receive the same quality. 
The greater impact would be on supply and up'2,IJ its regional and specialized 
components. Within a generally free market, we would not expect vertical 
competition between product qualities to persist without a difference in cost 
matching the difference in quality {as both cost and quality differentials 
are perceived by the buyers). Therefore, a leveling of the quality of beef 
would place the production of the more expensive beef at a disadvantage. I 
will argue later that this complete leveling of quality is not at hand but that 
some leveling is more than a wold dream. I need not spell out the implications 
for the corn belt. 
Recapitulating, I have questioned whether the present natural quality 
diversity of even so heterogeneous a product as beef is: better for producers 
and consumers than homogeneous -quality. I believe that in a day when 
1/ Willard Williams, et. al. , Economic Effects of U. 5. Grades for Beef, AMS 
Marketing Research Report No. 298, 1959. 
2/ It must be admitted that present market imperfections are substantial and 
that_ imaginary differences in quality may for a long period influence the 
market. 
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standardization and repeatability are the watch-words, that it can be 
plausibly argued that beef producers and consumers would benefit from 
homogeneous quality to the extent that can be obtained. In any case, we 
need more emphasis on product design of agricultural products. Whether 
there are multiple qualities or one quality, these "products'' of this 
"product" should be designed to suit the buyers. Such design will often 
transgress the "cost" and/or the "standards" definitions of quality. 
Compromises with "standards" may sometimes be advisable, but the 
designer must not become entrapped by cowboy lore nor the ideals of 
technical perfectionism, 
For a number of important agricultural products, "quality" is what the 
grading service says it is. This identity of grades and quality indicates the 
accepted usefulness of the grades. At the same time, the grading service 
assumes a heavy Tesponsibility in the case of products in which its definitions 
could be considerably wide of the mark without being generally realized by 
the trade. Economists have paid too little attention to the defining of grades 
and to the long run performance and structure of an industry of the substitution 
of more price competition for less quality competition. 
I shall briefly summarize a few conce~~ corx:erning grading which Professor 
Kiehl and I have previously specified. 
( 1) The assumption that all consumers 1 preference maps 
are identical is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for the justification of rank-ordered grade names. To state 
or imply by grade names that the grade preferred by one 
group is superior to the grade preferred by another group is 
misleading. 
(2) An unwillingness of some consumers to exchange some 
units of a product for other units at an equal substitutionary 
rate is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for grading. 
(3) Sensory differences (eating and/or visual) would appear 
to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for consumers 
to place differing economic values on differing product units. 
(4) "An optimum grading system should classify as alike or as 
'in a grade' all those products consumers value the same. 11 4/ 
In retrospect, I do not consider these conditions unduly severe, unless 
one gratuitously interprets the "optimum" goal as a necessary condition. 
Their shortcoming appears to lie in the omission of sufficient conditions for 
grading. The sufficient situation seems to me to involve so many judgmental 
3/ V. James Rhodes and Elmer R. Kiehl, "On O:msumer Grades for Foods, 11 
JFE, February, 1956. 
4/ Ibid, page 45 
43 
factors concerning the social benefits and costs of grading as to be 
impossible of simple statemenL 
Some Research Results and Interpretations. What is beef quality to consumers? 
What grades do consumers prefer? There have been numerous publications 
of preference results of various types. There have been even more numerous 
"interpretations" given by the researchers and interested observers. Under 
such conditions, a brief summary may be usefuL 
The early studies of visual preferences indicated that consumers' preferences 
were, indeed, diverse. The least popular grade usually came up with at 
least one-sixth of the first-place votes and the most popular with only one-
third or, in some cases of only three grades, one-half. Much ado was made 
about the most popular grade (characteristically chosen by ranking three or 
four grades of loin steaks in a display under an explicit assumption of no 
difference in price). In our own study, 5 I Prime had a slight edge in 
popularity, while Good was definitely more popular in studies in each of three 
western states. 6 I In all cases, the po,pularity of the leaner grades was 
sufficient to cause surprise and even concern on the part of some observers. 
These visual preference results suggested widely differing preference 
patterns of consumers. Of the several factors affecting consumer's choices, 
the most important were amount and color of lean and assumed eating 
characteristics. It was readily apparent that consumers differed widely with 
each other and with "experts" as to the visual indications of eating quality. 
This disagreement led us into research concerning eating preferences. At 
this point, we were forced to make a shift in our attack with important im-
plications which often are not understood. The visual studies tested the 
preferences of people for given, standardized products. The eating studies 
have never gotten much beyond the stage of testing products in terms of a 
composite preference of consumers. The difference arises from the amount 
of available product of known homogeneity, In a large laboratory eating test, 
we learned that judges could dis criminate between loin steaks from two 
animals within one third of a grade with almost the same accuracy as they 
could discriminate between two animals in non-adjacent grades. 7 7 Accurate 
testing of eating preferences for grades or for any products requires 
homogeneity in each product tested. Since that homogeneity does not exist in 
present beef grades, our preference tests describe mainly the distribution of 
5IV. James Rhodes, ElmerR. Kiehl, andD. E. Brady, VisualPreferences 
for Grades of Retail Beef Cuts, Mo 0 Res. Bul. 583, 1955. 
6IR. E. Branson, The Consumer Market for Beef, Texas Agr 0 Exp. Sta. BuL 
856, 1957; I. Mo Stevens, et. aL, Consumer Use and Preferences, Wyo. Agr. 
Exp. Sta. Bul. 340, 1956. 
7 IV. James Rhodes, et. al. , Consumer Preferences and Beef Grades, Mo. 
Res. BuL 612, 1956. 
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carcasses within a grade. It is true that we have paired off a number of 
carcasses from two grades and have reported the total number of preferences. 
The so- called higher grades have obtained a majority of the preferences. 
alothough individual carcass pairings have not been as cons istenL 8 / It 
should be apparent» however, that the preference totals depend upon the 
particular pairings-. 9/ 
This diagram shows the range and distribution of carcass ratings given 
short loins from 84 carcasses by a panel of 266 St. Louis men (Figure 1). 
The mean general acceptability rating of each carcass (obtained twice from 
12 to 14 men in as many neighborhoods) is shown on the ordinate after being 
translated from a descriptive, hedonic scale to a numerical one. Number 1 
is equivalent to 11 like extremely" and number 9 is equivalent to "dislike 
extremely". The range of .:c:arcass means is broken into thirds by shading 
to indicate more clearly the intra- grade distributions. The experimental 
design and internal evidence indicate that most of the variation stems from 
differences in carcasses and not from differences in consumers' preferences. 
Note that in the region above a rating of four are the means of all 42 Prime 
and Choice carcasses, more than two-thirds of the Good grade and almost 
one-third of the Standard grade. This tremendous over-lapping of grades as 
to carcass acceptability has been the result most difficult to accept. The 
greater intra- grade heterogeneity of carcasses as one proceeds toward the 
leaner grades is also larger than expected. We have found the same results 
with short loins from 80 more carcasses and are now embarked upon a 
similar test which will eventually involve over 500 more carcasses. If 
these results are again confirmed, then very serious attention must be given 
to the problem of improving grades. The best third of Standard and the best 
two-thirds of the Good grade were premium products which were 11 wrongly11 
labeled as inferior products. One of the claims now being made for Choice 
is that its greater homogeneity as compared with Good reduces the risks to 
the merchandiser of disgruntled customers. The social cost of this reduction 
of risk is the extra painds of fat placed in the retail tallow barrel or, more 
properly, the resources which produced that excess . 11 rind11 • Please note 
that these decisions of retail merchandisers are relatively immune from the 
constraints of consumers because of the current lack of knowledge in this area. 
If and when beef can be graded according to its acceptability, how many grades 
should we have? Any answer must be based considerably upon ·judgment even 
though we apply the theoretical conditions for grading stated above. I would 
8/ Elmer R. Kiehl, et. al, St. Louis Consumer's Eating Preferences for Beef 
LoinSteaks, Mo. Res.Bul. 652, 1958;V. James Rhodes, et. al., TheEffectof 
Contlnued Tasting Upon Consumer Evaluation of Beef Loin Steaks, Mo. Res. 
Bul. 676, 1958 
9/ 11 The simple fact is that adjoining grades so over-lap that preference results 
can be greatly affected by chance pairings." V. James Rhodes, "Relationship of 
Physical Product and General Acceptability Ratings. 11 in Conference on Consumer 
Preferences, University of Missouri" Mimeo, September ... 1957 ~ 
45 
Figure 1 
1 I ..... ..... I N ..... N !I ..... N II 
tQ ·z N II +- z_i-~ s:: II z .... z 0 
....:1 
'+o4 3 
0 
Ol I ~ , 0.0 1 .. ,..... .......-T .s 4 
+.I 
~ /f I 
:,:.... 5 I I +.I .... I ..... .... II ..0 
n! I I Middle thi~d of each +.I 6 II p.. range is s~aded Q) 
() I 
() I I < 7 
s:: I n! Q) 
~ 8 I 
I 
9 I 
Standard Good Choice Prime 
Federal Grades of Beef 
Distribution of Carcasses (Loins) 
by grade, St. Louis panel 
University of Missouri 
46 
say two grades with the dividing line at about 3 .. 5 on this scale and the 
lower limit of the second grade at 5. 0. Products below .5. 0 might bettel!' 
be tmprmred by tenderizing techniques or be sold as processed m.eats. 
For a ti:me perhaps, we should continue to separate out Prime as a special 
grade to protect the show circuit, although the perennial divergence of 
carcass and live animal show-ring results should be sufficient warning. 
Would two grades be sufficient for the diversity of consu:rner eating 
preferences? Ou:r admittedly incomplete evidence suggests that eaitng 
preferences are not terribly diverse. For example, in one test we had 
pairs of families compare several steaks from pairs of loins. Preferences 
of families were considerably different for only 24 of 60 cornparisions . 10 I 
What about the potenti.aliti.es of tenderization by enzymes, by hJ.gh 
temperature aging or by other means? Each of these methods show px'om.lse, 
but no real br-oo.k-through has as yet been accomplished. The apparent 
success of several well--known steak houses with tenderized, leaner grades 
suggests that tenderizer may be used most effectively in a carefully controlled 
commercial environmenL Lack of tenderness is frequently a limitl.ng 
characteristic in beef. We have reason to believe that the natural variation 
in juiciness, texture and flavor is small. Moreover, most roasts and many 
steaks undergo severe cooking treatment and often receive additives during 
or after cooking which rather effectively rnask natural variations in juiciness, 
texture and flavor. Therefore, a break~. through in tenderization conJ.d b.ave 
a great irnpact upon the acceptability of leaner grade carcasses. The consu:r:ne !' 
ideal of tasty, tender and lean beef would be obtained. 
Anothe:r· change in the beef industry may be nearer at hand. The Gradl.ng 
Service has been discussing the possibilities of adding 11 Cutability11 (retail 
yield of trimmed, salable, popular cuts} as a grading factor. As is usu.aH:r 
the case" the idea is being received with mixed emotions by the trade, and 
its ultimate acceptance is uncertain. 
The im.portance of the idea for our discussion is that retail y·ield is inversely 
related to the degree of finish. The Grading Service reports that these 
yield variations are of considerable importance. Pierce has repo:rted that 
a difference of 4. 05 percent was found between average yields fo.r the high 
and low yielding groups within the Choice grade, 500·-600 pound group. 
Individual care ass variations are reported of as much as 9 percent yield of 
preferred cuts in the Choice grade, which at present prices he valued at 
about ten dollars per hundred weight. ll/ Pierce indicated his belief that the 
10/ Rhodes, et. al., Bu1676, page 15 
11 J John C. Pierce, Jr., ' 1Beef Grading Studies ' 1 , Ams Mimeo of talk given 
at College Station, Texas, August, 1958. Yield is slightly :r.·elated to 
conformation also. 
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industry has not yet recognized the total impact of yield upon carcass value, 
although many buyers will reject an e:specially ''wastey" carcass .1 2 / I know 
of a few instances where buyers pay a premium to enter the packer cooler to 
select carcasses and they choose not the Choice most like Prime but the lean, 
high-yield Choice carcasses most like Good. The wide recognition of these 
yield results would likely make lean Choice carcasses (mostly ''low Choicen) 
more valuable than any other Choice carcasses. Such recognition should 
also cause a re-evaluation of the merits of the higher yielding, leaner grades. 
However, the fact that about four times as many low Choice as high Good 
carcasses are being rolled with the federal grade indicates something of the 
retailer demand for that U. S. Choice government grade label.1 3 / 
Perhaps I have dealt too specifically with one commodity. I hope that this 
discussion does indicate the importance of forces at work in one industry 
as they bear upon the problem at hand. 
What is quality in pork as viewed by the consumer buyer? Can we find an 
additional retail value for lean pork that can be added to its already 
recognized cut-out advantage? 
Several attempts to answer those questions have been made, and none have 
produced really conslusive results. 
Ordinary interviewing studies of visual preferences for pork cuts confirmed 
the overwhelming preference for lean cuts .1 4 / Some small-scale sales tests 
at Iowa and Illinois indicated that lean cuts would sell materially better than 
fat cuts . 15 / However, investigators generally found a visual sorting for 
leanness superior to the use of Federal grades in selecting "lean'' products. 
These very promising beginnings have not yet been verified with similar large 
scale results. Trotter's Pittsburg sales test in eight stores found that lean 
and fat pork cuts (center cut chope and pork steaks) sold equally well regard-
less of the price differential. Part of this buyer insensitivity to fat/lean 
differences may have been due to some experimental control problems and 
to the fact that a large proportion of buyers never perceived the full range of 
alternatives in the displays. 16 I 
12/ Ibid. 
13/ Williams, et. al, op. cit. , page 45 
14/ C. W. Vrooman, "Consumer Report on Pork Products", Oregon State College 
State Bulletin 521, 1952; R. 0. Gaarder and N. V. Strand, "Use of Photographs 
in Consumer Preference Studies of Pork;," JFE, February, 1957; Unpublished 
data, University of Missouri. 
15/ M. B. Kirtley, "Consumer Acceptance of Lean Pork Chops, "Illinois Farm 
Economics No. 233, June, 1955; R. 0. Gaarder and E. A. Kline, 1 'What Do 
Consumers Want From Pork?" Iowa Farm Science, December, 1956. 
16/ C. E. Trotter, Consumer Preference for Lean and Fat Type Pork Cuts, PhD 
Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1957; C. E. Trotter and Gerald Engelman, 
"Consumers Fail to Recognize Difference in Pork Grades, 11 Science for the Farmer 
5:1, Penn. State University, Summer, 1957. 
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Our own sales test involving hams and loins from 9, 000 hogs sold through 
14 chain supermarkets for eight weeks found that lean cuts sold as well as 
regular cuts at a four cents a pound premium for the lean. Lean cutj i"'l,old 
somewhat better than regular cuts almost 3:2 when priced the same. 1 
I participated in this Kansas City test; I am confident as to the adequacy of 
the experimental procedures: I quietly watched many consumers select from 
the displays; I expected the sales ratios to be more favorable. The coope:t·ating 
packer are,chain were apparently not sufficiently impressed to push the idea. 
further. 
Certainly pork has low prestige relative to beef. Recently I asked a sample 
of 150 Jefferson City households which they would probably serve a spedal 
guest at an evening meal: beef, pork, or chicken. There were 115 answe:r.s 
of beef, 30 of chicken, and 7 of pork. 
However during the Kansas City sales test, the sales of hams soared in 
test stores during the very warm summer months when pork. is supposed to 
be a drug on the market. Presumably, the combination of fresh product and 
adequate displays had a tremendous impact upon pork sales. 
We have been exploring the possibilities of solving much of the fat p::roblem 
by marketing hogs at 175 pounds or lighter. About 90 hogs ranging in 
slaughter weight from 125 to 17 5 pounds have been compared as to eating 
acceptability with conventional weight hogs. Except for some enthusiasm 
with the bacon from lighter weights, consumers response was much the same 
for all weights. There were a few carcass with mean ratings quite different 
from the mass, but in general there was surprisingly little difference in 
ratings. 
Slaughtering hogs at lighter weights would materially increase the meat/lard 
ratio at the packing house and apparently would not impair the consumer 
acceptability of the meat. We do not have adequate data to compare the 
increment in costs of feeding hogs from. say, 175 to 200 pounds with the in·~ 
crement in cut-out value. Zobrisky has shown J;hat fat is put on at a rapidly 
increasing rate as carcass weight increases, so that cut-out value increases 
less rapidly than weight ,19/ However, little more than feed might be 
charged against the last 25 pounds weight increment by many producers, so 
that total production costs may be computed as rising less rapidly than 
weight between 175 and 200 pounds. It is tempting to project the impact of 
lightweight hog slaughter via a slightly better feed efficiency and a considerably 
higher meat/lard ratio. However, research results are so preliminary as to 
make the projection premature. 
17/ Unpublished data, University of Missouri. 
18/ I have not commented upon the results of a recent Purdue study as I do not 
have the details necessary to evaluate them. 
19/ S. E. Zobrisky, Physical Composition of Swine during G:rowth and Fattening, 
Mo. Res. Bul., 672, 1958. 
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To summarize, I believe as do many others that leaner pork represents an 
improvement in pork quality. At the same time eating preference and sales 
evidence is not entirely conclusive. It is possible that retail grading or 
branding 9f pork cuts will demonstrate the sales appeal of lean pork and 
encourage its production. 
Itwould be a mistake to assume that such successful grading and merchan-
dising is certain to be obtained by the first innovator who attempts it. I 
suspect that fat is not the only important obstacle to the consumption of 
pork. 20/ The Jefferson City panel ranked ham after round steak, swiss 
steak, charcoal steak and pot roast as usually having a delicious flavor, 
mentioned it most often of those 5 cuts as excluded from diet for health 
reasons, checked it most often as being "fattening", and ranked it fourth of 
the five as far as being economical. I do not foresee any total eclipse of pork, 
but neither can I detect any latent consumer demand which -- properly 
exploited -- could bring pork back to its pre-war consumption relationship 
with beef. 
In stressing grading and quality improvement of fresh meats, I do not 
wish to underemphasize the importance of quality improvement via 
processing-- grinding, curing, etc. The 1955 Household Food Consumption 
Survey indicates that processed meats made up 50 percent of the weight and 
46 percent of the value of all meat consumed. Ground beef, por.k sausage 
and luncheon meats made up respectively, 13, 3, and 12 percent of total 
meat consumption. 21 I This strikingly large volume of ground meats testifies 
to the importance of a demand which has persisted in spite of varying product 
quality, arising from problems of freshness and occasional inclusion of 
excessive amounts of fat and other low value inputs. Standardization of 
quality could probably increase consumption considerably. Surely, entirely 
new products will be developed which will tickle the palate of Americans. 
While most ground meats require some fat for optimum palatability, the 
production of ''wastey" cattle and hogs will not be required. 
]: would be expecting too much of preference research and of this preference 
researcher to anticipate a full-blown answer to the major question with which 
this seminar is concerned. Improvements in beef quality mean a movement 
toward leanness as soon as innovations in sorting, processing and/or breeding 
obtain more consistent tenderness in lean beef. Improvements in pork 
quality likewise mean a movement toward leanness, although major changes 
in processing might also provide quality improvements. In general, move-
ments toward leanness mean higher feed efficiencies and less inputs per unit 
of output. On the other hand, improvements in meat quality which continue 
201 Luby has raised some interesting and plausible hypotheses concerning 
other obstacles. Patrick J, Luby, "Declining Demand for Pork - Reconsider-
ation of Causes and Suggested Prescription for Remedy",JFE, December, 1958, 
pp. 1832-1838. 
21 I Harold F. Breimyer and Charlotte A, Krause, "Consumption Patterns 
for Meat", USDA, AMS-249, May, 1958, 
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or accelerate the trend toward higher meat diets will require more 
agricultural inputs. The events may be expected to be slow moving and of 
little consequence for solving the farm income problem of 1959 or 1961. 
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INCREASING THE FOREIGN DEMAND FOR FARM PRODUCTS 
Lawrence Witt 
Surplus production has grown to some eight percent of total agricultural 
production, and threatens to increase still more. While the surplus has 
been growing, we have turned in desperation from one device to another 
in an effort to match production and consumption at acceptable prices. 
After the efforts of the twenties in strengthening the competitive process 
of reaching an equilibrium had failed, more direct methods were used. 
Efforts were made to control supply, then to expand domestic demand, each 
with a variety of techniques. Even as these programs floundered, the war 
and post-war experience demonstrated that a strong export market (even 
though dependent on dollar gifts and loans), would strengthen agricultural 
prices and reduce stockpiles. Hence it was both logical and with a sense of 
frustration that a massive export program came into being in 1954. 
This program puts substantial emphasis on sales for local currency, but 
also includes barter, loans, gift provisions. The export program combines 
two values close to hearts of most farmers (and many agricultural 
economists). These are that the farmer's product should be used usefully, 
not destroyed, and that there should be no hungry people in the world while 
there is surplus food available. The program is made more appealing by 
its buoyant influence upon farm prices and its success in reducing stock-
piles below what they might have been. The ignorance of the foreign exchange 
mechanism, of the real worth of foreign currency to the United States 
(especially when deposited in the other country 1 s central bank), and the 
nebulous link with economic development all help to confuse the is sue. The 
impression is left that the large quantities of wheat, cotton, tobacco, etc, 
shipped abroad must somehow do some good. 
As we discuss this topic, I should like to have you think of it in a broader 
context -- as a part of a broad international challenge appropriate to 
agricultural economists and social scientists at Iowa State and other 
agricultural colleges and universities. Despite five years of a program 
costing the economy over one billion dollars per year, there is no solid 
research dealing with this program. Is this because it is a foreign rather 
than a domestic program? Have we failed to see the full importance of this 
program to the national economy? 
Lawrence Witt is Professor of agricultural economics, Michigan State 
University. 
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Moreover, with regard to the mass of world problems which involve farm 
people -- tenure problems, development problems, instabiliti~s of world 
commodity prices, and a variety ci"cther agricultural and economic problems 
agricultural economists have had little to say. A few have been drawn into 
action programs overseas;; still they have not written much about the 
problems spread out before them and of which they are so much a part. 
Clearly we have been seriously ethnocentric in our United States -based 
research and other activities, leaving to others the formulation of the 
proper interrelations of domestic and foreign policy. 
Furthermore, we tend to reject involvement in value formation in 
partially specifying important values for society or at least strongly arguing 
for a set of values. No one should know better than we the amount of 
subsidy which has been involved in our education and training. Why should 
not our trained minds contribute more fully in posing and resolving the 
value conflicts of the society which has made these investments? To 
continue to ignore value issues, particularly in the international field where 
the vast majority of the people are unable to even articulate the relevant 
values, is morally irresponsible and a complete dereliction of duty -- as 
well as physically suicidaL Look over the bulletins and articles of any 
experiment station and the articles in the Journal based upon real research. 
How much has been contributed to an understanding of the interrelations 
between foreign and domestic policy? Multiply this by 50, and the result 
is still unsatisfactory. 
The General Situation. All this is really an introduction to an apology for the 
inability to provide precise answers to the problem posed by the title. 
Almost the only reports that can be drawn upon are either a generalized 
policy statement based upon the values implicitly assumed in classical 
economics, or a description of wh~t has been done in carrying out the 
Congressional mandate. On the one hand, the tensions created by deviating 
from traditional trading pattern.s lead some economists and political 
scientists to a thorough damnation of the program. On the other hand, the 
easing of the surplus burden, and its consequent presumed effect on the price 
and income position of American farmers is lauded as a material accomplish-
ment. My view is that the truth lies .somewhere in between. I should like 
to make a tentative approach, largely by showing the complications of the 
program and possible differential impact. 
First, what is the general export situation? During the past four and a half 
years we have shipped or contracted, to ship about $7 billion worth of farm 
products under special programs. Current farm export levels are close to 
$4 billion per year. Some 30 to 40 percent of this total represents directly 
subsidized exports, with an additional amount, perhaps 20 to 30 percent 
being sold for dollars at special prices. The remainder are commercial 
exports for tbllars .. Most of the special exports have been under Public Law 
480 -- The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act -- but 
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additional quantities have gone under Section 402 of the I. C .A. program, 
under the International Wheat Agreement, special dollar loans, and under 
legally reduced prices of the CCC program. Not all of the P. L. 480 are 
sales for local currens;y; significant amounts have gone as grants and dona-
tions, or have been bartered for strategic materials. Wheat, cotton, and 
fats and oils (soybean oil), are major commodities. Tables 1 and 2 provide 
some total figures. 
In the aggregate, aside from military equipment, this program has become 
the largest transfer of "wealth" between the United States and other countries 
since the Marshall Plan -- and the program is far from over. In fact its 
very place in your program suggests that it is being considered as a more 
or less permanent alternative to efforts to stuff more food down the throats 
of domestic consumers. Why do we have this program? What is it intended 
to accomplish? Two serious questions immediately arise. Who decides 
where, how much, and for how long such an export program is desirable? 
Secondly, suppose foreign countries were to say, "We want no more wheat, 
cotton, or soybeans, but we will accept great quantities of tobaccg, feed 
grains, and dairy products under these special provisions." Would and 
should agriculture adjust its commodity mix to these needs, or are we so 
concerned with preserving traditional patterns, values, and institutions that 
such measures cannot be considered? 
Goals of the Program. It is necessary to inquire more specifically into 
the goals of the program, and the extent to which they have been accomplished. 
To do either of these is far from a simple task. Values are not given; they 
must b-e untangled, related, reviewed and compromised. Moreover, this 
must be done not only relative to United States values, but also interrelated 
with the' values of each of the other countries affected. It is accurate and 
all too easy to say "We know not what we do". We do not have a clear state-
ment of the national purposes of the program, less so than when it began. 
Certainly we do not know the impacts upon other countries, except in a 
superficial and fragmentary fashion. Perhaps it will be mutually bene-
ficial to think together this afternoon about these programs. Take first the 
United States 1 objectives. 
The early and clear objective is the disposal of supplies of farm products 
overseas -- supplies which have accumulated or are likely to accumulate at 
prevailing prices and production levels o To some this is the sole objective 
of the program, and all other considerations are incidental. It appears, 
however, that a somewhat contrary view should be held and that several 
other objectives are becoming more significant. 
Time and again the values of the American society have shone forth clearly 
in an organized effort of giving -- the relief program under Herbert Hoover 
after the first World War, help for the Japanese earthquake victims, 
U .N .R .R .A o, the Marshall Plan, U oN .I oC .E .F .• the CARE packages and 
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Table 1. Exports of U. S. Farm Products Under Public Law 480 with 
Comparisons 
Program 1956-57 1957-58 Total 1954-58 
---------- --Mtlhons of Dollars------------
Public Law 48 0 
Foreign currency sales 
Grants and donations 
Barter 
Other exports 
Total exports 
902 
Z50 
401 
3 '171 
4 '724 
650 
267 
99 
2,984 
4,000 
2} 065 
1,001 
924 
11,371 
15,361 
Source: Eighth Seminannual Report on Activities carried -an under Public 
Law 480, Washington D. C., p. 6. 
Table 2 o Commodity Composition of all P. L. 480 Agreements signed through 
June 30, 1958 
Commodity Export Market Estimated CCC 
Value Cost 
--------Millions of Dollars----------
Wheat and wheat flour (bu. ) 1,028.0 1,732.1 
Feed grains (bu.) 192.8 33506 
Rice (Cwt.) 18L8 288.8 
Cotton (bale) 509o9 68L4 
Cotton linters (bale) .3 0 3 
Meat products (lb o) 39o2 39.2 
Tobacco (lb.) 142.3 142.3 
Dairy products (lb.) 43.8 74o2 
Fats. and oils (lb.) 384.7 391.0 
Poultry (lb 0) L7 L7 
Dry edible beans (cwt.) .4 .4 
Fruits and vegetables (lb,) 1502 15.2 
Seeds (cwt.) .4 .4 
Total 2,540.5 3,702.6 
Ocean gransportation 30L8 301.8 
Total, including ocean trans, 2,842.3 4,004.4 
Source: Ibid, p. 4 
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and similar programs 0 The legislation for P. R. 480 (and Section 402 of 
I. C .A.) clearly provides that food may be given under emergency conditions, 
without waiting for special legislation (as was necessary earlier in providing 
a gift of wheat to India) 0 Beyorrl this there is an element of humanitarism 
in the sale of local currency which justifies such special export programs 
as an effort to match "underfed people" with excess supplies. If there had 
been no P. L. 480 program, there still would have been donations, possibly 
more than in this category now. 
A third objective has come into greater prominence as the program began 
to operate. It is partly implied by the title "Trade Development and 
Assistance Act", and is more than a rationalization. This is the desire 
to use the surplus farm products as an instrument of economic development. 
As efforts to develop new large markets for farm products got underway, 
it was logical to look carefully at the low income, high population areas of 
the world. In today 1 s international arena, development is a key symbol for 
these areas; hence the U oS oD .A. must be concerned with development. 
Moreover, the competition and politico-economic relations with other 
exporting areas are such that the program is more defensible if many of 
the products are channeled into new, non-commercial markets. 
There are a number of other possible accomplishments which appear to 
be congruous with the American value system. These will become clearer 
by looking at individual programs 0 Among these goals are political 
stability, greater internal competition, and support of anti-communist 
efforts through strengthening the military forces. 
The Individual Programs" In turning now to individual countries, it should 
be stressed that these suggestions are little more than tentative hypotheses 
hypotheses which suggest the complexity of the effects and the necessity 
for more careful studies of the program impacts. 
Pakistan: The program in Pakistan comes close to being built in as an 
integral part of the nation's resources. A number of observers question 
whether it would be possible to stop the program. (About $186 million at 
market value was shipped or programed through June, 1958). The rupee 
cost of the imported wheat is higher than the price paid local producers. 
Since the price charged to consumers is intermediate, losses on imported 
wheat are offset by government profits on locally produced wheat. Internal 
farm prices, however, are being increased slowly. 
Internally it appears that the government has been more influenced by the 
political pressures of the refugees, migrants and squatters in the principal 
cities than by the agricultural groups. Thus, an adequate supply of low cost 
food becomes an iniportant element in lessening political instability, while 
the nation tries to stimulate local production and marketings by non-price 
means. A major share of the rupees·accunulated have"been allocated to the 
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support of the Pakistani military build-up as a member of the Baghdad Pact, 
Some of this military effort does have economic development significance, 
both in the training of soldiers to handle machines, and in the improvement 
of communication, The quantitative importance of this aspect of the 
program is not clear, 
' 
Japan: ln the case of Japan it appears that the Ministry of Agriculture is 
a major local supporter of P ,L, 480 agreements, (Some $150 million of 
commodities are involved,) Most of the accumulated yen are used for 
agricultural development, or for U, S. Government expenditures which save 
dollars (such as housing for military dependents), The ministry of 
Agriculture appears to be able to induce the Ministry of Finance to permit 
the use of some of these funds outside the regular government budget. In 
this way irrigation and drainage programs are implemented which were 
planned for a later date, Thus. despite a decrease in dollar earnings, the 
program has contributed to development, and to an earlier reduction in food 
imports. On the other hand, there appears to be a change in dietary patterns 
from sweet potatoes to rice, and from rice to wheat, which has the reverse 
effect. Much of this is due to the rising levels of living within Japan, and not 
solely to the availability of P, L. 480 commodities -- which really do not 
bulk large in the total Japanese trade. 
The Philippines: For the Philippines (with a small program involving some 
$15 million) it is necessary to enter into more speculation. General 
monetary and exchange problems make it clear that a limited amount of 
exchange would have been allocated to cotton. Many observers suggest that 
only a few textile manufacturers would have received allocations for the 
importation of cotton. Consequently the majority would have been squeezed 
out of the textile industry, with substantial profits possible for the suces sful 
applicants. With P. L. 480 cotton, entering the country, there was cotton 
for everyone, enabling the industry to remain competitive. Hence, those 
textile manufacturers less close to the government become internal 
supporters of the program. 
Indonesia'; In this country, the local currency (from a $100 million program) 
has been accumulated. However, in an effort to control inflation~ the 
Indonesian government has directed that almost none of the funds be spent. 
Thus, it becomes necessary to look at the general monetary and fiscal program, 
and identify the marginal reductions in expenditures had special import 
programs not been available -- admittedly a difficult problem. The foreign 
exchange crisis and/or the local food problem probably would have been more 
severe. More should be said, but I am unable to do so. 
India: The largest single program is in India (attaining $425 million of farm 
products). It appears that the imports went largely to feed the major port 
cities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. Shipments from the interior to these 
areas were blocked to avoid cross shipments, but probably also with some 
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impacts on the internal price structure. It appears that prices are lower 
than they would have been with no program -- however, a series of donations 
is probably the real alternative. It appears that the large income elasticity 
for food and semi-subsistence level of production may have held greater food 
supplies in the villages in recent years -- thus contributing to urban shortages. 
Both price policies and the distribution of income between sectors appear to 
have affected in consequence. 
Under the agreements, a major part of the rupee balances were allotted to 
economic development. These funds were deposited in the central bank. 
There is reason to believe that the Indian Government, with sophistication, 
is sued other currency to support its development program o It avoided the 
use of P. L. 480 currency accounts, and in this way was able to support 
local programs without having to clear programs with U. S. officials. Again 
the identification of this extra program is an exceedingly difficult task. 
Brazil: Wheat is a major part of the program in Bt-azil ($180 million of 
agricultural products are involved). Part of the United States 1 supplies 
replaced wheat normally purchased from Argentina, but not available because 
of production and price policies there. While the funds presumably were 
used for economic development, there are indications that the first agreement 
was an exceedingly loose document. Brazilian authorities appear to have 
had great discretion in the use of the funds, and have added substantial fuel 
to the already roaring inflationary fire. In effect they spent the local currency 
twice. 
Canada: Finally we turn to Canada, where many people feel that the United 
States' pro gram has cut in on Canada 1 s wheat export prospects o Mr. C 0 D. 
Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce in 1955 stated: 
"I think there is no doubt that by their (U oS.) disposal policies 
they have displaced our products in certain markets o What we 
can do about it, I do not know. The policies of the United States 
are their policies and are not ours. We follow our own policies. 
As I say, we protest where we think a protest is warranted, and we 
have protested in connection with certain recent transactions." 
In a recent document published jointly by the National Planning Association 
and the Private Planning Association of Canada, the statement is made . 1 / 
"Canadian protests have gone much further than simply criticizing 
the disposal of surplus wheat. They also have been concerned 
with the particular methods of disposal -- for example, the barter 
program which has been used to tie the disposal of wheat to the 
acquisition of minerals for U. S. stockpiles." 
1/ W. Eo Hamilton and W. M. Drummond, "Wheat Surpluses and Their Impact 
on Canada- United States Relations", January. 1959, pp. 3-4 .. 
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One newspaper article reported: "The cards are stacked 
against us in our economic poker game with the United 
States. It now has become clear that the only reason we 
may be able to sell more wheat in the world market is 
because we will soon be selling a lot less lead and zinc. 
This tie-up between lead and zinc and wheat is an intriguing 
one and the strings attached to it all lead back of Washington --
Washington has been stockpiling lead and zinc, taking a 
lot of the minerals in exchange for surplus wheat ••......• 
This buoyed up the world market and kept prices relatively 
stable. With United States suddenly cutting off this heavy 
buying for the stockpiles, the bottom fell out of the market ... " 
One Canadian official commented ... this week: "We haven't 
had a chance in this thing. The only reason we were able to 
sell our lead and zinc was because we couldn't sell our wheat. 
Now, the only reason we may be able to sell more wheat is 
because we can't sell our lead and zinc . 1' 
At the G .A. T. T. meeting on November 21, 1957, the Canadian view included 
the following statement: 
''The Canadian delegate pointed out that his delegation did not 
object to genuine United ~tates 1 aid programs and the extension 
of help to needy countries; indeed, within the limits of its 
capabilities Canada had also extended aid of this kind. Further, 
in more general terms his delegation had no objection t~ United 
States disposal programs which had the effect of increasing 
consumption of the commodity in question by the amount of the 
disposal. The main objection was that, by a variety of 
techniques such as export subsidization, sales for local currencies, 
barter deals and tied- sales, the United States was promoting 
exports of wheat and flour with such determination and in such 
volume that it caused great damage to Canada's normal commercial 
marketing of these products. This was evidenced in export 
statistics from the United States and Canada in 1955-56 and 1956-57; 
while United States exports rose from 347 to 547 million 
bushels, in the same period Canada's exports fell from 309 to 
261 million bushels. rr2/ 
The Canadians themselves by these figures say that total North American wheat 
exports have expanded by some 150 million bushels. However, an additional 
50 million of exports are a non-pareto transfer of Canadian exports to American 
exports. Their objections center on the barter phase of the 11rogram. 
2/ Ibid, p.4 
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Putting More Emphasis on Development. A little over 20 years ago Fred 
Waugh led a seminar on this campus in which he outlined the basic idea of 
the 11 stamp plan"" One of the questions on which he was probed repeatedly 
was "Why not preserve consumer sovereignty by giving the low- income 
families cash and letting them buy food directly?,, The answer was along 
this line" "You cannot get many dollars for such a program from Congress, 
However, you can do a lot to bring about a better income distribution, if 
you tie it to an agricultural surplus program, This blending of values makes 
it more acceptable politically, 11 
There is an analogy with the special export programs even in the discuss ions 
in 1954 as the original Act was passed" Congress will appropriate a 
certain amount of dollars and authorize loan funds which contribute directly 
to economic development. It appears to be willing, at least in the short 
run, to appropriate additional money to a program which blends two objectives 
or values -- namely, surplus disposal and aid to poorly fed people, 
Certainly in these programs Congress is limiting the area of decision 
available to other countires, in the same way as the 11 stamp plan" limited 
consumer decisions, 
In its present form, it is clear that the P, L" 480 has no chance of being 
hailed as another monument in the tradition of Len Lease and the Marshall 
Plano It is necessary to search for new dynamic and thrilling ideas 
appropriate to the leadership role the United States should be playing, Just 
as reconstruction was the major goal in Europe after the war, so economic 
development is the major goal in the countries receiving much of the surplus 
food, An appealing and dynamic program could be developed if economic 
development were blended in as a major goal -- rather than as something 
to be edged into sideways, Famine relief would then be a subsidiary but 
legitimate part of a program which focused on the twin goals of economic 
development and surplus disposal, What would such a program look like? 
1, It would be a long time program which would make food and 
fiber available to countries with development programs requiring 
such supplies" This would permit a country to restructure its 
economy without the necessity to look at its domestic food supplies 
crop year by crop year, Once the United States had committed 
itself to a five or 10-year program of agricultrual exports, these 
amounts would become full-fledged claimants to our production 
in the same way as the domestic consumer, 
2, Realistic long time development programs in other countries 
would be needed which contemplated training, investment, 
population transfers, public and private facilities, etc,, as necessary 
parts of the program" Some countries will need help in 
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formulating such a program. Imported farm products could 
offset some of the short term production declines that follow 
in some countries, or offset inflationary pressures as people 
in other countries increased food consumption. Training 
programs for farm people probably would involve increased 
consumption by those participating, and some decrease in 
production on the farms they left. 
3. Dollar loans and grants would be needed in association 
with farm products. It appears that in many of the countries 
the range of likely projects would require that 40 to 60 percent 
of the extra needs be in food and fiber, but some non-farm 
commodities would be required. (Road building with a low state 
of the arts would depend heavily on food and fiber.) 
4. A number of projects, particularly strategic in economic 
development, might not be given proper cognizance unless 
the United States was willing to provide additional farm 
products and dollar suppies contingent upon the inclusion of 
such programs . 
5. The United States would by itself or with other nation~ 
absorb the risk of flood or drouth disaster, through world 
or United States reserves earmarked for this purpose. 
6. Presumably as individual countries define their programs 
and compare local needs with local production, the gaps will 
add up to a total combination of commodities which is 
different from the commodity mix now in surplus. Adjustments 
will be needed in U. S. domestic policies to induce the 
requisite flow of production. Exports might decline somewhat, 
particularly while the development programs were being 
formulated. 
7. It will desirable to induce other developed countries to 
participate in the program -- in an international transfer of 
resources -- so as to utilize the wheat surplus of Canada, the 
coffee surplus of Brazil and Latin America, and the industrial 
talents of We stern Europe in this effort. The degree of 
multilateral effort certainly should be increased. 
8. Considerable study is needed as to the amount and type of 
investment, both physical and human, that is needed to enable 
a particular economy to take off on a self- sustaining cycle of 
economic growth. Every effort should be made to insure that 
this level of effort is attained and maintained. Agricultural 
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export programs should be fully integrated with development 
programs. To do so in our ••sectorist11 government is 
difficult. Interested, sympathetic, and competent non-
government efforts are clearly needed. 
Final Statement. There are a number of positive elements in the present 
program. Additional ones could be incorporated into the operations. 
Unfortunately, many of the positive elements are slipping away because the 
program is viewed as temporary. Others slip away because we are not 
giving sufficient attention to the requisites of sustained economic growth, 
and as economists we do not know enough about how to engineer development. 
Much of the difficulty derives fron1 the emphasis on United States derived 
values, and insufficient attention to how our values and those of other countries 
might be blended and compromised s.o as to attain a larger value satisfaction. 
With this, I turn once more to the role which agricultrual economists should 
play. With their training in economics, their knowledge of agriculture, and 
their familiarity with quantitative methods, agricultural economist:; have much 
to contribute to an understanding of economic growth. In the domestic scene 
we find ourselves concerned with aggregate responses -- supply curves, 
market adjustments, national control programs, etc. Yet, we hesitate to 
move one step further and inquire into similar relationships overseas. Some 
of the puzzling relationships might be clarified· if we had the benefit of the 
perspective of another economy. 
Secondly, we should stress the importance of value formulation as a vital 
contribution of our work. We cannot expect the general population to urge 
upon Congress the importance and validity of certain values which Americans 
have respecting other peoples, unless we, ourselves, as professional social 
scientists give a part of our effort to the study of values in the interrelation-
ships of foreign and domestic policy. If you believe, as I do, that the lack 
of a positive foreign policy is a major criticism of America• s world position, 
then the creation and advocating of such a program is fundamental. Against 
the alternative of thermonuclear war, or even the threat of it, any economic 
development effort is small change. Surely when the history of the 1960 1 s 
is written (assuming there is someone to write it), it should not be said that 
the trained minds stood aside when these human values should have been 
discussed. 
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DISCUSSION OF THE WITT PAPER 
Erik Thorbecke 
I am in general agreemeht with the tone of the paper. More specifically 
I endorse strongly the following two recommendations made by Dr. Witt: 
1. The need for research on the quantitative impact of surplus 
disposal programs on the U.S. as well as on the world economy. 
The F .A .0. has made pilot studies of the effects of these 
programs on the economic development and growth of India. 
This type of research should be pushed much further before 
any long-run policy decision is arrived at in Washington with 
respect to these various agricultural disposal schemes; 
2. Tying the objective of surplus disposal to the objective 
of economic development - if this is the best feasible alternative 
from a political standpoint - subject to a certain number of 
qualifications which are incorporated in some of the subsequent 
points of this discussion. 
Many of the advantages of the recent surplus disposal programs under P. L, 
480 and other acts were brought out clearly by Dr, Witt. While recognizing 
that any program will have to be a compromise between economic desirability 
and political feasibility I would, nevertheless, like to point out some of the 
possible disadvantages of the present surplus disposal programs from the 
standpoint of the best possible allocation of resources in the world, as a 
whole. 
First, it has become customary to compare the so-called "trade-creating" 
effects to the "trade-diverting" effects of any shifts in trade flows in order 
to determine whether or not an improvement in world-wide economic welfare 
had taken place. Any shift in the source of supply from a low cost producer 
to a high cost producer represents trade diversion and worsens the 
allocation of resources in the world whereas any shift in the source of supply 
in the opposite direction improves the allocation of resources in the world. 
Title 1 of P. L. 480 requires that reasonable precautions shall be taken to 
safeguard usual marketings of the U.S, and to as sure that foreign currency 
sales under this Act will not unduly disrupt world prices of agricultrual 
commodities and will not Iead to undue impairment of the traditional 
competitive positions of friendly foreign countries. 
Erik Thorbecke is Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics, Department 
of Economics and Sociology, I.owa State College. 
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To the extent that the U. S. government subsidized programs infringe 
upon the commercial demand which had been previously satisfied by other 
agricultural producers, trade diversion occurs. It is true that according 
to P. L. 480, recipient countries are asked to absorb only additional 
amounts of surplus commodities over and above what they normally import. 
If this rule were vigorously followed, trade disruption would not take place, 
but trade divers ion could still occur whenever imports of surplus commodities 
displaced competitive agricultural commodities produced locally. It is, 
of course' extremely aifficult to determine whether the increase in the 
demand for U. S. surplus commodities abroad is caused by a substitution 
in the source of supply or by "additional "'demand. 11 
Second, as long as the U. S. government refuses to commit itself to a long 
run continuation of surplus disposal :programs there exists a risk that the 
economics of the importing countries could become so dependent on U. S. 
surpluses that a sudden decision to abandon these programs would lead to 
serious distortions in the latter countries 1 economies. It would appear from 
Dr. Witt's comments that Pakistan offers a good example of an economy 
which would be seriously damaged in the event U. S. surplus commodities 
were no longer available under the present terms. 
Third, the objective of economic development, as such, would be best 
served if the developing countries received U. S. aid with no strings attached. 
This would make it possible for these countries to buy not only the kind of 
commodities they need most but also to purchase them in the cheapest 
markets. It seems likely that many underdeveloped areas would ~buy a 
number of capital goods in Western Europe, rather than in the U. S., in 
view of the greater affinity which exists between the resource structures 
(labor-intensive) of these two groups of countries. This phenomen would 
tend to increase the flow of dollars to Western Europe, which would in turn 
alleviate Europe's dollar shortage with the U. S. Unconditional aid by the 
U. S. would, thus, help restore a system of multilateral trade which would 
indirectly benefit the latter since either the amount of U. S. aid to Europe 
could be reduced, or Western Europe, with a larger supply of dollars from 
the lesser developed areas, could import more from the U. S., thereby 
stimulating American export industries. 
It would be unreasonable to expect Congress to formulate policies which 
would be based on purely economic factors; however, the advantages which 
can be gained from a policy which is politically acceptable (such as linking 
surplus disposals to economic development) should always be weighed against 
the purely economic disadvantages of politically expedient policies. 
In conclusion I can only reiterate Dr. Witt's recommendation for more 
empirical research dealing with the overall effects here and abroad of surplus 
disposal programs. 
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CHANGES IN CONSUMER EXPENDITURES FOR FOOD 
Goeffrey Shepherd 
Consumer disposable income and expenditures in the United States have 
risen every year since 1939. The data are given in Table 1. The table 
shows expenditures for food, for other goods, and for services. The changes 
from 1945 to 1958 are shown in Figure 1. 
The chart and table show that expenditures for food have been rising; but 
they have not been rising as rapidly as consumer disposable income. Tl:!is 
income rose from $170 billion in 1947, just after World War II, to $311 
billion in 1958; this was a rise of 84 percent. But over the same period, 
consumer expenditures for food rose only 51 percent. 
This situation can be put another way: In 1947, consumers spent 27 percent 
of their disposable income for food; but in 1958, they spent only 22 percent. 
Food has been losing ground in the competition for the consumers 1 dollar. 
Farmer's Share of Food Dollar Declining. But this shows only a part of the 
picture. A breakdown of the food expenditure data shows that not only have 
consumers been spending a smaller percentage of their incomes for food; 
in addition, farmers have been getting a smaller percentage of consumers' 
expenditures for food, They have been getting a smaller percentage of a 
smaller percentage. 
The total retail cost of the domestic farm products sold by farmers and 
consumed by civilian consumers in the United States is shown in Figure 2 
and Table 2. 1/ The figure also shows the farm-to-retail marketing bill 
Goeffrey Shepherd is professor of agricultural economics, Department of 
Economics ahd Sociology, Iowa State Colle_ge .. 
1 I The total expenditures for all food in the United States shown in Figure I 
are compiled and published by the U. S. Department of Commerce. The total 
retail cost, for domestic farm food products only, is compiled by the USDA. 
This total retail cost is smaller than the total expenditures for food shown 
in Figure 1, hecaus e it does not include imports, seafoods, food consumed 
on farms where produced, nor food for the Armed Forces. 
The USDA also compiles another series, similar to its retail cost series, 
but including the estimated extra cost of food consumed in restaurants (over 
what their cost would be if the food had been purchased in retail stores) and 
the estimated lower cost of food for institutions, etc., bought at less than 
retail price. This series is entitled "civilian expenditures for food." The 
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Fig. l 
INCOME AND EXPENDITURES 
200 
1950 1955 1960 
SOURCE:.,U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 1958 ESTIMATED BY AMS 
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Table 1. Consumer income and expenditure, United States, 1939-58 
Year 
1939 
194o 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 : 
1958 l): 
Disposable 
persona.l income 
70.4 
76.1 
93.0 
117·5 
133·5 
146.8 
150.4 
16o.6 
170.1 
189·3 
189.7 
207·7 
221·5 
238.7 
252.5 
256.9 
274.4 
290·5 
305.1 
311.0 
lJ Estimated. 
Tot&l 
67.6 
71,9 
81.9 
89.7 
100.5 
109.8 
121.7 
147.1 
165.4 
178.3 
181.2 
195.0 
2Q9.8 
219.8 
232.6 
238.0 
256.9 
269.4 
284.4 
290·7 
Personal consumption expenditures 
Food other goods 
26.1 
28.2 
33·4 
34.6 
38.o 
41.5 
47.2 
6o.o 
68.2 
73·2 
74.8 
82.7 
86.2 
88.4 
94.2 
94.0 
105.2 
107.6 
111.5 
uo.4 
Data p.tblished quarterly' in SUrvey ot CUrrent DJ.siness (Department ot Commerce). 
Services 
!!!!!2!~ 
25.8 
26.9 
29.0 
31·5 
34·7 
37·7 
4o.4 
46.4 
51.4 
56·9 
6o.o 
64.9 
70.2 
75.6 
81.8 
86.3 
92·5 
99.6 
1o6.5 
lll.9 
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Fig. 2 
DOMESTIC FARM FOOD PRODUCTS 
$ BIL. 
50 
retail cost' 
40 
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DOMESTIC FARM FOODS PURCHASED BY CIVILIANS IN THE UNITED STATES 
*AT RETAIL FOOD STORE PRICES 1958 DATA PRELIMINARY 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NEG. 3563-58 ( 10) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE 
Table 2 . Retail cost, payment to farmers, and rrerketing bill for farm food products 
purchased by domestic cl.vilitm consumers, Untted States, 1947-58 
0 0 
Year ;Ret.-11 cost y; ~:;:~!; 
1947 
19~ 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
Dillion 
dolle.rs 
Billion 
~~ 
18.7 
19.2 
17.1 
17.7 
20.2 
20.1 
:: 
: Farm-retail :: 
: liiB.rketing bUl: : 
:J! :: 
0 0 
Year ;Retail cost y; Payment to farmers Z/ 
·-'--
Billion 
~~ars 
17.8 
19.8 
20.8 
::1953 
::1954 
::1955 
::1956 : 
::1957 v: 
::1958 11 : 
:: 
Billion 
dollars 
Billion 
dollars 
19.0 
18.~ 
18.~ 
18.7 
19.5 
20.7 
Farm-retail 
marketing bill 
:J! 
Billion 
dollars 
25.6 
2h.6 
27.9 
29.6 
30.9 
33.0 
------------------~·~----~------·-----------------
]/ Estilll!.ted cost at retail-store prices of all domestic food products sold by farrrers and bought by 
civllian consumers in this country. Fann food products sold in the form of meals ere vnlued at what the 
food would have cost in retail food stores. iJ Payment to farmers for equlwl.ent fann products, adjUBteC! to eliminate imputed value or nonfood 
b1J>roducts. J/ Difference between retail cost and payment to farmers. 
""£/ Prelim!. nary. 
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for this food, and the payment to farmers (the money that farmers 
received) Ofor tliis 'food. 
1 
The figure shows that the farm-torretail marketing bill nearly doubled from 
1947 to 1958, ~while the payment to farmers rose only 10 percent. 
In summary,then: Consumers' disposable income from 1947 to 1958 rose 
84 percent; their expenditures for !food, however, rose only 51 percent; 
and farmers' receipts for the food rose only 10 percent. 
Why did these things happen? And is the same sort of thing likely to continue 
in the future? 
Reasons for the I)ecline in the Percentage of 
Consumers 1 Income Spent for Food 
First, why has the percentage of the consumer's income spent for food been 
declining? 
The chief reason is the influence of what i.s known as Engel's law. 
About the middle of the nineteent~ century, Ernst Engel studied consumer's 
budgets in Belgium and Saxony to determine to relation between income 
and expenditures for food. His work showed that the high income groups spent 
more money per capita for food tl;lan the low income groups.; but the high 
income groups spent a smaller proportion of their incomes for food than the 
low income groups. A number of statistical studies since Engel's time 
have revealed similar relations bcrtween income and rexpenditures for food 
in other countries. 
An income-food expenditure curve for urban consumers in the United States, 
based on the data given in Table 3, is shown in Figure 3.1/ The upper part 
of the chart (Section A) shows that high income urban groups spend more 
money for food per family than low income groups. The straight line drawn 
reasons for needing three different series, and the characteristics of the 
three series, are given in some d,etail by K. E. Ogren, "The Farmer's Share: 
Three Measurements•• Agricultural Economics Research, USDA, April 1956, 
Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 43-50, and l?Y M. Burk in the Marketing and Transporta-
tion Situation, AMS, USDA, Nov. 1958, pp.20-25. 
1/ Basic data from Food Consumption of Households in the United States, 
Household Food Consumption Survey, 1955, Report No. 1, USDA, p. 11. 
The data for urban consumers are selected for illustration here because urban 
cons-umerS' are more hornoge-neo-~ in their- food expenditUre behavior than 
·an consumers. 
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through the dots shows that, on the average, a family with I percent more 
income than another did not spend I percent more money for food; it spent 
only 0. 44 percent more. The income -elasticity of family expenditures for 
food, then, was 0. 44 
The lower part of Figure 3 (Section B) shows that, although high-income 
groups spend more money for food per family than low-income groups, 
what they spend is a smaller percentage of their incomes. The general 
rule is this: The bigger the family income, the smaller is the percentage 
of the income that is spent on food. 
The percentage spent on food per family by the high-income groups would be 
still lower than it is, were it not for the fact that families in the high- income 
groups are larger than families than the low-income groups, as Table 3 
shows. The average family size of the highest-income group ($10, 000 and 
over) is 3. 80 persons; this is larger than the size of the lowest- income 
group family, 2. 88 persons. It used to be said that "the rich get rich and 
the poor get children." This does not appear to be borne out by Table 3. 
The high-income groups have large families, however, not only because 
high incomes are conducive fo fertility, but also because income and family 
size both increase with the passage of time. Normally a young couple begin 
their married life at the bottom fo the ladder with a small income and a 
small family. Bigger pay checks and more children come along together 
with the pas sage of time. If income and family size were not positively 
correlated, the income-elasticity of expenditures fur food·wauld b·e lower 
than the actual figure, 0. 44. 
The influence of family size can l;:le removed by expressing the urban data in 
the form of expenditures for food per person instead of per family. When 
this is done, the income-elasticity per person is shown to be only 0. 29. For 
the United States as a whole, it is 0. 37. 1/ This is the figure used in the 
rest of this report. 
The income-elasticity of the consumption of farm produced food measured at 
the farm level is much lower than the income-elasticity of expenditures for 
food given above. It is about 0. 12. This is the figure for food from all 
sources. The figure for purchased farm food, however, is about 0. 24.2/ 
1/ See the fifth and eighth lines up from the bottom of Table 915, M. C. 
Burk, "Some Analyses of Income-Food Relationships, "Jour,. Am. Stat. 
As s n . , Dec . 1 9 58 , Vo 1 53 , p . 9 15 . 
2/ Burk, op. cit., p. 915. 
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FIG. 3 -Weekly family food expense, April-June, 1955, by income groups: 
(A) in dollars; (8) as per cent of income. 
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Engel's law probably does not have exactly the same effect when incomes 
change over a period of time as the effect it has on different incomes at a 
given point of time, especially when other things are changing as well as 
incomes. Let us see. 
If Engel's law had the same effect over periods of times that it has at a given 
point of time, then from 194 7 to 1958, consumers 1 expenditures for food would 
have risen 84 x 0. 37 percent, or 31 percent. But actually, they rose more 
than this; they rose 51 percent. 
That is to say: Consumers' ex:penditures for food rose more from 1947 to 
1958 than Engel's law could explain if it applied to changes in income over 
periods of time as it does to differences in income at a given point of time. 
The question, then, is not, why did the percentage of consumers' income 
spent for food decline so much from 1947 to 1958, but, why did it decline so 
little? 
There are several reasons: 
( 1) One reason is that part of the rise in consumers income 
from 1947 to 1958 was not a rise in real income, but only a 
rise in monetary income, the result of inflation. From 194 7 
to 1958, the consumers' price index rose from 99 to 124, a 
rise of 25 percent. Thus, consumers 1 real income rose not 
84 percent as the dollar figures along show, but only 84-25 : 
59 percent. So the percentage spent on food declined less than 
it would have declined if the rise in consumers' money income 
had all been a rise in real income. 
(2) Another reason is that another part of the rise in consumers' 
income was the result simply of an increase in the number of 
consumers. The population of the United States grew 20 percent 
from 1947 to 1958. If all the increase in consumers' income 
had been due to the increase in population, one would hot have 
expected the percentage of income spent for food to decline 
at all. Engel's law applies to per capita income, not to total 
national income. 
Table 4 and Figure 4 show the data in per capita form. They 
show that per capita money income rose only 53 percent from 
1947 to 1958. This is only a little more than the rise in per 
capita expenditures for food, which was 47 percent. 
{3) Figure 4 and Table 4 also show another reason why the 
percentage of consumers 1 income spent for food declined 
only a small amount. The percentage actually spent declined 
from 26.9 percent in 194 7 to about 22 percent in 1958. This 
is a decline of 18 percent. But the quantity and composition 
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Fig. 4 
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Table 4 -- Per capita food cost and expenditure related to 
disposable personal income, United States, average I935-39, annuall946-58l/ 
: Total :Cost to consumer of 
:exp e ndi- : __ __:F=--=-o-=-o-=d~e=-.:x:.::.p~e =n-=d.::..it:..:u:.:r:..:e:___ _ :fixed quantities of 
:Dispos-
Year : able 
:ture for : Percentage of - : food representing 
:consumer: Total :I935-39 average annual 
and :personal : goods :Actual :expendi- consumption per 
Dispos-:ture for person3/ quarter: income and 2/ 
2/ :services able : goods Percentage 
2/ income : and Actual: of dispos-
1935-39 
1946 
I947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Dollars 
514 
l.,J36 
1' 180 
1,291 
1, 271 
I,369 
I, 474 
1,521 
1,582 
1,582 
1,660 
1,727 
1' 782 
1,790 
Dollars 
493 
I,040 
1,148 
1,216 
1,214 
1,286 
1,359 
I, 400 
1' 457 
1, 466 
1,554 
1,602 
1_, 661 
1, 669 
Dollars 
118.6 
288 
318 
328 
311 
313 
346 
356 
355 
355 
358 
370 
388 
393 
:services 
Percent Percent Dollars 
23.1 24.0 118.6 
25 .. 4 27.7 201 
26.9 27.7 244 
25.4 27.0 256 
24.5 25.6 243 
22.9 24.3 245 
23.5 25.5 274 
23,4 25.4 279 
22.4 24.4 271 
22.4 24.2 
21.6 23.0 
27~ 
265 
21.4 23. 1 267 
21.8 23.4 276 
22.0 23.5 287 
Annual rates. seasonally adjusted 
1stquar.l,768 1,653 4/393 22.3 23.8 
2ndquar.1,779 1,660 4/398 22.5 24.0 
3 r d qua r. 1 , 8 0 6 I , 6 7 0 4/3 9 5 2 1. 9 2 3 . 7 
4thquar; I,803 1,689 4/394 21.9 23.3 
286 
291 
288 
285 
able income 
Percent 
23.I 
17.7 
20.7 
19.8 
19. 1 
17.9 
18.6 
18.3 
17. 1 
17. 1 
16.0 
15.5 
15.5 
16.0 
16.2 
16,4 
15.9 
15.8 
1/ Most date for 1946-57 have been revised; see August 1954 issue of this 
Situation (MTS-114) for 1929-45 data. 
2/ Computed from data of the Depatment of Commerce. 
3/ Cost to consumers of quantities of food representing average annual con-
sumption per person during 1935-39; calculdted by applying to the actual 1935-
39 expenditure for food ($118. 60) a consumer food price index which is a 
weighted average of indexes representing (a) retail food prices in urban areas 
(Bur. Labor Statistics), (b) retail food prices in rural areas (Agr. Market. 
Serv. ), and (c) prices received by producers applied to foods consumed on farms 
where produced. 
4/ Quarterly data are estimates by the Agr. Market. Serv. from exp~nditures 
for food and alcoholic beverages reported by the Dept. of Commerce. 
Alcoholic beverages are not included in food expenditures. 
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of the food increased over this period. If it had 
remained unchanged from the 1935-39 period, the 
percentage would have declined from 20. 7 in 194 7 
to about 16 £ercent in 1958. This is a decline of 
22 percent. I 
(4) Another reason is that the percentage of farmers 
in the population has been declining, from 18.2 in 
1947 to about 11 in 1958. People spend more for 
food when they take an urban job than they spent 
when they were on the farm; their home-produced 
food on the farm is valued in the series used 
above at farm prices, but when farmers take a job 
in town they pay retail prices, which are more 
than twice as high as farm prices. 2 1 
(5) In recent years, a considerable amount of 
"built- in maid service'' was included in many 
foods. Apparently, however, this did not increase 
expenditures for foods much. A recent pilot study 
indicates that the average housewife pays less than 
1 percent more for these convenience foods than for 
the less processed kind. 3/ 
(6) Another force was acting in the opposite direction 
to those listed above. It was the rate of increase in 
the demand for food relative to the rate of increase 
in supply. 
If everything else remained constant, but the demand 
for food increased relative to the supply for food, 
the percentage of consumers 1 disposable income spent 
for food would rise, because the demand and supply 
of food are both inelastic. 
1/ This is only a .little larger than the figure of 19 percent given above. 
The change from 1935-39 to 1958, however, was much greater. 
2/ ''Since the mid-1930's, the use of purchased farm foods has risen 
almost twice as much as the use of farm foods from all sources. In the 
mid-1930's home production supplied about 20 percent of civilian consumption 
of all farm foods, but in 1957 the proportion was down to about 8 percent. 
Most of the change has occurred since 1941." (The National Food Situation, 
Agricultur<H Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture. 
February 1959 o p o 23.) 
3/ R o C. Harris and P. B. Dwoskin, Convenience Foods and Their Cost 
to Consumers, AMS, USDA, 1958. 
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What actually has been happening in recent years? Has the 
population been pressing on the food supply, or has the 
food supply been pressing on the population? 
Table 5 shows the per capita consumption of food from 
1910 to 1957, This table shows that per capita consumption 
has been increasing; the food supply has been pressing on 
the population. This in itself would reduce the percentage 
of consumers' income spent on food. 
The six reasons given above are the chief reasons why 
the percentage of consumers' income spent for food 
changed differently over time, in relation to consumer 
income, from the way it differed among income classes 
at the one point of time in 1955. Not only are the rates 
different in themselve:s a other things being equal; in 
addition, other things did not remain equal; half a dozen 
other things were changing with the pas sage of time, 
and still other changes, too numerous to mention, were 
also taking place, 1/ 
Different elasticities for different foods. We would like to make one final 
point in concluding this section: That point is that Engel's law has different 
effects on different foods. 
Expenditures for most foods are higher for high- income groups than for low-
income groups, But how much higher they are differs for different foods; 
for some foods, indeed, (called 11 inferior goods 11 ) expenditures by high-
income groups are lower than for low-income groups. 
One food of great interest to us here in the middle west is meat. The relation 
between income and expenditures by urban families on each of the four "red 
meats 11 is shown in Figure 5. 2 / 
This figure shows that on the average, for each 10 percent higher income 
the expenditures for beef were 2. 8 percent higher. For pork, they were 1. 3 
percent higher; for lamb, 7.8percent, and for veal, 2.8. The income elasti-
cities for each of these meats were one tenth of these figures. 
1/ A detailed technical discussion of the reasons for the differences between 
eros s- section and chronological income food relations hips is given in M. C. 
Burk, 11 Some Analyses of Income-Food Relationships'', Jour. of the Am. Stat. 
Assn., 53:286, Dec. 1958, pp.905-927. 
2/ This figure (and the next figure) are taken from Harold F. Breimyer and 
Charlotte A. Kause, Consumption Patterns For Meat, AMS, USDA, May, 1958. 
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TABLE 5 
Food Consumption; Index of Per Capita Consumption { 194 7-49 100), 
United States, 1910-57 
(Retail weights) 
Year Index Year Index 
1910." ...... 88 1947 ......... 102 
1920 ......... 87 1948 ......... 99 
1930 ......... 91 1949 ......... 99 
1935-39 ...... 91 1950 ......... 100 
1940 ......... 95 1951. ........ 98 
1941. ........ 97 1952 ......... 100 
1942 ......... 97 1953 ......... 101 
1943 ...... ". 98 1954 ......... 101 
1944 ......... 101 1955 ......... 102 
1945 ......... 102 1956::g ........ 103 
1946 ......... 104 1957~ ........ 102 
1958 ......... 101 
*p 1' > re 1m1nary. 
Source: Consumption of Food in the United States, 1909-50 Agriculture 
Handbook No. 62, USDA BAE. September, 1953, p. 147, and The National 
Situation, USDA, Oct., 1957, p.2. This index is a physical-volume, 
price-weighted { 1947-49 prices) index. 
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The next figure (Figure 6) is based on pounds purchased, rather than on 
expenditures, for beef and pork. It shows these amounts at three different 
times. 
The elasticities here for 1955 are lower than the corre.~pandi!J.g elasticities 
of expenditures shown in the preceding figure, -because people with higher 
incomes buy more of the higher priced cuts as well as !more pounds. 
Perhaps the most startling thing shown in Figure 6 is the decline in the income-
quantity elasticity for pork since 1942. The elasticity in 1955 in fact was 
slightly negative. 
Reasons for the Decline in the Farmer's Share 
of the Consumer's Expenditures for Food 
Why did the farmer's share of the consumer's expenditures for food decline 
from 1947 to 1958? Why did food expenditures and marketing costs rise so 
much, and payments to farmers rise so-little? 
The chief components of the rise in marketing costs are shown in Figure 7 
and Table 6. This figure and table show that the chief reason for the rise in 
marketing costs was the rise in labor, transportation, and other costs. 
Profits were only a small item, and they aid not change much in any case. 
Further light is thrown on this matter by Figure 8. The data in this figure 
are expressed in index form, and the chart is a little hard to read on that 
account. But the lower part of the chart is similar to the lower part of 
Figure 2 shown earlier, and it goes back farther. This provides more 
perspective. 
The chart shows that the farmer's share of the consumer's retail-store 
food dollar did not decline from normal during the 1950's; it declined~ 
normal. It is running now at about 39 percent -- just about the same as it 
was in the 19 30 1 s before World War II. I/ 
We will keep this in mind in the next section when we try to forecast the future. 
1/ A somewhat different series, entitled "civilian expenditures for food," 
includes with the retail store ~o:st of food, an addition for the extra cost of 
food consumed in restaurants and a subtraction for food bought at less than 
retail store prices. The percentage of the consumer's expenditures for food 
measured by this series is running a little lower now than it was before 
World War II. It decline from 38 percent in 1939 to 36 percent in 1957. 
(The Marketing and Transportation Situation, AMS, USDA, Nov. 1958, 
pp. 20-25.) 
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Fig. 5 
VALUE OF MEAT USED, URBAN FAMILIES 
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Table 6. Corporate profits, labor, transportation, and other coats in marketing farm food products 
sold to civilian consumers, United States, 1939-57 Y 
Corporate profits _gl Rail and Farm-retail Labor truck Other marketing Year Before Atter ;; !!/ 
taxes taxes 
transportation bill 
Billion Billion Billion Billion Billion Billion 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
1939 0.4 0.3 3·1 1.0 3.1 8.2 
1940 .4 ·3 3·9 1.0 3.2 8.5 
1941 .6 .4 4.1 1.2 3·3 9.2 
1942 ·9 .4 4.5 1.0 4.1 10.5 
1943 1.0 ·5 4.6 1.0 4.5 11.1 
1944 1.0 .4 5.0 1.1 4.3 11.4 
1945 1.0 ·5 5·5 1.3 4.7 12.5 
1946 1.7 1.0 6.7 1.6 5.6 15.6 
1947 1.5 ·9 1·9 2.0 6.4 17.8 
1948 1.2 ·1 8.9 2.2 7.5 19.8 
1949 1.3 .8 9.4 2.4 1·1 20.8 
1947-49 average; 1.3 .8 8.7 2.2 1·3 19.5 
1950 1.6 .9 9.9 2.6 7.1 21.2 
1951 1.3 .6 10.6 2.7 8.2 22.8 
1952 1.4 .6 11.4 3·1 8.5 24.4 
1953 1.5 ·1 12.1 3.3 8.7 25.6 
1954 1.5 ·1 12.6 3·5 9.0 26.6 
1955 1.8 ·9 13.0 3.3 9·8 27.9 
1956 2.0 1.0 13.9 3.6 10.1 29.6 
1957 2) 2.0 1.0 14.2 3·7 11.0 30.9 
!J Relates only to food fran American 'farms sold to civilian consumers and not to that sold to the Armed 
Forces or exported. 
gj Includes profits received by incorporated marketing f'i:ms only and not those of unincorporated firma 
or of firms enp.ged in intercity transportation. JJ Does not include the cost of labor in restaurants and other eating places but includes the estimated 
coat of additional retail-store labor tbat would be required to handle in retail stores the f'ood sold in 
eatins: places. These adjustments are made because the food served in these places h valued at retail-
store prices in the retail coat estimates :frail which the marketing bill is derived. The cost ot labor --
ployed in intercity transportation is included in charges tor transportation. 2J Difference between sum ot items in preceding columns and marketing bill; includes other coats and 
noncorporate protita. 
:if Preliminary. 
Fig. 7 
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Fig. 8 
MARKETING CHARGES AND FARM 
VALUES FOR MARKET BASKET 
%OF 1947-49 
60 
20 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
c 60 r-- FARMER'S SHAR1E OF CONSUMER'S DOLLAR _ ___, 
50~---+~~~~~~~-4----~ 
40 ~~--~---~-----4---~~-
30 ~--4----4---+---~--~ 
1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 
DATA ARE FOR MARKET BASKET OF FARM FOODS BASED OH AV. "52 PURCHASES BY URSAH FAMILIES 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NEG. 1424A-58(l) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE 
82 
Prospects for the Future 
What is likely to happen in the future? 
There are two questions to be answered. (1) Is the percentage of consumer's 
income spent for food likely to continue to decline, slowly as it has in the 
past, or more rapidly, or not at all? (2) Is the farmer's share of the 
consumer's food dollar likely to continue to decline, as it has declined in 
recent years, or is the present 40 percent level something of a bed-rock 
bottom? 
We will consider these two questions in order. 
1. Percentage of consumers 1 income spent for food 
It seems likely that consumers' per capita and total expend-
itures for food will continue to increase in the future 
as in'the recent past, but that the percentage of the income 
spent for food will continue to decline. The question is, 
how rapid will be the rate of the decline? 
The same reasons that caused the percentage of consumers' 
income spent for food to decline in the past probably will 
be operating in the future -- Engel's law, mild inflation, 
population growth increasing the demand for food, and 
technology increasing the supply Of food at about the same 
rate or slightly faster. 
We cannot assert that reasons will continue to exert their 
effects at the same rates in the future as in the past. And 
even a small change in the rate of any one of them could have 
a large influence on the percentage of consumers 1 income 
spent for food. For instance, a small increase in food 
production relative to the increase in population growth could 
depress the prices of farm products drastically, because 
the demand for food is highly inelastic. 
Here we can only point out what the reasons for the changes 
were in the past, and ask the experts in those fields to tell 
us what the possibilities for the future are in each case. As 
laymen in those fields, we can merely say that it seems to 
us to be likely that the rates of change in the different factors 
will be about the same over the next few years in the future 
as they were in the recent past. If they are, then the percentage 
of consumers 1 income spent for food is likely to continue to 
decline in the near future at about the same rate as it declined 
in the past, or a little faster. The reason why the decline 
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may be a little faster is that the income- elasticity 
curve is convex from above, A detailed study of 
individual households rather than averages from groups 
of households, in three separate income groups, 
reveals that the relationship between income and the 
value of food and beverages consumed differs at different 
levels of incomes, "Among nonfarm households, the 
average value of all food and beverages consumed per 
person during a week was $6 o 70 in low-income households, 
$8 0 06 in medium-, and $9 0 46 in high- income households o 
The income elasticities at these means were 0,25, 0,21, 
and 0 0 15, respectively, These findings show that the 
effects of a change in income on value of food consumed 
at home are more pronounced when they occur at low 
levels of income than when they take place at higher 
levels of income, This seems to be in accord with ex-
pectations since high income people probably already are 
eating the foods they prefer and would have little incentive 
to change their consumption patterns if their incomes go 
up, ,,1/ 
This means that as incomes continue to rise in the future, 
reaching higher levels than they attained in the past, the 
effects of this rise on expenditures for food are likely to 
be smaller than they were in the past o 
2o_ Fc:~mers' share of consumers' expenditure for food 
The question here is whether the farmer 1 s share of the 
consumer 1 s expenditures for food will continue to decline 
as it did from 194 7 to 1958, or remain at about the same 
percentage (40 percent), that it reached in 1958, which is 
about the same as it was during the period 1935 - 1940 
before World War II 0 
The income-elasticity of the demand for marketing services 
is estimated to be about 5 times as high as the elasticity for 
food products at the farm level ( 0 0 7 compared with 0 0 15) 0 2 I 
If per capita incomes continue to rise, as most economists 
predict they will, then the demand for marketing services 
will expand more than the demand for food as such, In that 
1/ Letter from George Ro Rockwell, SHR, AMS, USDA, May 12, 19590 
2/ Rex Daly, "The Long-Run Demand for Farm Products," Agr, Econo 
Res., VIII:3, po 78, and 11 Demand for Farm Products at Retail and at the 
FarmLevel,''mimeo, Oct, 1957, pp,8-l2, 
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case, the number of workers employed' in marketing, and 
the total resources used by marketing firms, will increase 
relative to workers and resources in agriculture, and 
marketing costs will make up an increasing share of 
consumers 1 expenditures for food. This means that the 
share of consumers 1 expenditures for food going to farmers 
will decline. 
These things will happen unless new technological improve-
ments increase efficiency in food marketing more rapidly 
than in agricultural food production. This is possible. As 
G. T. Barton and R. F. Daly said here last fall: 
"There is no; doubt that the consumer demands more of the 
highly processed, packaged and trimmed foods such as canned, 
frozen and concentrated foods and juices; prepared mixed; 
packaged meats and vegetables; prepared meals; parking space; 
big modern efficient display stores. But it is not so clear 
how much more services the consumer is getting in the form 
of man-hours of work, use of transportation facilities, and use 
of materials in marketing and processing. Recent studies 
show, notably for citrus fruits, that fresh fruit is more 
expensive at retail than highly processed frozen juices. 
Prepared mixes apparently cost only a little more thjn the 
separate ingredients, and in some instances less .'1 1 
Thus it may be possible for the food marketing industry to provide the in-
creasing quantity of services demanded by consumers so efficiently that 
marketing costs do not increase. It seems hardly likely, however, that this 
increase in marketing efficiency can :proceed so rapidly that marketing costs 
will decrease relative to farm food production costs. 
1/ Barton, G. T. and R_, F. Daly, "Prospects for Agriculture in a Growing 
Economy, 11 USDA, ARS, AMS, Mimeo., Oct. 1958, p. 5. 
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DISCUSSION OF THE SHEPHERD TALK 
Elizabeth E. Hoyt 
1. Engel's law. It is unfortunate that we ever came to use the term Engel's 
law for what is really nothing more than the inelasticity of the human 
stomach. Anybody in this room could have produced Engel's law. But giving 
the fact a name of a person suggests that maybe it is not a permanent law, 
and may be superseded or modified, in somewhat the same way as Newtonian 
physics was modified by Einstein and the newer theories of today. 
2. The Harris and Dwoskin study referred to on page 75 of the Shepherd 
report is misleading, and puts us on our guard against the use of other studies 
which appear to have been produced to give certain desired evidence rather 
than to make an objective investigation. It is subject to criticism on four 
counts: 
a. Some foods the cost of which diminished by processing 
are included several times (oranges come in four times, 
lemons and limes four times) whereas some foods the cost 
of which increases by processing (breakfast cereals) are 
not included at all. 
b. The units used for unprocessed and for processed foods 
are not always the same. The chief example of this is tea; 
in order to get the advantage of tea processing, which 
reduces the price, the tea is to be bought in units costing 
$7.84 each. 
c. Season of the year at which comparisons were made. 
Comparisons of cost offt-uit and vegetables, fresh as 
contrasted with processed, were made in December, when 
the cost of fresh vegetables would naturally be at its 
high point. It is very misleading to compare cost of fresh 
corn on the cob with the cost of canned corn in December. 
There are 11 other similar examples. 
d. There is no weighting of items in relation to their use 
in family food consumption. Shrimp, the cost of which was 
reduced by processing, comes into these figures twice, 
whereas bread, the cost of which is increased, comes in 
only once. 
3. On page 82 the question is raised of predictions for the futur~; what is 
likelyto be the c'our'se "of the percentage Of COUSUmers I inCOme Spent for food? 
I should like to emphasize the conclusion that we cannot predict it. Demand 
Elizabeth E. Hoyt is professor of economics, Department of Economics and 
Sociology, Iowa State College. 
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for particular foods is influenced by many things, including research (which 
may or may not be objectively presented at the time it is made); fashion; 
advertising and promotion, as well as factors of price, income, availability, 
etc. 
4. There is a tendency in American life, not limited to food, to look down 
on anything inexpensive; in food this is illustrated by calling inexpensive 
foods, such as bread, "inferior goods." {Paper, p. 76) 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
AGRICULTURAL AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
Morton Smutz 
There is a complex relationship between the agricultural and chemical 
industries. The chemical companies sell :many products to the farmer, 
and the chemical companies buy many products from the farmer. 
Frequently the chemical industries improve the properties of agricultural 
products before using them or reselling them. In a number of cases, the 
chemical industry and the agricultural industry are in direct competition. 
This paper discusses each of these facets of the relationship and attempts 
to predict the future relationship between these two important segments 
of our society. 
A Consumer of Chemicals: The availability of chemical fertilizers, feed 
supplements, herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides, etc. makes 
it possible to farm more efficiently and produce farm products at a lower 
cost. In most cases, these improvements have been joint efforts between 
agricultural scientists and representatives from the chemical industry. 
For reasons best known to you, farm efficiency does not seem to be as 
important as it once did. Some economists have suggested that a tax be 
levied on chemical fertilizers to discourage their use. Although this 
might be effective in reducing production, there must be more direct methods 
of making agriculture less efficient and adding to production costs. 
The phosphate fertilizer manufacturers provide more than 10, 000, 000 tons 
of product annually, and this is now the fastest growing branch of the 
inorganic chemical industry. Present trends indicate that this growth rate 
will continue for quite some time. 
Because the annual loss by agricultural ·pests is about $10, 000, 000, 000 and 
the amount spent for pesticides is only a small fraction of that, one can 
expect a continued growth of chemical pesticides. 
Raw Materials for the Chemical Industry: The chemical industry has used 
various agricultural products as raw materials for many years. About 
2, 000, 000, 000 pounds of starch are produced from cereal products each 
year. Almost 70 percent is used in the various chemical industries~ 
Morton Smutz is Head, Chemical Engineering Department, Iowa State College. 
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Large quantities of cellulose are obtained from cotton and wood. Over 
100,000 tons of cotton linters are processed annually to produce the cellulose 
needed to make rayon, cellulose acetate (60, 000,000 lbs. per year for 
cigarette filters), plastics, etc. 
Large quantities of grains are used in the production of various alcoholic 
beverages B.uch as beer and whiskey. Large quantities of vegetable and 
animal oils are used in the soap and paint industries. 
Improvement of Agricultural Products: Many examples could be cited showing 
how the chemical industry improves the quality of agricultural products. 
The hydrogenation of fats and oils has had a pig impact on the industry. Over 
3, 000, 000, 000 pounds of hydrogenated oils are produced in the United States 
each year. 
The application of solvent extraction as a processing technique has resulted 
in more and better soybean oil at a lower price. The Solexol process is 
used to split soybean oil into two fractions. One fraction is a better drying 
oil and the other is a better edible oil. Various "fat splitting" techniques 
have made fatty acids available. The Emersol process makes it possible 
to separate the fatty acids on the basis of saturation. Vacuum distillation 
techniques separate fatty acids according to molecular weight. 
Competitors: Many examples can be cited showing how the chemical 
industry has reduced the demand for agricultural products by providing a 
better product or a more economical prorluct for the consumer. One 
example is that of industrial alcohol manufacture. For many centuries, 
ethyl alcohol has been made by the fermentation of starch or sugar. Until 
recently, very large quantities of corn and sugar were used to produce our 
alcohol requirements. During the past few years, almost all of the non-
beverage alcohol has been made by the chemical industry using ethylene 
from natural gas as the starting material. In this process, ethylene is 
reacted with water to produce low cost high purity alcohol. Although 
estimates vary, corn would have to cost less than 50 ~ents per bushel to 
be seriously considered as a raw material for non-beverage industrial 
alcohol manufacture. 
During World War I, one of the remarkable contributions of the chemical 
industry was the manufacture of acetone and butyl alcohol by the fermenta-
tion of starch contahiing gr·ain:;. The petrochemical industry now produces 
almost all of the acetone required. 
We are all familiar with the popularity of the synthetic fibers such as nylon, 
orion, dacron, dyne!, etc. Although cotton still reigns supreme, the growth 
of the synthetic fibers has been spectacular. Recent predictions {March 30, 
1959 Chemical and Engineering News) indicate that the sale of noncellulosic 
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synthetic fibers will increase by 145 percent between now and 1965. 
Latex based paints were introduced commercially in 1948 and grew very 
rapidly. In 1953 latex paint sales amounted to over 40, 000, 000 gallons. 
You and I enjoy using this type of paint because it is almost "streak proof", 
dries quickly, has low odor and is durable. This type of paint has increased 
the demand for butadienestyrene copolymer and reduced the demand for 
vegetable, animal and fish oils. 
Chemurgy Research: Many capable scientists and engineers have devoted 
their lives to research hoping to find more industrial uses for agricultural 
products and byproducts. The research work by industry, the four 
Regional Laboratories, and by universities have developed some sucessful 
processes. In recent years, however, developments in the chemical 
industry have reduced the demand for agricultural products rather than 
stimulated new uses. 
It is possible to- ·make hundreds of chemical substances from agricultural 
products and byproducts. In most cases it is possible to make the same 
products more ·economically by simpler direct chemical reactions using 
products from natu:t'.al gas or crude oil as starting materials. 
The greatest potential in finding new industrial uses for agricultural 
products would seem to be to find the most economical way to isolate the 
most complex chemicals present and to seek new uses for them. The 
chemical industry would develop alternate ways of producing some of these 
compounds, but some would survive the competition. Too little research 
of this kind is now being done. 
The Future: 1. The farmer will continue to buy chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides and feed supplements in ever increasing quantities. 
2. Over a period of years we will gradually exhaust our non-renewable 
sources of organic c~micals; natural gas, crude oil and coal. We will 
gradually become more dependent on renewable sources. 
3. The amount of agricultural products used for industrial purposes will 
depend upon the cost of these products to the chemical industry, the amount 
of research done to develop new uses, and unpredictable new technical 
developments. 
4. As advances are made in fundamental chemistry and chemical engineering 
science, the chemical industry will be able to produce more complex chemicals 
economically on a large scale. It is possible to foresee the possibility of 
direct competition between the chemical industry and the agricultural industry 
in the food market. 
90 
5. The same vertical integration developments taking place in poultry 
and meat processing will take place in supplying raw materials to the 
chemical industry. The possibility of more stable prices would encourage 
the use of agricultural products as raw materials. 
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POTENTIALS FOR NEW CROPS TO MEET 
NEW EXISTING DEMANDS 
I. J 0 Johnson 
Approximately two years ago, the Congress authorized the appointment of 
a commission 1 / to study the possibilities for greater industrial utilization 
of agricultural products. Major objectives of this study were to determine 
if possible expansion of industrial uses might serve to utilize surplus 
products now in storage and to find new agricultural crops having unique 
industrial uses that could be grown as a replacement for those crops now 
produced in surplus 0 This commission under the chairmanship of S. Leroy 
Welsh with Mr. Wheeler McMillan as Executive Director established 
"task groups", each to deal with a specific aspect of the entire problem. 
After study of the problem, among other recommendations, this commission 
recommended that appropriate steps should be taken to enact legislation by 
the congress to provide appropriations for research and for such other 
programs related to industrial utilization as was deemed necessary to carry 
out its recommendations. A bill was introduced in 1958 requesting 
appropriations to implement these recommendations. 
Emphasis on programs to find new uses for agricultural products is not new 0 
Surplus of crops in the 1930's became an important factor in the decision 
to establish four regional research laboratories in the U. S. Department of 
Agriculture; the one for this region located at Peoria, Illinois. According 
to the original mandate, nearly all research at these laboratories was to be 
directed toward finding new, improved or expanded uses for existing 
commodities. This is in sharp contrast to the present proposed program 
(for crops) to find~ crops to replace those in surplus. 
That opportunities exist for the establishment of new crops can hardly be 
denied. About 50 years ago, soybeans were grown on only a very limited 
scale (less than 50,000 acres); today this crop is grown on nearly 25 million 
acres. Ten years ago the acreage of safflower was essentially none, while 
now the acreage is over 100, 000. Among the 250, 000 species of higher 
plants, less than 100 have an annual value of $1, 000, 000 each in the U.S .A. 
Iver J. Johnson is Professor in charge of Farm Crops, Iowa State College. 
1 I Public Law 540 -- 84th Congress, Sec. 209. 
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Very few crops can be called "new crops•• in the most strict sence. Nearly 
all crops now grown were important in some parts of the world long before 
they were introduced into American agriculture. 
For purposes of this seminar, a ••new crop 11 will be defined as one not 
currently in domestic use, or if so, on such a limited scale that its importance 
has not yet enabled it to find its potential place in culture and one :whose use 
fills a new need. In an economy of surplus feed crops a new crop thus 
cannot be one which only serves as a substitute for uses of existing crops. 
For example, grain sorghum, although relatively new in many parts of the 
U.S .A., is in reality only a substitution crop for corn and other feed grains. 
Hence, it serves no real function in a new crops program designed to 
establish new uses for agricultural products. In contrast, if a new use can be 
found for an existing crop this expanded use may make possible the absorption 
of a surplus. In this discussion, major emphasis will be given to finding 
new crops whose potential use does not become a substitute for an existing 
crop. 
The logical starting point in a new crops program is to determine needs 
based on the end-point uses of plant products and from these needs to 
determine which new species might best fulfill them. This process has been 
described as "an educated fishing expedition11 by Wolff and Jones 2 1. The 
task force on New and Special Crops under the President's Commission has 
outlined the major new and expanded needs for crop products in the following 
categories: 
1. Pulp and Cordage Fibers 
a. Paper and paper products - 30 million tons, much 
of which is imported. 
b. Dissolving pulps (cellophane and cellulose derivatives -
800, 000 tons. 
c. Hard fibers - 200, 000 tons imported. 
d. Soft fibers - 850, 000 tons imported. 
2. Gum-like products 
Carbohydrate gums and mucilages used in textile printing, 
paper coating, etc. - 40 million pounds imported. 
3. Proteins for industrial and feed uses. 
Industrial use of protein now at 100 million pounds annually. 
More economical plant source needed. 
2/ Chemurgic Digest, September, 1958. 
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4, Industrial Vegetable oils 
Present use of synthetic chemicals at 3 billion pounds 
New oils needed with specific properties. 
5. Waxes 
Present import 30 million pounds. 
6. Pharmacueticals 
Present and potential acreage for obtaining drugs from 
plants is small. 
7. Tanning agents 
Present import about 64, 000 tons annually. 
8. Insecticides 
About 100 million pounds used annually of which 7. 2 million 
pounds from plant sources. 
9. Antioxidants 
Used in petroleum products, paints, etc. Present use 
88 million pounds. Many plant products have antioxygenic 
properties. 
10. Films and Fibers 
In 1954 over 350 million pounds of cellulose film produced. 
Markets are expanding. 
11. Soil conditioners 
12. New Foods 
13. Seeds 
Estimate needs of 450, 000 acres to produce crop seed now 
imported. 
On the basis of the above information, the New Crops Research Branch in the 
Crops Research Division and comparable units in the Utilization Research and 
Development Divisions have jointly undertaken a research program to 
procure promising new crops and to screen them for their unique chemical 
components that would economically fill these needs. Although this program 
has been in operation for only a very short period of time, a few promising 
leads have been found in the following specific 'Categories; 
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1. Oilseeds 
a. Species high in erucic acid {Brassica family) 
Bras sica campestris, crambe abyssinica, Eruca sativa, 
etc. 
b. Species high in petrosilinic acid. Daucus carota, 
Foeniculum vulgare, Apium graveolens, etc. 
c. Species high in_ diene'-c'orit;Hning oils. Rudbecki a 
bicolor, Helianthus maXIn.iliana, Helianthus annus, etc. 
d. Species high in triene-containing oils. Monarda 
fistulosa, Margorana hortensis, Euphprbia marginata, etc. 
2. Pulp crops 
Crotolaria juncea, Sesbania sp., Sorghum almum 
3. Non- starch carbohydrate gums 
Guar 
The above is only a partial list of plant species that have potential new 
industrial uses. In certain cases, especially in the oil seeds, the residue 
also is high in protein. 
From prior explora,tory work on new crops, another group of species appear 
to have industrial usefulness. Certain of these species are now grown to a 
limited extent, but the industrial development of their products has not 
progressed to a large enough scale to provide important replacements for 
existing crops. These crops include: 
1. Castorbeans - a source for industrial oils. 
Potential use in 3 years; 120, 000 acres, in 13 years 
500, 000 acres, in 23 years, 1, 000, 000 acres. At 
present only 5, 000 acres grown in southwesL 
2. Canaigre - a source of tannin. 
Present acreage, essentially none; potential 100,000 
acres. A root crop, harvested in second year from seed. 
Largely adapted to southwest. 
3. Bamboo - a source 'for pel,per pulp. 
Present acreage small; potential 1, 000, 000 acres. Largely 
adapted to southeastern states. 
4. Jojoba - a source for wax. 
Present acreage nonei potential 150,000 acres. Largely 
adapted to southwest. A shrub growing to maturity in 8-9 
years. Liquid wax obtained from nuts. 
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5, Kenaf - a source for soft fiber, 
Present acreage almost none; potential 200, 000 acres, 
Largely adapted to cotton belt and southern part of 
corn belt, An annual crop, 
6. Sansevieria - a source for hard fiber, 
Present acreage very small; potential 100,000 acres, 
Largely adapted to southeasL Crop established from 
cuttings and harvested 3-4 years later, 
There are many problems associated with the development of a new crop in 
American agriculture, First, from the viewpoint of production, it must be 
adapted to mechanization, With farm labor supplies dwindling, any new 
crop that requires excessive hand labor in planting and harvesting can 
hardly be expected to find acceptance. Second, production practices must 
be determined to attain optimum procedures for growing the crop. Present 
crop plants widely grown have passed through a long transition period (and 
still subject to change) in this respect. Third, development of superior 
strains by breeding will surely be necessary to improve agronomic, 
chemical, disease and insect resistance. American farmers have come to 
expect their crops to be improved in these respects 0 Fourth, industry 
utilizing the product derived from the crop must be assured of a stable 
outlet for the product to justify investment in plant facilities, .E..i!!.!:.• the 
competitive position of the industrial product must be favorable either 
to a synthetic source or to imports from abroad where the product might 
be produced at a lower cost, The implications of producing at home, rather 
than importing, to the balance in trade for those crops which we export to 
other countries may in the long run be disadvantageous to our own economy, 
The discussion thus far has been concerned largely with ''new crops'' for 
industrial uses o Perhaps equally important is an analysis of the potentials 
from modification of existing crops to meet new industrial demands. The 
advantages of this approach are obvious, since the know-how of producing 
the crop has been established, Two examples may be cited to illustrate 
this point, 
1. Development of waxy endosperm in maize. This type 
of starch provided a replacement for a similar type 
previously obtained from the cassava root imported 
from the Dutch East Indies. This type of starch is 
used in food products (tapioca and instant puddings) 
and for glue and other adhesives. Approximately 
100, 000 acres of waxy corn a:re grown to provide this 
type of starch. 
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2. Development of high anylose starch in corn. 
Current research suggests the possibility of 
adding these genetic factors for high amylose 
to existing lines of corn. The straight-chain 
starch molecule of this type offers promise for 
.use in films and fibers. 
General Summary: The development of new crops to replace those now in 
surplus should not be considered as a short-time research and development 
program. Establishment of a new crop (for crops) requires a coordinated 
program among several agencies to firmly establish the demand' for its 
product, the competitive relationships of the product with alternative 
sources of supply and the potentials for its economic production as a crop 
under present day mechanized agriculture. 
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POINT FOUR AND ITS EFFECT 
ON UNITED STATES TRADE 
Sherwood 0. Berg* 
Introduction. An analogy between Karl Marx's nineteenth century gas-light 
London and the twentieth century "tail-finned" United States was made by 
Gunnar Myrdal in the International Economy. In his comparison, Dr. Myrdal 
substituted countries for classes and concluded that as wealthier nations 
increase their wealth, poorer nations become poorer. 
One clear lesson of the opposite movements of rich and poor nations was that 
the security of our nation would be further threatened. But, perhaps more 
importantly, it would add to the further political instability and economic 
and social frustrations of the millions of peoples of the lesser developed 
countries of the world. 
The overwhelming majority of the peoples in the underdeveloped countries 
are· illiterate; many live at the borderline of adequate nourishment. They have 
a life expectancy of a little over 30 years, or less than one-half of that in this 
country. They produce, on a per capita bas is, less than one ..;tenth the goods 
an'd services of the co/ntries of Western Europe or approximately one-twentieth 
of the United States. 1 The things they share in common are: low productivity; 
low income, low levels of living; a high rate of population increase; and; in 
most instances, a recently-kindled, intense desire to shake themselves of 
this poverty. 
Some of this newly fermented zeal for economic progress and social reform 
has been merely blunted in a vague and nebulous resentment against conditions 
as they now exist; in other cases, it has served to fire a quest for growing 
knowledge and outside resources to initiate and accelerate economic growth. 
Thus, the changing status and aspirations of people in the less developed 
countries have opened new paths leading to expanded economic relations and 
general contacts in the world. In this general stiring and awakening, a new 
and untested world balance of power is being created. 
Sherwood Berg is head of the Department of Agricultural Economics, University 
of Minnesota. 
>!<The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Mr. Turner Oyloe, 
research assistant, University of Minnesota, and the helpful suggestions of Dr, 
Arthur F. Hanau, University of Goettingen, West German, presently visiting 
professor, University of Minnesota. 
1/ "Economic Development Assistance," Committee for Economic Development 
April, 1957. 
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Moreover, the arousing of the underdeveloped nation's. desire for progres Iii, 
coupled with the developments of a bi-polar international power struggle 
between East and West, has precipitated a world-wide ideological struggle 
for men's minds. The rise of Russia from a backward country to the world's 
second greatest industrial power in 40 years can be a powerful incentive for 
underdeveloped nations to attempt development by communistic methods. 
A situation has been created in which the millions of people, searching for 
the touchstone of economic progress with desperate determination, are 
weighing two systems: the communist system and our system. Which will 
lead to the fulfillment of goals of betterment more quickly? 
The current power struggle can be witnessed in many areas. but perhaps it 
is being waged most dramatically in the Near and Far East. All of the small 
nations of Southeastern Asia and the Near East are watching to see if the 
economic development programs currently pursued are more successful 
within the working democracy in India or under the totalitarian communistic 
system of Federated People's Republic of China. The destiny of our free 
society, the ideals we: cherish and the world balance of power is at stake. 
The success of the United States in its efforts to encourage, aid and abet 
these important areas of the world might, in the long run, spell victory or 
defeat of the so-called Western way of life. 
The present international situation has lead us to accept three rather broad 
postulates in the conduct or guidance of our foreign affairs: firstly, that -
economic growth of the underdeveloped world is essential to our own national 
security; secondly, that economic development will increase our trade with 
foreign nations arid thereby permit a more economical use of resources by 
promoting specialization of production; and, thirdly, that the humanitarian 
principle dictates that we should help our follow men. Z/ 
It is the second postulate that we wish to examine most closely in this 
presentation. Moreover. we shall confine ourselves to the operation of Point 
IV activities as differentiated from other economic development programs 
and their effect on the exports of the United States agricultural and industrial 
exports. And, furthermore, we shall attempt to explore the effects in the 
short and long run or through various stages of development. 
The Objectives of Point IV. The basic intent and purposes of Point IV has 
been stated clearly by the Congress of the United States. The following 
Z/ Mason, EdwardS., "Competitive Coexistence and Economic Development 
is Asia," Proceedings of Eleventh American Assembly, Columbia 
University, June 1957, pp. 63-71. 
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objectives were ecompassed in the initial legislation: 
To aid the efforts of the peoples of economically under-
developed areas to develop their resources and improve 
their working and living conditions by encouraging the 
exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow 
of investment capital to countries which provide conditions 
under which such technical assistance and capital can 
effectively and constructively contril:u te to raising standards 
of living, creating new sources of wealth, increasing 
productivity and expanding purchasing power. 
The expenditures to carry out the specific objectives of Point IV have not 
been large. Our total foreign aid outlays have been large but not our Point 
IV expenditures. In recent years, from $3.8 to $5. 0 billions of foreign grants 
and credit have been extended annually by the United States. Most of these 
funds have been spent on our direct military or defense support efforts. 
Other than for emergency relief or famine, only $1.0 to $1.5 billions has been 
for economic aid to the underdeveloped countries. Of this latter sum, only 
$100 to $135 million have been allocated to Point IV purposes. 3/ For a 
program touching more than a billion of population, covering three continents, 
it is of very modest cost compared with other programs. Its annual cost is 
about one-third of our total defense and economic assistance support to the 
one country of South Korea. 
In addition to being a relatively small program, Point IV differs from other 
aid programs in that it is a technical assistance program engaged, first and 
foremost, in the development and transfer of skills and related knowledge. 
However, the initiation of technical progress, as so clearly spelled out in 
the Congressional mandate cited above, is intricately interwoven with 
effeCtive utilization of capitaL In fact, the interdependence of knowledge and 
capital as related to economic development demand further exploration. 
The Transfer of Knowledge. Looking initially at the problem of transfer 
of knowledge, economic growth depends upon both technological knowledge 
about things and living creatures and upon social knowledge about man and 
his relationships with fellowmen. The former is often emphasized in the 
context of Point IV. However, the latter is just as important since growth 
depends as much upon such matters as learning how to administer large scale 
orgranizations, or creating institutions which favor economizing efforts, as 
it does upon breeding new seeds or learning how to build bigger dams. 
3 I Gardner 1 Richard N. , "New Directions in U. S. Foreign Economic Policy, 11 
Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, Number 133, January-February 
1959. 
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For example, the potential increased productivity from the dissemination 
and the use of available information in some underdeveloped communities 
is profound. This is especially important when we consider that increased 
productivity of the soil in most underdeveloped areas is one ot the quickest 
methods of raising national income. Admittedly, in many areas, considerable 
research must be carried out before extension recommendations can be made; 
in fact, research is a pre-requisite to extension. However, once knowledge 
becomes available the need for dissemination through extension type programs 
becomes of primary importance. 
The costs of the extension of knowledge are part of the overall plan of 
economic development that must be borne by the general economy. According 
toW. Arthur Lewis' study, The Theory of Economic Growth, a general 
rule of thumb for the allocation of funds for agricultural extension and 
research purposes varies between 3/4 and one percent of the national farm 
income. This proportion has, for example, been spent by the United States, 
Great Britain, and Japan. 
Mr. Lewis also cites some rough estimates of the returns on this type of 
investment and these estimates underscore the high marginal rates of return 
that have been experienced. An example of increased productivity through 
application of technical knowledge involves Japan where agricultural product-
ivity increased at a cumulative annual rate of L 3 percent per annum during 
the period 1880-1920. Rates of one percent were attained by Great Britain 
and the United States during the same period. 4/ 
The Need for Capital Formation. In addition to the transfer of knowledge, 
capital investments are associated with increased economic growth. More-
over, we must emphasize again that it is not merely a matter of making 
capital funds available but a suitable institutional framework for its 
utilization must be provided. In a sense, this establishes a condition that 
knowledge and capital go hand'. in hand. 
In the experience of most industrial countries, capital investments of 9 to 12 
percent of national income have resulted in growth in the economies of about 
3 percent. Thus, the ratio of the value of added capital and value of additional 
output has been roughly three or four to one. 5/ 
These estimates of growth rates in developed nations are generally predicated 
on increased investments in direct production equipment. For these nations m 
which there are large investments in buildings and public works, increased 
capital investment does mean direct productive goods. However, for 
4/ Lewis, W. Arthur, The Theory of Economic Growth (London: Sinson 
Shand, ltd.), 1957, 1. 189. 
5/ Ibid, p. 201. 
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underdeveloped nations the structure of investments is substantially different. 
There must be investments on the farms in the form of permanent land 
improvements, livestock, farm buildings, fertilizer and so forth; in specific 
service to agricultural production and marketing, such as water control 
works~ storage and processing; in seryices shared by the farm and non-farm 
sectors, as transportation, communication, electrification, education and 
health service; and in urban development and industrialization in general. 6/ 
In other words, little improvement in national welfare is possible without 
a progressive shift from a predominantly subsistance agriculture to production 
for the market. Markets, in turn, are dependent upon the expansion of 
transportation and communications, upon the growth of industrialization and 
urbanization, and the development of trade on an international as well as a 
national scale -- all of which hinges, of course, on capital investment and 
the acquiring of technical 11 know'how''. Agriculture is never developed for 
agriculture 1 s sake, but only if, through the industrialization process, urban 
populations are expanded in the country or in other parts of the world and if, 
as a result, the demand for food and other farm products increases. 
With a large segment of capital expenditures earmarked for basic construction 
purposes, the immediate utilization of capital for increasing the real income 
of the people will likely be lower in underdeveloped countries than what we 
have come to accept as normal in more advanced nations. Also wastage of 
capital will have to be tolerated due to lack of talent in organization, main-
tenance, and skill in use of productive as sets. 
Because of the expense involved in purchasing capital goods, every available 
means should be utilized in substituting labor for capital. In the early stages, 
progress in production is achieved primarily by the use of surplus rural labor 
and simple working tools in improvement work. Studies from the Far East 
regarding the labor needed to maintain draft animals have de1nonstrated that 
such beasts of burden are essentially accumulators of human energy. In other 
words, over a period of time, the human labor expended in caring and 
maintaining an animal were roughly equivalent to the animal 1 s power contribution. 7 l 
This was explained in part by the fact that human labor is spread over the 
year. However, with economic development, work animals were being used 
more days in the year and their net contribution in power value exceeded 
the human labor invested. 
6/ de Vries, Egbert and Oscar Zablits, 11 Capital Investment and Its Effect 
on Agricultural Production and Demand for Agricultural Products, 11 Mimeo-
graphed paper, International Population Conference, Rome, Italy, August 1954. 
7/ Ibid. 
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In spite of the efforts of capital substitution, savings in the form of 
accumulated funds are invariably needed to carry out economic develop-
ment. The problem always seemed to resolve itself to the question: 
from whence cometh the money? 
If we grant that some of the investment in high productivity ventures will 
be undertaken by international developmental ~gencies, foreign governments 
and private investors, then the low return investment will be largely the 
responsibility of domestic financing. History has demonstrated that a 
high activity in capital formation and economic growth has taken place where 
income is distributed more favorably in the direction of capital and less 
favorably toward labor. Stated in another manner, given the goal of rapid 
economic development, increased productivity in a given economy can not 
be passed back to labor, for then the surplus would go toward consumption 
expenditure rather than capital investment. 
Moreover, productivity gains of an economy to be used for reinvestment 
can be drained off in two general ways. One is by inflation; the other, taxation. 
A combination of inflation and taxation may also be employed. The manner 
in which development has taken place in the past using inflation and taxation 
are rather interesting. Japan is a case in point. The state gained control 
of the feudal lands of the nobility by first heavily taxing the land and then 
taking over the debts of the nobility and is suing government bonds in payment. 
The nobility finding themselves with government bonds turned to banking 
and were allowed to purchase factories whose establishment the government 
was encouraging. 8 1 Clearly, the cost of industrialization initially was borne 
by agriculture in the early period of economic development. 
This pattern of capital accumulation has been the rule in the development 
of ot.her countries, including our own. European capital, which immensely 
aided this country in its development, was initially serviced or paid for 
by agricultural exports . 
Point IV and Trade Patterns. As a young, expanding nation, we. were 
nurtured in our growth by a reliance on export markets as outlets for our 
domestically raised farm products and as sources of much-needed capital. 
Today, as a developed economy, much questioning and pointed criticism is 
directed at our national policies which in any way might encourage the 
production in underdeveloped nations of farm products that are directly 
competitive with ours. Thus, some persons and some groups would remove 
or severely curtail the opportunities for economic growth among under-
developed countries by methods which we in our early history once enjoyed. 
8/ Lewis, W. Arthur, op. cit., p. 237. 
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This attitude, I feel, is symptomatic and symbolic of our times. It springs 
from a growing anxiety spawned in the shadow of a pyramiding stock of $7 to 
$8 billion of farm surpluses; it reflects the cross-currents and conflicts 
which ensue when organized special groups are willing to sacrifice the nation's 
general welfare for their own interest; and it underscores the need Of public 
understanding of international economic problems o 
Admittedly, the impact of Point IV on our pattern of trade is difficult to 
assess. The interdependence of technical assistance and economic aid when 
applied to economic development should by now be apparent and defies 
differentiation, The two are hand and glove, Moreover, the time lag from the 
introduction of a new technique or new capital to fruition in terms of improved 
productivity, the availability of exportable surpluses, and their appearances 
on the world commodity markets shows a highly irregular pattern among 
nations and through periods of time. However, some attempt must be made 
to put this- problem in its prospective. 
It may be pointed out that the United States imports less than $35 million worth 
of farm commodities that are regarded as materially interfering with any 
domestic price support or other agricultural program undertaken by the 
Department of Agriculture. These products account for only about one percent 
of our total imports of foreign agricultural goods. The import restrictions 
our governmeflt imposes under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 
as amended, holds most of these imports at token levels. The majority of 
our agricultural imports, roughly $3 o 9 billion annual?', are either complemen-
tary or supplementary to our agricultural economy. 9 
Of course, we are interested in the degree to which our foreign markets 
may have been displaced due to technical aid extended to nations which compete 
with us for export outlets, But, here again, we should not overlook the 
influence of other important factors: namely, the impact of our farm price 
support program; and the actions of private U.S. corporations and investment 
firms abroad. 
_Factors other than Point IV may contribute to competition. The United States 
adherence to a system of farm price supports considerably above world 
market levels has served as a protective umbrella for prices of many farm 
commodities entering international commerce. As a consequence, at least 
in part, the response among producers of other nations, many of them in 
underdeveloped countries, has been to expand production under the favorable 
price conditions . 10 / In cotton, for example, at the same time that the 
9/ Gastineau, R.L., ''The Other Hal{p" Foreign Agriculture, USDA, FAS, 
Julyl957, p.6 
10 I It must be recognized that price supports programs have also stimulated the 
production of synthetic materials, such as synthetic fibers and detergents, 
which are competitive to both domestic and foreign farm products, 
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United States, in the face of a cotton surplus, reduced its output by almost 
three million bales as a result of an acreage cut of 25 percent, other cotton 
producing countries increased their production by 1, 3 million bales, 
Likewise, private investors have influenced agricultural production and trade 
pattern..s ~ Private investments leading to the production of competitive 
agricultural products have been made by United States private firms, 
particularly in Latin America. In these countries many United States 
companies, individuals and financial institutions have either directly or 
indirectly through subsidiaries and affiliated concerns, brough about large 
increases in cotton production and exports by establishing cotton gins and 
markets, furnishing technical and management assistance and providing 
financial aids to growers, cotton ginners and cotton cooperative. United 
States capital to a lesser degree has promoted increased production of other 
basic commodities and dairy products in these countries, 
The role of such private investments has been seen in Latin America where 
United States investments were largely credited with the very great increase 
in cotton production since 1950-51. AccQrding to the findings of a Congressional 
Subcommittee, United States corporations interested in such operatiYY1 have 
invested millions of dollars in plant and equipment in Latin America. Thus, 
while criticism has been frequently directed at governmental Point IV 
operations, there is considerable evidence that a number of United States 
owned companies are engaged in helping through financial and technical aid 
to stimulate production of agricultural commodities which are in surplus in 
the United States. 
Stages of Development Affect Trade Pattern. The further evaluation of 
Point IV policies on trade patterns must take into account certain short and 
long run aspects. In the short run, the application of a simple technical 
assistance program would have extremely limited effects on the United States 
exports of either industrial or agricultural goods. Training programs take 
time to establish and administer, and only small changes would flow from 
programs so limited in scope. 
However, if technical assistance were packaged with economic aid, a different 
impact can be expected. In carrying out such a program, it is highly probable 
that a recipient country operating on an industrial base which has exhibited 
some growth will choose to use its relatively meager hoard of aid dollars to 
11 I Hearings, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of 
Representatives 84th Congress, 2nd Session, "Department of Agriculture 
Appropriations for 1957, Part I: Investigation Reports,'' 1956. 
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purchase capital goods to accelerate its industrialization rather than spend 
them on consumption items, such as food. Under such circumstances, the 
market for United States industrial goods tend to expand, while those for 
agricultural commodities are relatively unaffected. In fact, they might be 
reduced if purchases of needed foods could now be made from soft currency 
areas. 
Recently, much interest has been generated for the direct use of surplus 
agricultural products in economic development. In fact, President Eisenhower 1 s 
"Food for Peace" program is based upon this thesis. Much of the discussion 
in implementing this program give recognition to the proposition that labor 
to a degree can be substituted for capital. 
In the early stages of economic development, large outlays are required for 
elementary public facilities such as roads, housing, harbors, electrical 
power, reclamation, public hygiene and education, without which there would 
be no industrial or agricultural advancement. The erection of this basic 
substructure has been estimated to account for about one-half of the initial 
development costs. That is the type of investment that requires relatively 
little outside economic aid for "overhead costs" of development, but requires 
large quantities of indigenous .material and local labor. It is the type of 
basic groundwork that has been frequently lacking, and this lack has led to 
an ineffective absorption of our economic assistance. 
Although the establishment of the substructure is essential to economic growth, 
the investments made produce no consumer goods in the first instance. An 
underdeveloped <country could resort to deficit financing of the building of 
the required substructure. In most nations, however, this would result in 
tremendous inflationary pres sure. The people added to the working force 
would spend most of their wages on food and clothing and, since those are not 
likely to be available, prices would rise. Moreover, the consumption among 
rural people is currently at such a low level that much of any increase in food 
output would be absorbed within the rural sector and would not be available 
for the new members of the industrial labor force, Thus, it is apparent that 
under circumstances of this nature, increased United States agricultural 
exports could be used to bring about more rapid employment to bolster a 
program of deficit financing in economic development. 
In a pilot study carried out in India there appeared to be a large number 
of projects potentially suitable for financing, in whole or in part, through 
surpluses, either as individual projects or as part of the general development 
program. It was further concluded that the longer the period for which the 
project could be assured surplus financing, usually the greater the proportion 
of total cost which can be financed by agricultural surpluses. On a four-year 
program basis, the average proportion of the costs covered by surpluses 
106 
varied from a low of 46 percent for industrial and semi-industrial projects; 
to 75 percent for roads. irrigation, and hydroelectric projects; and to 100 
percent for education and social development, lZ/ 
Clearly, the results of this study tended to be optimistic in regard to 
utilization of surplus foods for economic development. It is also interesting 
to observe that the category where utilization of agricultural products could 
cover most all the cost was education. The importance of education and 
individual training to economic growth has been imphas ized previously in 
this paper. 
If history chooses to repeat itself, the long-run effects of technical assistance 
will stimulate foreign trade. For historically, economic development has 
been an important factor in stimulating trade in both agricultural and industrial 
commodities. Contemporary events have shown how economic development 
played an important role in increased foreign trade. The Marshall Plan aid 
to Western Europe stimulated economic growth and consequently, U. 5. 
exports to this sector of the world. 
Moreover -- and this appears fairly important -- the countries with the 
highest per capita incomes are always our best customers. A country with a 
developed economy, such as the Netherlands, for example, spends $40 per 
person per year for American goods. Figures for other industrial nations 
are .Belgium and Luxembourg, $35; United Kingdom, $16; West Germany~ $14; 
and Japan, $9. This heavy volume of trade can be compared with that of 
underdeveloped countries: Ceylon, $2. 32 per ~erson per year; Pakistan, 
$1. 31; India, 77 cents; and Burma, 36 cents . 1 I The economic betterment 
of the latter nations would result in greater trade and prosperity for the 
United States. 
Summary and Conclusions. The United States technical assistance program, 
known as Point IV, is a relatively small portion dollar-wise of our foreign 
operations, but it is an important dimension of our foreign economic policy. 
Point IV is a major instrument through which millions of people in under-
developed countries hope and aspire to the fruits of economic growth. It is 
a means of promoting stability in regions vital to our own nation's security; 
it is a vehicle to carry out a humanitarian program between wealth and 
dire need. 
The tapestry of economic development is shaped by the warp of transfer of 
knowledge and the woof of capital formation. As an underdeveloped country 
13/ "Aid. Builds Markets, Congressmen Say, "Minneapolis Tribune, April 
17, 1959. 
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moves through its stages of development, its trade patterns may change 
to cause conflicts of interest with producer groups in the United States. But 
in the long run, historically, economic development has stimulated trade 
in both agricultural and industrial commodities. 
The future of our country as a world power depends to a large degree upon 
how well the general public understands our stake in the development of the 
economies of the nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We must 
recognize the difference between being a leader in economic development 
and dominant in economic development. The first term implies high interest, 
high activity and responsibility; the second implies a tendency to exploit every 
advantage to its limits. 
We must carefully assess our economic needs for the future and also the 
needs of the rest of the world and then arrive at a policy which will benefit 
as many people as possible. Our programs must be aimed at both national 
and world economic expansion. 
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THE BEHAVIOR OF MARGINS IN WHOLESALE AND 
RET AIL FOOD DISTRIBUTING FIRMS 
Bob R. Holdren 
This paper cannot be said to have a modest set of objectives. On the other 
hand, it can easily be seen by the reader that this paper cannot be said 
to be definitive. 
First, the margin behavior of wholesalers and retailers in the short run 
will be determined, and second, the long run behavior of margins will be 
predicted. 
Food Wholesaler in the Short Run. By "Food Wholesalers" we shall mean 
the agencies from which food retailers obtain merchandise for resale. Food 
wholesaling thus includes merchant wholesalers; the distributive organizations 
of some food manufacturers; meat packers; dairies; and the district ware-
houses of integrated retailers. All of these agencies have one characteristic 
in common: more than 90 percent of their total cost is represented by the 
"cost of goods sold1'. Thus, even a 10 percent increase in wages of labor 
could not increase the costs of food wholesalers by as much as one percent. 
In the short run, however, labor does not vary proportionately with sales 
(a large part of labor costs are fixed costs) and thus only a minuscule pro-
portion of any increase in labor cost can enter pricing. For all practical 
purposes, we can assume that wholesaling agencies have horizontal marginal 
cost functions and that these marginal cost functions differ little from the 
"cost of goods sold". On the other hand, it is well-known that merchant 
wholesalers, produce jobbers, and the like customarily practice average 
cost pricing (that is, they customarily add a fixed percentage margin to the 
"cost of goods sold"). Thus, the short run pricing behavior of such firms 
can be described by: 
1) I~ (We of F) (1 .; m) 
where I is invoice cost to the retailer, W c is wholesale list price in primary 
markets (or manufacturer's list price to wholesaler as the case may be), F 
is "freight inward", and m is the wholesaler's percentage markup. In the 
short run a change in freight rates or a variation in W c can affect I. We 
shall (somewhat tautologically) define the short run as the period in which there 
is no variation in m. 
Bob R. Holdren is assistant professor, Department of Economics and Sociology, 
Iowa State College. 
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Food Retailers in the Short Run: Food retailing has been variously 
described as competitive, monopolistic, monopolistically competitive, 
oligopolistic, or larcenous (especially by farmers and/ or consumers). The 
case for oligopoly appears very good on the surface. In any given competi-
tive group of stores, "fewness" dominates. The cross elasticities of 
demand between firms are substantial.!/ For a number of reasons, however, 
oligopoly agreement, and thus oligopoly behavior, does not eventuate. First, 
entry is relatively easy and less than optimal size firms enter and nibble 
away at the supermarkets trading area if price is established at a high level. 
Thus, price competition may not be a zero sum game. Second, losses may 
be imposed on outgroup retailers who cannot retaliate. Third, retail 
complementarity makes price cuts very attractive. Thus, any ag!eement 
is almost impossible to maintain. Fourth, differences in product line width 
make for differential pressures on entrepreneurs for price competition and 
make it impossible to establish any one price level and structure which is 
satisfactory to all participants. Fifth, the transgressor's offer cannot be 
duplicated except at prohibitive cost because of the omnipresent spatial 
differentiation. Sixth, the multidimensional character of response paths 
and the presence of consumer ignorance mean that there is a long lag between 
the initiation of action and the time when the results of the action are felt by 
competitors. In the interim, many parameters have changed and the 
competitors are never sure just what caused their change in sales. Seventh, 
marginal costs are subject to frequent changes and may be different for 
different stores. Thus, oligopoly agreement is virtually impossible and we 
are left with a market from which is best described as monopolistically 
competitive with substantial cross elasticities of demand, but which is subject 
to many other imperfections which preclude a long run adjustment to a zero 
profit equilibrium. 
For the moment let us aggregate over-all the products sold by a retailer 
and consider only the short run movement of the aggregate gross margin in 
response to movements in parameters. First, we must determine the 
shape and composition of the firm's marginal cost curve, In a study done by 
the writer, it was found that 98.6 percent of the variable costs of super-
markets are represented by "ca.st of goods sold'' {I). Of the remaining 1, 4 
1/ The writer has calculated the Biship measure of oligopoly (price elasticity 
Eii divided by eros s elasticity Eji) in one case between two supermarkets about 
one mile apart and found it to be 1. 6, which would of course be an oligopolistic 
relationship. See: Robert L. Bishop, "Elasticities, Cross Elasticities and 
Market Relationships", American Economic Review, XVII, No. 5 
(December, 1952), 780, 
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percent, 0. 9 percent is supplies and 0, 5 percent is labor cost. Z/ Supplies 
(primarily wrapping materials) vary in constant proportion to real output. 
Thus, the retail marginal cost function is horizontal and virtually unaffected 
by any change other than movements in L A comparison of columns 5 and 6 
of Table 1 confirms the conclusion that labor cost changes have little to do 
with retail price changes. Houston, Texas, a city with an already high level 
of wages, experienced the greatest increase in hourly earnings of any city in 
the group. Yet in roughly the same period Houston's food price index in-
creased by very nearly the smallest amount experienced in any city. Through-
out columns 5 and 6 there seems to be almost an inverse correlation between 
wage changes and retail price index changes. 
If we define the short run as the time period in which no major movements 
of the retail store's demand curve occurs, then it can be seen from Figure 1 
that the optimum change in retail price is one- half the change in I. 3/ This 
hypothesis competes with another formulated precisely, by Professor Fox. 4/ 
That is Pr = O?w -+ dr) rr' where Pr is retail price' pw==I, dr is store handling 
cost and 'Fr, is a factor greater than one. 51 In the Fox hypothesis: 
2 ) dp == r r di , r r > 1 0 
Now equations (1) and {2) are seemingly quite incompatible and at this point 
it seems wise to appeal to some data. Unfortunately only price index series 
and not price series are available so that some manipulation of equations ( 1) 
and (2) is essentiaL Let Yt equal the month to month change in the retail price 
index and Xt equal the month to month change in the wholesale price index for 
processed foods. 
2/ Actually in a regression of labor cost on sales, "b" was not found 
to be significantly different from zero at the ten percent confidence level. 
See: Bob R. Holdren, "The Structure of a Retail Market and the Market 
Behavior of Retail Units". (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Yale 
University, pp. 51-52). 
3/ In equilibrium dp::::- 1/2 dl. T,his result is dependent only upon the 
existance of a horizontal marginal cost curve and a linear demand curve. It 
is independent of the elasticity of demand. 
4/ See: Karl A. Fox, Econometric Analysis for Public Policy (Ames, Iowa: 
Iowa State College Press, 1958, pp. 50-51). 
5/ Ibid., p. 50. 
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0------~~----~----------~~A=R~---------
q 
Figure 1 
3) Yt = t1 pt 
Po 
and from equation ( 1): 
Applying note (3) and equation (5) 
and 
9) Yt::::l/2Xt(l-tm)Wc0 
Po 
The Fox hypothesis leads to: 
10) Yt:::.rr Xt (1+m) Wc 0 
Po 
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m equals approximately . 06 and. Wc_n ( 1. 06) probably equals about . 83. Thus 
under my hypothesis: Po 
Under the Fox hypothesis: 
12) Yt= .83 rr Xt, rr> 1. 6 / 
Consider the last column of Table 1. It seems unlikely that the Fox hypothesis 
is applicable in recent years. This conclusion is borne out by the regressions 
recorded in Table 2. (Admittedly, the writer chose two cities for computations 
which seemed most favorable to the writer's hypothesis.) At any rate, 
the results suggest that a more extensive analysis of the available data should 
prove interesting. 
6/ rr.:::- 1 is the hypothesis that retailers maintain a constant percentage 
margin and in such case, Yt= .8 3 Xt'. 
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The observed inverse relationship between hourly wage rate changes 
and changes in the price index, together with the results of the regression 
analysis, are compatible with a monopolistically competitive market afflicted 
with imperfections in knowledge on the part of both buyers and sellers and 
with different retail demand elasticities in different cities. 
(The elasticity of demand would not affect the seller's optimum response to 
a change in I in a "perfect" monopolistically competitive market, but in 
a market in which the seller is imperfectly informed, a low elasticity allows 
non-optimising behavior to go unpunished. It is well known that there is a 
bias towards too high a price in such markets. Thus we would expect the 
observed price increase to be greater than optimal and the less elastic the 
demand, the larger is the departure from optimal behavior.) 
The foregoing statement concerning elasticities in different cities is in 
part tautological. A precondition for a high price elasticity is the existence 
of informed buyers. It is possible, however, to make the statement other 
than totally tautological. 
First, retail demand elasticities would vary directly with mobility or the 
ease of travel within the shopping area. Cities which exhibit relatively 
large increases in their price index in Table 1 seem to be cities which 
experienced a large part of their growth prior to the advent of the automobile 
or are quite hilly cities. Pittsburgh and Scranton are doubly cursed. On 
the other hand, if we assume that hourly earnings in manufacturing are a 
reasonably good indicator of disposable income, the level of disposable 
income seems to vary inversely with changes in the retail index. (See 
Table 1). In the other words, high labor costs may reduce, rather than in-
crease, retail margins. High income consumers are on the average better 
informed, mol)e mobile, and have more leisure to shop around. Thus, the 
optimum numb'er of stores is smaller and the optimum width of product line 
is wider in cities where per capita disposable income is relatively high. 
It may seem surprising that a low density of stores relative to population 
should lead to highly competitive retail markets. A large trading radius, 
however, gives the retail store a.higher marginal revenue curve. 
Other things being equal, the number of households attracted by a given 
finite price change is proportional to : 
2 2 2 7 I 13) .1A=tr(r-t-A't) -r .=(24rr+4r ). 
7/ For the circle dA 2 r. 
dr 
1 
City 
2 
Sales per 
G Store 
New York, N.Y. 163,862 
Chicago, Illinois 167,656 
Los Angeles, Calif. 327,268 
Detroit, Mich. 181, 856 
Philadelphia, Pa. 119.738 
Boston, Mass. 207, 914 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 129,467 
Cleveland, Ohio 192, 561 
Washington, D. C. 270,159 
Baltimore, Md. 126,668 
St. Louis, Mo. 172,486 
San Francisco, Cali£.174, 865 
Atlanta, Ga . - -- - -- -
Cincinnati, Ohio -------
Houston, Texas -------
Kansas City, Mo. -------
Minneapolis, Minn. -------
Portland, Oregon -------
Seattle, Wash. -------
Scranton, Pa. -------
5 6 
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TABLE 1 
3 
Average num-
ber persons 
served by ~ach 
store 
'""1954 
470 
459 
500 
414 
317 
214 
171 
506 
395 
328 
231 
7 
4 
Hourly earmngs 
in Manufacturing 
1956 1957 
l. 97 2.04 
2.20 2.30 
2.20 2.31 
2.46 2.59 
2.06 2.15 
1.88 2.00 
2.28 2.37 
2.11 2.21 
2.04 2. 16 
2.07 2.17 
2.32 2.44 
1. 78 1. 88 
2.03 2.13 
2.19 2.33 
2.02 2.15 
2.05 2.15 
2.21 2.28 
2.23 2.32 
1. 55 1. 60 
Ll Retail Index on Foods from 
..6.R 
10.5 
9.1 
8.3 
10.3 
11.4 
10.2 
13.6 
9.5 
11.8 
9.7 
8.2 
10.9 
10.5 
12.9 
7.8 
8.5 
6.8 
8.9 
9.9 
15.1 
.6. Hourly 
Earnings 
Dec.l955-JUne1958 
'19 
.25 
.30 
.29 
.23 
.27 
.18 
.23 
.28 
.30 
.22 
.21 
.56 
.27 
.21 
4Wholesale Index Dec. 1955 
Total over the period, June 1958 
.73 
.59 
,54 
.67 
.76 
.67 
.89 
.62 
.77 
.63 
.54 
.71 
.69 
.84 
.51 
.55 
.44 
.58 
.65 
.99 
Sources: Census of Business and Monthly Labor Review 
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TABLE 2 
Price Index Linear Regression 
A Linear Regression of the Change in Retail 
Price Index of Processed Foods on the Whole-
sale Price Index of Processed Foods 
The results of this regression are arrived at from 24 observations taken from 
the period July, 1956, to June, 1958. (One observation per month during 
this two year interval.) 
National Figures: 
1. Yt= .13$ .623 xt 
2. Sample Standard Deviation from Regression: Sy. x .::=. 663 
3. Sample Standard Deviation of the Regression Coefficient: 
Sb.=:: .150 
4. 5o/o Confidence Interval of "b": .3126: B'-.934 
5. 20o/o Confidence Interval of "b": . 425 f:: Bb- . 821 
Kansas City 
1. Yt== . 002f;. 553 Xt 
2. Sample Standard Deviation from Regression: Sy.x=. 743. 
3. Sample Standard Deviation of the Regress ion Coefficient: 
Sb= .195 
4. 5o/o Confidence Interval of "b": .1496 B?. .957 
5. 20o/o Confidence Interval of "b": . 396.!:- B b. 810. 
Minneapolis: 
1 . Y t :::= • 144 t . 3 6 2 Xt 
2. Sample Standard Deviation from Regression: Sy.x= .194 
3. Sample Standard Deviation of the Regression Coefficient: 
Sb:=. 044 
4. 5o/o Confidence Interval of ''b": .271-B-.453 
5. 20o/o Confidence Interval of "b'': . 304- B-. 420 
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Thus the larger is the trading radius (within tolerable limits), the higher 
is marginal revenue at any given sales level. Finally if large trading radii 
occur in high income areas, and they frequently do, then marginal revenue 
is increased by still another factor. The worth of each household captured 
by the store is enhanced since the income elasticity of the demand for food 
is greater than ze!l"o. 
One further factor must be considered. The lar,er the optimum trading 
radius, the wider is the optimum product line. 8 Since retail complement-
tarities operate in favor of most foods, then the marginal revenue function 
for most foods contains not only their "own" marginal revenue.but:.is enhanced 
by the sum of the profit margins on all other commodities stocked. 9/ 
Two further factors must be mentioned. The foregoing results could not 
obtained if retailing were afflicted with decreasing returns to scale or if 
marginal costs rise at a finite output level. The second factor is the most 
easily resolved of the two, In the relevant output range, marginal costs never 
rise for retail stores since capacity is determined by the crowding and in-
convenience which customers are willing to undergo (in the short run capacity 
restrictions may reduce the elasticity of demand for crowded stores). This 
capacity limitation is reached long before the marginal cost curve turns up. 
There is considerable, but fragmentary, evidence that within the range of 
store sizes which have been utilized, increasing returns to scale are the rule. 10 I 
Lot size economies, greater degree of specialization of labor, and the 
substitution of capital for labor are available as store size increases. It 
makes little difference whether increased size and sales are obtained by a 
widening of the product line or by an increase in store traffic with an un-
changed product line. 
Thus as farm prices fall relative to other prices, the behavior of retail and 
wholesale firms results in a drop in the farmer's share of the food dollar. 
As farm prices rise, the opposite result obtains. The magnitude of the 
retailer's contribution to this movement has probably been magnified here-
tofore, however. 
Retailing in the Long Run: Given the existence of scale economies, the 
future behavior of retail margins depends largely upon our estimate of move-
ments in variables which affect retail demand elasticities. The record of 
the past 25 years is very encouraging. In the early thirties, supermarkets 
pointed with pride to a gross margin of 12 percent in their grocery 
departments. Within the past year, this writer has observed several stores 
8/ Holdren,.·op:. cit., pp. 1,72-176. 
9/ Ibid., pp. 190-196 
10/Ibid.; pp. 62-86 .. 
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with gross margins as low as 5 percent in their grocery departments {even 
though many non-foods with higher average margins are ''keyed" on the 
grocery key) and 10 percent would be considered a rather high gross margin 
in the grocery department for all but "Mom and Pop" stores. Margins on 
meat and produce seem to be about the same (19 percent and 23 percent 
respectively) as they were in the early thirties. Even this comparison is 
deceptive however, since the margins in these departments have pil"obably 
narrowed on the items which· were commonly stocked in the "thirties'!. 
The only elasticity enhancing variable, which one might fear a decrease in, 
is that of mobility. That is, as our streets become more crowded, the 
disutility of travel within population centers may increase sufficiently to 
negate the effects of increased per capita income. Given the present patterns 
of urban development, such a result does not seem at all likely, however. 
One cannot be quite so optimistic concerning the supply side of the market, 
however. The retailer is the offer maker and the market is sufficiently 
imperfect to allow the continued existence of non-optimizing behavior. In 
the writer's knowledge, non-optimising behavior never takes the form of 
a lower than optimum price. The existence of uninformed sellers makes 
the market less competitive and prices higher than they need be. For 
example, there is one group of 124 "loosely affiliated" supermarkets who 
operate on over;-all gross margins of 13 to 14 percent, show expense rates 
of about 11 percent and enjoy a rate of return on capital of 50 percent or 
better. They operate in competition with chains who report a gross margin 
of 17 to 19 percent and a 15 percent rate of return on capital. Not only 
could the non-optimizing stores be led to reduce their margins, but in so 
doing they would force a reduction in the profit rate of the more efficient 
stores. Even the more efficient stores can probably reduce their expense 
rates. A 9 percent expense rate seems to be obtainable (with no change in 
sales volume per store) within the present technology and with no change in 
distribution systems. In one such store with a $4 millions annual sales 
level, it was estimated that a 9 percent expense rate is obtainable with an 
additional investment of approximately $125, 000. This indicates that even 
the most efficient stores are not sufficiently capital intensive. Thus, in my 
optimistic moments, I envision a saving in food aistribtitiori cost of 4 percent 
to' 7 percent resulting from improving the management of food stores. The 
social benefits from reducing the number of redundant food stores and re-
leasing socially valuable urban space would not be a negligible additional 
blessing. 
If we consider changes in the distributive system, the obtainable cost 
reductions are even larger. Almost all food processing operations carried 
on "on premises" in retail stores fail to exhaust scale economies in even 
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the largest stores. The processing of produce, poultry and pork is 
gradually being moved out of the retail store. Lunch meats are rarely 
packaged "on premises", in the more efficient stores. The remaining high 
cost operation on which little progress has been made is that of the "on 
premises" processing of'beef cartasse.s. The shelf life of "cut and packaged 
beef" is too short to permit off premises cutting and packaging under present 
technology. 
If we are very conservative and estimate the obtainable price reduction to 
be only 5 percent, the effect on the agricultural surplus would be quite 
substantial. (I'll leave it to the members of the seminar, who are much more 
skilled than I in this area, to estimate the impact of this price reduction.) 
Further, such a price reduction would benefit both consumers and farmers, 
impose no additional tax burden and injure only the redundant retailers. 
It is not to be inferred that retailers willfully fail to optimize. In spite of the 
fact that retailing is one of our most important industries, not enough research 
has been done to provide retailers with anything approaching an adequate 
basis for decision making. Retailers lack market information, but more 
importantly they have little or no idea what information is needed nor how to 
use it if it were provided. I can conceive of no other place in the economy 
where research money would have more welfare leverage than in retail 
management. 
Wholesaling in the Long Run. Like retailing, wholesaling is subject to 
scale economies. If an individual wholesaler enlarges operations by selling 
to more stores of a given size, the attendant scale economies are reasonably 
substantial. However, if this enlargement is obtained by selling to fewer 
but larger retailers, the scale economies available can more than halve 
present average wholesale expense rates. Between 1948 and 1954, the number 
of grocery wholesalers declined from 4, 253 establishments to 3» 320 
establishments . 11 / In the same period, as indicated by Table 3, the number 
of retail grocery stores decreased substantially and were the only type of 
retail store to do so in spite of the fact that their relative importance in-
creased by a very large amount. During the same period wholesalers 1 
operating expenses decreased from 8. 2 to 7. 5 percent of sales. 12/ 
These averages conceal the extent to which wholesaling costs may be reduced. 
For example, one Chicago wholesaler, operating on a 3 percent margin 
(including discounts), services stores within a radius of 300 miles. He 
achieves this low margin by servicing only stores with a minimum of 
ll/ U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Business, 1948 and 1954 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948 and 1954). 
12/ Ibid. 
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TABLE 3 
RET AIL SALES BY TYPE OF STORE 
U. S. SUMMARY 
Sales a Sales as 
Retail (000) percentage 
stores Number In 1948.Prices of Total 
by 1948 1954 1948 1954 Retail Sales 1948 
t e 
Grocery 377,939 279,440 24,770,123 31,812,166 30.9 
Other food 114,773 105,176 4,.308, 589 4,936,644 5.4 
General 
merchandise 74,111 76,198 17,134,718 16,656,464 21.4 
Apparel & 
Accessories 115.246 119,743 9,803,218 10,324,519 12.2 
Appliances & 
Furniture 85,585 91,797 6,914,179 8,100,566 8.6 
Farm Equip-
ment & 
Hardware 52,289 53,547 4,879,841 5,168,120 6.1 
Drug & Pro-
prietory 55~796 56,009 4,013,231 4,894,493 5.0 
Otherc 158,372 199,833 8,263,475 12,250,550 10.3 
Total 1, 034. 111 981,743 80,087,374 94,143,522 100.0 
aThree indexes were used: Food Price Index, Durables Index and 
Non-Durables Index. Source: Department of Labor. 
bTotal wage costs== payrolls corrected for wage rate change plus [number 
of proprietors times 50 (estimated working hours) times 1. 088 (average 
hourly wage in retailing for 1948 fl. Source: Census of Business, 1948 and 
1954 
CDoes not include eating and rinking places, the auto group, fuel and ice 
dealers or lumber and building supply dealers. 
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TABLE 3 
RET AIL SALES BY TYPE OF STORE 
U.S. SUMMARY 
Sales,:as Average Sales Total Wages 
percentage per Storeln Total Wage Cost as 
of Total 1948- Prices In 1948 Wagesb Percentage 
Retail Sales (000) (000) of Sales 
1954 1948 1954 1948 1954 1948 1954 
33.8 66 114 2,293,153 2, 341' 783 9.3 7.4 
5.2 38 47 1,281,601 689,835 29.7 14.0 
17.7 231 219 2,511,115 2,176,979 14,. 7 13.1 
11.0 85 86 1,449,332 1,390,278 14.8 l3.5 
8.6 81 88 1,152,885 1,117,657 16.8 18.8 
5.5 93 97 1,331,908 1,280,920 27.3 24.8 
5.2 72 87 609,449 641' 144 15.2 13.1 
13.0 52 61 1,380,453 1,414,412 16.7 11.5 
100.0 77 96 12,009,896 11,053,008 15.0 11.7 
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$2 millions annual sales volume. In addition these stores must have manage-
ments sufficiently skilled to require a minimum of wholesaler services, no 
wholesale salesmen, and no credit. The combined operating expenses of 
wholesaler cum retailer in this case is less than 14 percent of retail sales 
(the best chains seldom show less than a 16 percent cost ratio). Thus, as 
we increase the scale and efficiency of retail stores, we almost automatically 
increase the scale and efficiency of wholesaling operations. 
Some question might arise as to whether such savings will be delivered to the 
retailer or whether they will only enhance wholesaler's profits. Historically, 
wholesalers and food processors, who distribute directly to retailers, bought 
in relatively perfect markets and sold in markets in which they possessed 
considerable monopsony power. 13 I However, when faced with a large 
retailer (say a single store with $2,000,000 annual sales volume) the market 
situation approximates that of bilateral monopoly with the wholesaler in a 
comparatively weak bargaining position. The market, in such a case, 
approximates competitive results (although chaotic price discrimination is 
rampant) .14/ The writer knows of one case in which a medium size meat 
packer, in return for full line forcing on the part of a large single store 
retailer, was forced to allow a 30- day payment period on all meat invoices 
(this is equivalent to an interest free loan of $80, 000) and guarantee that the 
invoice prices to the store in question were as low as those given to any 
chain in the area. Thus as the average size of retail stores increase, whole-
sale economies will be possible and will be delivered to the retail store who 
in turn can be forced to deliver the resulting savings to the consumer. The 
key to setting this chain of developments in motion is obviously that of im-
proving management decision making in retail trade. 
13/ The single important exception to this is probably A&P which seems to 
have been able to manipulate price of produce in primary markets. 
14/ See for example: Tibor Scitovsky, Welfare and Competition (Chicago: 
RichardD. Irwin, Inc., 1951), pp. 414-422. 
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DEMAND EXPANSION AND 
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
Karl A. Fox 
I. Introduction. When the Seminar Committee made up its program last 
February, it intended that this paper would summarize results from the 
preceding ones . and if possible place them in a quantitative framework 
so that the relative importance of different methods of expanding demand 
might be made clear. I have not been able to do a neat job of either 
recapitulation or quantification in this draft, though my emphasis has been 
upon the latter. 
A. Demand expansion in a policy framework. Various economists have 
estimated that farm output is currently exceeding commercial demand at 
"satisfactory11 prices by about 6 to 8 percent. The object of attempts at 
demand expansion is to shift demand curves to the right, so that larger 
quantities of farm products will be consumed at a given price or that the 
same quantities will be consumed at a higher price. (see, for example, 
Table 1, page 126.) 
The simplest measure of the effectiveness of a demand expansion program 
may be obtained as follows: multiply the appropriate "base period11 quantity 
of consumption by the increase in price that would occur as a result of the 
demand expansion program if the quantity consumed were kept at the base 
period level. For example, if a demand expansion program results in con-
sumers being willing to pay one dollar more per unit for a fixed supply of 100 
million units, the effect of the program will be valued at 100 million dollars. 
In an agricultural adjustment context, the effects we are interested in should 
be manifested at the farm price level. The farm price for a given quantity 
of a commodity could be increased either by raising the consumer demand 
curve or by reducing marketing charges. In the latter case the derived 
demand curve at the farm level rises relative to the fixed consumer demand 
curve. 
The 100 million dollar effect of our example might in some cases prove to be 
a gross rather than a net gain. If farmers have paid 20 million dollars for an 
advertising program that has the indicated gross effect, the net benefit of the 
program to farmers is 80 million dollars. Furthermore, some programs may 
have negative side-effects on other farmers or even·the same farmers. If 
Karl A. Fox is Head, Department of Economics and Sociology, Iowa State 
College. 
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the program just mentioned has raised the demand curve for beef, it may 
have lowered the demand curves for pork, lamb, and poultry by smaller but 
still significant amounts. Also, if we are thinking in terms of the national 
interest rather than that of a particular commodity group, a program may 
be found to have pegative effects on domestic taxpayers and/or consumers 
and upon various groups in foreign countries. Assuming that the dollar effects 
of a prpgram upon each of these domestic and foreign groups could be measured, 
different policy makers could arrive at their own estimates of the over-all 
net benefits of the program by assigning appropriate weights {including zero 
weights in some cases) to each of the side-effects. 
In this paper I shall assume that our primary interest is in achieving a net 
increase in demand for farm products in the aggregate. Consequently, I 
shall not 'Say much about effects on consumers and taxpayers, but shall pay 
attention to pas sible effects of programs applied to one farm product upon 
the demand for substitute or competing farm products. 
B. Classification pf variables for policy purposes. Some important variables 
affecting the demand for United States farm products are not subject to control 
or even influence by policy measures specifically directed toward demand 
expansion. Such variables would include population growth in the United States, 
changes in the age and sex composition of the population, changes in the 
average leve~ and distribution of national income, changes in population, 
income, and other .variables in foreign countries, and the intercorrelations 
among these various average levels and distributions. These may be called 
non- controlled variables. 
Variables which we wish to influence by means of demand expansion programs, 
primarily the farm prices of individual products, groups of products, or farm 
products in the aggregate, may be referred to as target variables. 
Variables which we can control or manipulate in order to influence target 
variables in the desired directions and by the desired amounts may be referred 
to as instrument variables or instruments. 
Our analyses will be difficult enough even if we assume that values of all 
non-controlled variables remain fixed at their 1959 levels. By making this 
assumption, we can concentrate on estimating the net effects of different 
instruments upon different target variables, without facing the complication 
of time trends in the non-controlled variables. 
For a full-dress analysis of demand expansion policies, we would need to know 
the existing values of all relevant variables, whether non-controlled, instruments, 
or targets, and also the structural coefficients that tell us how much particular 
target variables will increase as a result of unit increases in given instrument 
variables. These coefficients include demand elasticities, measures of the 
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responsiveness of sales to increases in advertising expenditures, and so 
on. 
The combination of time and knowledge available to me has not permitted a 
consistent application of this policy framework. Nevertheless, I think it is 
well to have such a framework in mind as a goal for further work in evaluating 
demand expansion (and other) programs, 
C, Background information. Table 1 divides total utilization of farm products 
in 1956 among various utilization categories, Some 88 percent of total utili-
zation took place domestically, 76 percent as food and 12 percent as non-food 
products, An additional 12 percent of total utilization took the form of exports 
to foreign countries and shipments to United States territories. Each possible 
demand expansion program could be "tried on for size 11 initially in terms of 
the percentage of total utilization to which it might apply. For example, new 
industrial uses of farm products would affect some part of the fibers and 
leather, industrial oils and soap, and other non-food use categories, totaling 
about 8 percent of all utilization, 
Table 2 shows changes from 1950 to 1956 in various types of utilization. Most 
of the domestic non-food utilization categories declined between the two years, 
Domestic food use increased at least in line with population growth. Exports 
and shipments rose substantially from 1950 to 1956. Attempts at demand 
expansion might be regarded as successful if they either accelerated an ex-
panding utilization category or slowed the decline of a contracting category 
relative to what would have happened in the absence of such attempts. 
Figure 1 gives a rough impression of the r(llative magnitudes of different 
utilization categories and of the demand functions that limit their expansibility 
in the short run. The demand function that conditions the success of our 
export programs is that of all other countries combined for farm products 
produced both in the United States and in other nations, The elasticity of 
this foreign demand curve, measured at the United States farm price level, is 
probably small -- around -0.2, perhaps. United States 1 exports of the sorts 
of commodities other countries are likely to buy are equivalent to not more 
than 10 percent of the total consumption of such commodities in the rest of the 
world. Thus, the export portion of Figure 1 implies an elasticity of demand 
for United States exports of farm products of about - 2. 0. This figure does 
not allow for exchange problems -- that is, problems confronted by foreign 
countries in earning additional dollars to pay for more imports from the 
United States -- and may exaggerate fre short-run responsiveness of our 
exports to subsidy and related programs, 
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Table 1. Final (net) Utilization of farm commodities, United States, 1956. 
Item 
Total, all types of final (net) utilization!/ 
Domestic use, total 
Food 
Nonfood 
Feed for workstock 
Fibers and leather 
Tobacco 
Alcoholic beverages 
Industrial oils and soap 
Other nonfood use 
Exports and shipments 
Commercial 
USDA 
(1) 
Percent 
of total 
utilization 
19561 / 
Percent 
100.0 
87.9 
76.1 
11.8 
0.9 
6.2 
2.1 
0.8 
1.3 
0.5 
12.1 
11.2 
0.9 
(2) 
Approximate 
farm v~lre 
1956 
Bil. dol. 
29.0 
25.4 
22.2 
3.2 
0.2 
1.8 
0.6 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
..u_ 
3,3 
0.3 
1/ Net, excluding pasture. Also excludes feed fed to livestock (other than farm 
wo:tkstock) and seed, as these ar~ "intermediate" uses, and their value is in-
cluded in that offin<H utilization. ·Taken from AAC·seminar paper bY. Harold F. 
e,reimy~r, March 9, 1959, page 9 (in: preliminary draft). 
2/ Based on Supplement for 1956 to; Measuring the Supply and Utilization of 
Farm Commodities (Agriculture Handbook No. 91). USDA-AMS, October 1957. 
Major subtotals are adjusted from the 194 7-49 farm price level used in this 
publication to the 1956 farm price level, using the Index of Prices Received by 
Farmers for all commodities {1956 level is about 87 percent of the 1947-49 
average), 
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Table 2. Changes in utilization of farm commodities, United States 1950-1956 
(As percentages of total utilization in 1947-49 -- annual average.) 
Item 
Total utilization 
Domestic use 
Food 
Nonfood 
Feed for workstock 
Fibers and leather 
Tobacco 
Alcoholic beverages 
Industrial oils, soap 
Other nonfood use 
Exports and shipments 
Commercial 
USDA 
Utilization in 
1950 1956 
Change 
1950 to 1956 
Percentage of total utilization in 194 7-49 
101.5 114.8 13.3 
92.1 100.9 8.7 
76.0 87.4 11.4 
16.1 13.5 
-
2.6 
2.2 1.0 
-
1.2 
8.0 7.1 
- 0.9 
2.3 2.4 0.1 
1.1 0.9 
-
0.2 
1.9 1.5 
-
0.4 
0.6 0.6 0.0 
9.4 13.9 4.5 
7.7 12.9 5.2 
1.7 1.0 
-
0.7 
Source: Breimyer AAC paper, page 9, as cited in Table 1, footnote 1/. 
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Figure 1. Demand curves affecting utilization of United States farm products 
by major utilization categories.* 
*: Domestic Food Use 
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*slopes, relative quantities and marketing charges are believed to be roughly 
descriptive of the actual demand situation as of 1959. 
+U.S. ex~orts without P. L. 480 or price subsidies are indicated by the 
distance SQ; those with P. L. 480 and existing price subsidies are mdicated by 
the distance SQz. 
Q 
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II. Expanding the Domestic Demand for Food. 
A. Background information. Table 3 deals exclusively with the 76 percent 
of total 1956 utilization which was consumed domestically as food. The 
percentages inColumn 1 include fish, imported as well as domestic quantities 
of sugar, and perhaps some other imported items. However, the figures 
in the remaining columns deal only with domestically produced farm products 
used for food. The value of such food at retail store prices in 1956 was 
approximately 50 billion dollars; marketing charges amounted to about 30 
billion dollars, leaving a net farm value of about 20 billion dollars. {see 
Table 3, footnote 2 . ) 
The figures in Table 3 are displayed graphically in Figure 2. In this figure, 
an area of 0. 5 square inch represents 1 billion dollars. A one percent rise 
in the demand curve for meat at the consumer level would increase farm 
income from meat animals {other things equal) by 128 million dollars; a one 
percent rise in the consumer demand curve for poultry and eggs would 
increase the farm value of a given quantity of poultry and eggs by 4 7 million 
dollars. More generally, the effect of a one percent reduction in marketing 
charges or a one percent increase in the level of a consumer demand curve 
will be proportional to the corresponding area shown in Figure 2. 
Although marketing research has not prevented the farmers' share of the 
consumers' dollar from declining substantially during the last 10 years, 
increased marketing efficiency is a perfectly legitimate instrument for 
increasing the farm-level demand for farm products. As observed before, 
one dollar decrease in the marketing margin for a food product has the same 
net effect upon its farm price as does a one dollar increase in the level of 
the consumer demand curve. 
Consumption of different food products responds differently to given percentage 
changes in their prices or in consumer income. The first column of Table 4 
shows estimated price elasticities of demand at retail for a number of major 
food groups and for all food. {The elasticity of demand for eggs is, according 
to my analyses, more like - 0. 3 than - 0. 58; however, the other figures in 
Column 1 are reasonably close to my own estimates and are partly based 
upon them. )3/ Column 5 gives income elasticities of demand for the same 
food groups -- specifically, the percent increase in the number of pounds of 
a given commodity group purchased per 21 meals consumed at home associated 
with a one percent increa.se in disposable personal income per family member. 
This column is based on a 1948 food consumption survey for urban families; 
however, it embodies substantially the same concept as that used by Wetmore 
and his colleagues in the recent publication noted in Table 4, footnote 1 I. 
3/ See Wetmore et al (cited below) page 66, footnote. • 
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Table 3. Background information on domestic food consumption and on retail 
cost, farm value, and marketing charges for food products of United States 
farm origin, 1956, 
Meat products 
Beef 
Pork 
Other meats 
Dairy products 
Butter 
All other 
Poultry and eggs 
Poultry 
Eggs 
Fruits and vegetables 
(1) 
Relative 
importance 
in tndex of 
per capita 
food c~m-1 / 
sum phon 
Percent 
25.0 
10.2 
10.4 
4.4 
19.5 
---z.s 
17.0 
11.5 
5.0 
6.5 
21.0 
Bakery and cereal prod. 
Miscellaneous products 
Fats and oils 
7.6 
15.4 
4":2 
2.2 Dry beans, peas , 
and nuts 
Sugars and sweets 
Fish 
Total 
6.5 
2.5 
100.0 
(2) 
Relative 
importance 
in the "foud•• 
Market basket, 
July-SeP,t. 
1956t.j 
Percent 
24.9 
10.0 
22.5 
15.2 
8.6 
4.4 
0.0 
100.0 
2/ Aggregate values, 1956 
Retail Farm 
cost3/ value 
Marketing 
bill 
Bil. dol. BiL dol. Bil. dol. 
12.8 
4.7 
10.8 
6.7 
4.4 
6.6 
4.1 
2.8 
1.3 
1.0 
6 .. 2 
4.8 
1.8 
8.0 
5.4 
3.4 
29.6 
1/ Includes some quantities of foods that are imported or are shipped in from 
U.S. territories -- notably sugar -- as well as foods consumed on the farm 
where grown, and foods of nonfarm origin (fish). 
2/ Includes all domestic farm foods that were both sold by farmers and bought 
by civilian consumers in this country. Excludes food consumed on the farm 
where grown -- valued at 1. 7 billion dollars in 1956 measured at farm price 
level. Hence, farm value of U.S. farm foods consumed in 1956 was 20.4 billion 
dollars (18, 7 plus 1. 7) and the 11 retail 11 value was 50.0 billion dollars (48. 3 
plus 1. 7), or slightly more if farm home use is valued at more than the farm 
price equivalent. 
3/ Crude estimates of retail values of beef or other items listed in the stub of 
the table could be obtained by using the percentages in Column (1) as weights. 
Sources: Column {1) from Wetmore et al, op.cit., page 54, left hand column; 
Column (2) from The Marketing and Transportation Situation (MTS-124), January 
30, 1957, page 50; Columns (3), (4) and {5) from The Marketing and Trans-
portation Situation (MTS-130), July 30, 1958, page 11. 
Percent 
of 
Retail 
Value 
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Figure 2 ~ Farm food products: Retail cost, farm value, and marketing bill, by 
major commodity groups, United States, 1956. 
( Livestock Products )If---·-------.... _~ 
Poultr-y; Dairy Fruits 
Retail Yalue -- Billion Dollars 
Bakery,, 
Cereal 
s 
t . I/ ranspor atton 
(Intercity) 
recessing charges 
and trade margins 
Farm 
Value 
1/ Allocation of transportation bill (3.6 billion dollars in 1956) among 
commodity groups based upon table 11.3 in Fox. Econometric Analysis 
for ,Public Policy, page 216. 
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Wetmore et al have relied on logic (rather than statistics) in estimating the 
cross-elasticities of demand between various food groups. Many other 
economists have noted that calories consumed per per son remain almost 
constant from one year to the next even though an index of per capita food 
consumption weighted by retail prices may show changes of as much as 3 
to 4 percent. Per capita consumption of a particular important food, such 
as beef, has sometimes increased by as much as 25 percent between two 
adjacent years; while it seems perfectly clear on an intuitive basis that 
consumption of some other foods had to fall to keep calorie intake within 
bounds, statistical analyses have given significant measures for only a few 
of the substitution effects that must logically exist. (I have found statistically 
significant cross- elasticities only between such obvious competitors as beef, 
pork, lamb, chicken, and turkey.) Wetmore fills in, on a logical basis, 
approximate values for the whole array of cross-elasticities between food 
groups that must exist if we are to explain the almost constant level of per 
capita calorie intake. I believe that the price elasticity of demand for all 
food at retail may be nearer - 0, 30 that the - 0. 20 used by Wetmore; other 
than tlat, and the own-price elasticity shown for eggs, I think Wetmore has 
done a reasonable and possibly definitive job. 
The figures in Column 1 of Table 4 are the only ones that an individual 
producer group might think of as important. For example, a decrease of 
one percent in the retail price of meat would in itself increase the con-
sumption of meat by 0. 6 percent and the index of per capita food consumption 
by 0. 2 percent. But it would also decrease the consumption of other foods 
(if their prices remained constant) by an amount equivalent to 0. 1 percent 
of the index of per capita food consumption. 
Table 5 shows other examples, real and hypothetical, of the relation between 
the positive or direct effect of a program beamed at a particular commodity 
and its negative or side-effects upon other commodities. In Set A, a one 
percent decrease in the price of beef would increase beef consumption by 
0. 83 percent, but it would reduce consumption of other meats (in this example) 
by 0. 25 percent, so that the adverse effects upon other meats are about a 
third as large as the direct effect on consumption of beef o This extends 
inside of the meat group the same substitution phenomenon just noted. Set B 
in Table 5 applies them to competition among three grades of beef, and Set D 
to competition among three hypothetical brands of soap which we assume to 
be almost identical in chemical and physical compos it ion 0 
In passing, we might note that popular conceptions of the effectiveness of 
advertising and promotion may well be based on the Set D situation, in which 
the elasticity of demand for "Brand "' may be extremely large. At the same 
time, the elasticity of demand for ''all soap" might be as small or smaller than 
the elasticity of demand for all beef, all meat, or even all livestock products 
as an aggregate o 
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Table 4. Coefficients for appraising the effects of price, income and other 
programs upon domestic consumption of individual food groups and the aggregate 
of all foods, United States, 1955. 
Price Effects 1 I Income Effects~ 1 
Average Effect of 
11 0wn-price'' cross elasti- ~ percent. 
Elasticity cities with 1ncrease tn Expendi- Quantity "Produ~ Food Group respect to prices of ture purchased mix" at retail other foods all foods 
( l) (2) (3) {4) (5) 
Meat -0.60 0.31 -0.29 0.36 0.23 
Dairy products -0.50 0.32 -0.18 0 .. 32 0.23 
Eggs -0.58 0.42 -0.16 0.22 0.20 
Fruits -1.00 0.56 -0.44 [o.4z 0.33 
Vegetables -0.70 0.52 -0.18 
"Other" -0.10 0.10 0 0.08 -0.12 
All foods -0.20 -0.20 0.28 0.14 
1/ From Table 18, page 71 of Wetmore, et al_.. Policies for Expanding the 
Demand for Farm Food Products in the United States. Part I. History and 
Potentials. April 1959. 
2. From Fox, Econometric Analysis for Public Policy, Table 6.5, page 127. 
The concept used by ;w~tmore in appraising income programs, though not 
specified by him in this form, is essentially that of Column (5) but based on 
1955 data rather than 1948. 
{6) 
0.13 
0.09 
0.02 
0.00 
0.20 
0.14 
3/ Includes effects of shifting from one major food product to another as incomes 
rise, as well as effects of pu:rchasing higher qualities of rather narrowly_ defined 
commodities (for example, beef or butter) as incomes rise. 
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Table 5. Demand functions used to illustrate direct and indirect effects 
of programs aimed at one member of a group of competing commodities. 
Equation 
( 1) 
(2) 
(3} 
A. Bee£, pork and other meats 1 / 
Relative 
importance 
( 1) 
0.5 
OA 
0.1 
Consumption 
(2) 
qb :::: 
q' p ::: 
q 0 
-
Weighted averages: Om 
Percent change in consumption 
for 1-percent increase in: 
Price of Price of Price of 
beef r,ork other meats ( 3) 4) (5) 
-.83pb + 0. 25pp + 0. 05Po 
0.25pb -0. 73pp + o. 05p 0 
0.25pb +0.25pp -2. 00p0 
-.290 - .142 - .155 
Resulting .elasticity of demand for all meat= -0. 587 
Equation 
( 1) 
(2) 
p) 
B. Three grades of beef (hypothetical)2 I 
Initial 
relative 
importance Price 
( 1) (2) 
0.3 Pl. 
0.3 P2 
0.4 p3 
Weighted averages: PB 
-
Percent change in price for 1-percent 
increase in quantity sold: 
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 
(;3) (4) (5) 
-0.6qi -0.3q2 -0.3q3 
-0.3ql -0.6q2 -0.3q3 
-0.3ql -0.6q2 -0.6q3 
-.39 -.39 -.42 
Resulting price-flexibility for all beef:=: -1.20 (equivalent to demand elasticity 
for all beef= -0.83, as in Set /L) 
1/ Approximated on the basis of empirical demand analyses in Fox, op. cit., for 
1922-41 period. 
2/ Hypothetical figures assuming own-elasticities for each g:rade of about 
... }. 7 and cross elasticities between grades of beef somewhat larger (relative 
to own-elasticities) than for competion between beef and pork in Set A. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
C. Meat in relation to other food groups 
;3/ 
Effect of.· one percent change in the price of: 
Meat Dairy Eggs Fruits Vegetables 
<hn= -. 60pm + .lOpd + . 04pe + . 08pf + . 06pv + 
"Other" 
.03p 
0 
Effect on meat consumption of one percent increase· in prices of all foods=-. 29. 
D. Three brands of soap (hypothetical) 
Effects of !-percent Effects of !-percent increase 
Quantity_ incit'ease in price of: in advertising expense for: 
Eguation Weights sold Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 Brand 1 Brand 2 Brand 3 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
.33 ql -20pl + .9.Bp2 
.. 34 q2 9.8pl -20p 2 
.33 q~ 9.8pl + 9.8p2 
Weighted averages: -.133 -.133 
Resulting price elasticity ordemand 
for all soap= -0. 4 
Own-price elasticity of demand for 
each brand of soap= -20. 0 
+ 9.8p3 
+ 9.8p3 
-20p 3 
-.133 
k -0.49k -0.49k 
-0.49k k -0 .49k 
-0.49k 
-0 .49k k 
.0067k .0067k .0067k 
Resulting elasticity of 
total quantity sold with 
respect to total advertising 
expense= 0.02k 
3/ From Wetmore, et al. op. cit. Row (1) of Table 18, page 71. 
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B. Results of various measures for expanding domestic consumption of food. 
The recent (April 1959) publication by Wetmore, Abel, Learn, and Cochrane, 
Policies for· Expanding the Demand for Farm Food Products in the United 
~.!~t~' Part I, History and Po_t._~~!_i:_~ls presents careful estilfltes of the effects 
on food consumption of several demand expansion programs. Their 
alternatives embrace programs to increase food consumption by low income 
groups; general price subsidy programs; and calculations based on the achieve-
ment of various alternative diets, each of which meets all nutritional require-
ments but involves a consumption pattern appropriate to a different consumer 
income level. For a highly technical audience, a few of the coefficients 
estimated or assumed by Wetmore et al, might be called into question. But 
these questions are not at all serious, in my opinion, in terms of yielding 
realistic estimates of the probable effects on food consumption of the programs 
they analyze. 
1. Programs to raise food consumption among low income groups. According 
to a 1954 survey, about 9 percent of all persons. in the United States were ~ 
families or spending units with per capita incomes of $250 a year or less. · 
An additional 9 percent of all persons were in spending units with per capita 
incomes ranging from $250 to $499. The relationship between food consumption 
and family income displayed in Dr. Shephen:l' s AAC Seminar paper (Figure 3) 
indicates clearly that expenditures for food by such families would increase if 
their incomes were raised to (say) $500 per capita -- presumably by means 
of government payments. 
Wetmore estimates that, if all persons in the United States were to receive 
a minimum of $500 income per capita, the total quantity of food consumed in 
the United States (at constant prices) would increase by 2. 4 percent. 6 / If per 
capita incomes were raised to a minimum of $750, the estimated increase in 
food consumption would be 6.1 percent and if to $1,000 the increase would be 
7. 3 percenL However, these higher income figures are not realistic in terms 
of other policy guidelines. For example, the federal minimum wage as of 
May, 1959 is $1.00 an hour. This amounts to approximately $2,000 per year 
for a full-time jobp so that a family consisting of man, wife, and two children, 
with a single breadwinner working at the minimum wage, would be realizing a 
per capita income of $500. The federal income tax exemption of $600 per person, 
or $2400 for a family of four, suggests a slightly more liberal concept of 
minimum income. But for programs requiring expenditures of public funds, it 
4/ Technical Bulletin 231, University of Minnesota Agricultural Experiment 
Station, April, 1959. 
5/ Wetmore, op. cit., page 54, 
6/ Note that quantity here is an index of pounds of various foods weighted by 
their retail prices -- this index can rise without implying an increase in calory 
intake, 
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still seems to me that the $500 per capita level is about as far as the Congress 
might realistically go under current conditions. (Another guideline might be 
maximum rates of unemployment compensation, which, in most States, seem 
to be less than $1.00 an hour-- during the 1957-58 recession, average un-
employment compensation payments per unemployed worker were about $130 
a month, and most of the workers had been employed in high wage, durable 
goods manufacturing industries.) 
If we stay with the $500 minimum income level, then, the potential of an income 
supplement program is about 2. 4 percent in terms of quantity of food purchased. 7 1 
2. Programs based on (subsidized) reductions in retail prices. Figure 3 A 
provides a framework for comparing the income supplement program of the 
preceding paragraph with the effects (a) of a price subsidy to low income 
consumers and (b) of a food stamp or food allotment program for the same 
group. The solid-line demand curve shows the approximate relationship between 
retail price of food and per capita expenditures for food for persons with per 
capita incomes of $250. The income supplement program of the preceding 
paragraph would present these persons with $250 additional cash per person; 
they would then presumably increase their food expenditures to the level 
characteristic of other families who receive incomes of $500 per person. In 
our example, such a family would increase its food expenditures from $150 up 
to $200 per person, so that an income payment of $250 would increase food 
expenditures by about $50. 
One might achieve the same increase in food expenditures (which should also 
represent an increase in food consumption, as the retail price of food is assumed 
constant at 100) by reducing the price of food to low-income families by 50 
percent. In this case, the government might pay retail stores 50 percent of the 
value of all food purchased by authorized low- income families, so that the 
retail value of food purchased by these families would be $200 per person even 
though the net cost to the families would be only $100. 
Finally, a food stamp or food allotment plan might require families with 
incomes of $24:0 per person to lay out at least $150 per capita for stamps as 
a condition for participating in the program. The government would then is sue 
them additional stamps worth $50 perperson. If there were no dilution of the 
program (for example, through bartering food for shoes, beer, and so forth), 
a "blend price" of 75 for families participating iri the program would result 
they would get $200 worth of food for an outlay of $150. 
7/ See Wetmore, table 5, page 55, and table 6, page 56. If we assume a 
quantity-price elasticity of -0. 3, such a program would raise the ;:"eta.il p:dce 
of a fixed quantity of food by about 8 percent (2. 4 divided by 0. 3). 
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Figure 3. Frarrework for analyzing the effects of income supplements, price 
subsidies, and "food allotment" plans upon food consumP.tion by low income 
families, United States (approximate 1955 conditions). 1 'I 
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by these particular low-income families. Not more than 18 percent of all 
families could possibly be involved in these special programs (under our 
assumptions) so the demand-increasing effect averaged over all consumers 
would be a small fraction of that than suggested by Figure 3 A. 
Figure 3 B presents one of the more esoteric arguments for special price, 
income, or food allotment programs for low-income families, This particular 
argument depends upon the assumption that the total supply of food available 
for consumption in a given year is fixed, so that any increase in the domestic 
demand for food by any population group will immediately increase the retail 
price of food paid by all consumers. Assuming such a fixed supply of 100 
units, the intersection of Dn and II gives the initial allocation of food between 
low-income consumers (Il) and other consumers (Dn.) who will not be part-
icipating in a special program, If through some special program the demand 
curve for food on the part of low income groups is shifted over from I 1 to I2 , 
these low-income families will "compete away" part of the existing food 
supply from the more prosperous consumers, thus forcing them to move 
upward along their demand curve, Dn, paying a higher price for a smaller 
quantity of food. In this example, a program costing somewhere between 20 
percent and 100 percent of the original total incomes of low-income families 
might increase expenditures for food in the aggregate by 8 to 10 percent of 
the initial food expenditures of all families in the United States. If we are 
trying to separate out the net effects of demand expansion programs, this is 
a reasonable argument --Uis not overthrown by the:fact that farm output may 
in fact be increasing so rapidly that the net effect on demand may be much 
more than offset by downward pres sure on prices from the supply side, 
In brief, it appears that the maximum potential for increasing food consump-
tion by special programs for low-income groups is on the order of 2.4 
percent. Various practical problems would reduce this potential. For 
example, among the 19 percent of United States families in 1954 who received 
incomes of less than $500 per capita, about two-fifths lived on farms, 
Programs involving government money tend to be hedged around with provisions 
for ensuring that the funds are used as intended. There would be real 
difficulties in administering a food allotment plan affectively in the cases of 
farm families who could readily expand their production of food for home use, 
thereby releasing purchasing power (obtained from government checks) to buy 
other things, Also, two-thirds of the 18 percent were resident in the South, 
and within the South two-thirds of all farm families and one-fourth of all 
nonfarm families would have been eligible to participate. Important groups 
in the South might well oppose such a massive introduction of personalized 
subsidies from the Federal government. Allowing also for regional and farm-
nonfarm complications, for the barter of food stamps for other commodities, 
and for other slippages, the practical potential of price, income, and food 
allotment programs for low-income groups probably does not exceed one percent 
of total food consumption. Moreover, this net increase would be a "one- shot" 
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affair -- i.e., The demand curve would be shifted to the right by one percent 
in (say) 1960, but the year-to-year changes in demand from 1960 on would not 
be affected. 
3. Quality improvement and advertising. 
a. Quality improvements. If quality improvement is to contribute to 
agricultural adjustment in a short-run context, it must raise the .level of a 
demand curve (such as 11 in Figure 3 A) without increasing by an equal or 
greater amount the cost to farmers of producing the improved quality. 
The equations constituting Set B of Table 5 may be used to suggest the effects 
of increasing the proportion of cattle of "Grade 1 11 and reducing the proportion 
of "Grade 3. '' Suppose that, with the initial distribution of slaughter cattle 
by grades indicated in Table 5 ( 0. 3, 0. 3, and 0. 4 for Grades 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively) the market prices for these grades are respectively 5, 4, and 
3 units. What happens if we reduce the proportion of Grade 3 from 0. 4 to 0. 3 
and raise the proportion of Grade 1 from 0. 3 to 0. 4? The coefficients in S'et B 
suggest that the result would be a decrease of 10 percent in the price of 
Grade 1, an increase of 10 percent in the price of Grade 3 and no change in 
the price of Grade 2. The weighted average price of all cattle sold for 
slaughter would rise from 3.6 to 4.0, or a little over 10 percent. 
This would mean a very handsome increase in returns to beef producers if 
it were pure gain. If, however, the original price differentials were quite 
closely in line with differentials in production costs, this gross advantage 
could be largely or even fully offset by the increase in cost (as from longer 
and more expensive grain feeding of low-grade range stock). A careful re-
working of this example, using actual market prices for cattle and actual 
costs associated with raising the average grade at time of sale, might con-
siderably reduce the estimated gross gain -- my figures are hypothetical, 
though perhaps not completely unrealistic. 
The narrow price differentials between grades for certain commodities, such 
as butter, suggest that the economic potential in terms of price and income 
gains to farmers resulting from further quality improvement may be small. 
I would guess also that improvements in quality of eggs and fluid milk over 
and above the minimum levels enjoined by public he~yh authorities will not 
bring substantial price premiums from consumers. Column 6 of Table 4 
suggests that there is practically no correlation between family income level 
81 On a national average basis. I believe that, until two or three years ago, 
Iowa had lagged behind most other States in setting minimum standards for eggs . 
Iowa egg producers might therefore derive significant benefits from improve-
ments in egg grading but producers in (say) Connecticut might well have reached 
the point of "diminishing returns to quality." 
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and the price per pound paid for eggs, The same may be true for fluid milk. 
(The other figures in Column 6, Table 4, are probably influenced more by 
differences in the proportions of distinct commodities -- for example, more 
beef and less pork -- consumed at different income levels within the large 
food aggregates listed in the stub. A finer breakdown of the fruits aggregate 
in Table 4 shows virtually no increase in price paid per pound for citrus 
fruits and tomatoes as family income rises; for a more heterogeneous sub-
group the "product mix and/ or quality elasticity with respect to income" was 
greater than 0. 09). 
Certainly life is pleasanter and more healthful as a result of the many things 
that have been done to improve the quality of foods. But I wonder whether the 
improvements yet to come will have such dramatic appeal to consumers as 
those that have already been achieved. As a layman, I get the impression 
that our sanitary standards in food processing are high and that practicall9 
all units of food actually displayed in retail stores are in sound condition. I 
I believe that careful research could arrive at reasonable estimates as to the 
probable effects of further quality improvement on consumer demand curves and 
net farm income. These effects may be very large relative to the amount of 
research and development work going on in this field. However, the effects 
upon aggregate demand for food may be quite small -- possibly on the order 
of 0. 1 percent aer year in terms of a retail-price weighted index of food 
consumption.! I 
Promotion and advertising (advertising, for short) sound very promising indeed 
to some producer groups. As in the case of quality improvement, I have no 
solid quantitative basis fo~ estii:n.ating the effects. of food advertifi~· I can, 
however, offer some posstble atds to our reasontng about them. 
9/ The individual food processor and food retailer may not share my com-
placency -- he may experience this rather as a constant struggle to avoid off-
flavors, spoilage, and inadequate culling of batches or individual items that are 
in unsound conditions. Any processor or retailer who became careless and 
allowed his product to fall much below the general standard would be risking 
bankruptcy. I am simply arguing that the great majority of food handlers are 
already maintaining such high standards of quality control that the returns to still 
higher standards may be small. 
10/ In his AAC seminar paper, James Rhodes concluded that "events [issociated 
with quality improvements in beef and pork. K.Q may be expected to be slow-
moving and of little consequence for solving the farm income problem of 1959 
or 1961. 11 Note, however, that the effects (if any) of quality improvement could 
be cumulative over the years, whereas the programs discussed for low-income 
families would have only "one-shot" impacts (as mentioned on page 12 above). 
11 J Wetmore et al comment (page 44, footnote) that "The authors would very 
much have liked to have investigated the potential for increasing food consumption 
through advertising and sales promotion, but they were unable to develop a line 
of work that would yield any useful estimates .' 1 
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In his AAC Seminar paper, Robert Walsh pointed out that advertising 
expenditures in 1957 amounted to more than 10 billion dollars. This was 
equivalent to about 2 1/2 percent of the gll."oss national product and about 
three percent of disposable personal income. Approximately 2. 1 billion 
dollars was spent upon advertising for "food and food beverages." This 
proportion, about 20 percent of all advertising expense, is almost equal 
to the proportion of disposable personal income that is spent for food. 
On the surface, at least, it would appear that food is getting a fair share 
of attention in the form of advertising. 
Figure 4 suggests a basic problem of advertising directed at consumers. 
In any given year, the total disposable income of consumers is pretty much 
independent of the efforts of any one advertiser. Ordinarily consumers in 
the aggregate save 6 or 7 percent of their disposable incomes; the other 
93 or 94 percent is expended for consumer goods and services, including 
food. Manufacturers and distributors of different commodities try, by 
means of advertising pressure, to expand the inner circle of "personal 
consumption expenditures" in a direction favoring purchases of their 
particular products; this involves a reduction in personal saving, in ex-
penditures for other goods and services, or in both. Similarly, we might 
describe the objective Of advertising on food as that of moving the inner 
circle of Figure 4 "Northwest" at the cost of smaller consumer expenditures 
for non-food items. 
If advertising expenditures on behalf of food were raised from 2 billion to 
(say) 4 billion dollars while advertising expenditures for other goods re-
mained constant, there might well be some increase in consumer expenditures 
for food. It is not clear, however, that the increase in expenditures would 
exceed or even equal the 2 billion dollars of additional cost. 
From Figure 4, it would appear intuitively that ''all food" is a rather difficult 
aggregate to manipulate by means of advertising. This does not preclude 
the possibility that advertising might have important effects upon the demand 
for individual foods that take up very small fractions of the consumer's 
budget. 
The various sets of equations in Table 5, which indicate that a decrease in 
price of one commodity results in increased consumption of competing com-
modities, raise a question in my mind as to whether a similar effect exists 
in the case of advertising. Sets A, B, and C suggest that anywhere from 
one-fourth to one-half of the effect of a reduced price for commodity 1 upon 
its own consumption may be offset by opposite changes in consumption of the 
other cpmmodities. If we succeeded (through advertising) in raising the 
143 
Figure 4. Diagram for cons ide ring the effec~venes s of advertising 
in expanding the aggregate demand for food. 1 
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1 I A physical analogy to bring out the intent of the diagram would be that 
of a nonstretchable or very slightly stretchable cord around Consumption 
Expenditures, with all firms and commodity groups engaged in a "push-
of-warl'to force this cord outward in a manner favorable to their own sales. 
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demand curve for meat, a minimum offset would be a reduction in purchases 
of the lower cost foods sufficient to offset the increase in calories obtained 
from meaL It seems intuitively plausible that "eros s- elasticities with 
respect to advertising effort 11 may bear about the same relationship to 
"own-elasticities with respect to advertising effort•• as do corresponding 
eros s -elasticities and own-elasticities with respect to price. 
Some optimism with respect to the effectiveness of advertising may stem 
from stories of successful promotion of a particular brand in competition 
with other brands having identical physical and chemical properties once the 
packaging is removed. Set D suggests on a hypothetical level a situation in 
which sales of any one brand of soap are highly sensitive -- to changes in 
their relative prices and also to changes in their relative advertising expendi-
tures. The coefficients are chosen in such a way that the price elasticity 
of demand for 11 all soap" as an aggregate is about -0 .4, a little larger than 
the price elasticity of demand for all food. If through advertising pressure 
the demand function for Brand 1 were raised by one percent, it appears that 
sales of Brand 1 at the original price would increase by 20 percent, but that 
sales of Brand 2 and Brand 3 would each decrease by 9. 8 percent. This 
11battle of the brands 11 is doubtless highly exciting to the participants and the 
advantage to Brand 1 of choosing a more expensive, but more popular, cast 
for its soap opera may be substantial. If there were only one soap manufacturer 
and one brand of soap, however, the .effectiveness of advertising in expanding 
his total sales might be suggested more realistically by the price elasticity 
of demand for all soap (around -0.4 in my hypothetical example) rather than 
the elasticity of demand for Brand 1 (around -20). 
I suspect that advertising programs with respect to a particular major 
product, such as beef, may encounter a sluggishness of consumer response 
analogous to the aggregate demand for soap rather than the demand for some 
particular brand. Further, by analogy with equation C in Table 5, it seems 
reasonable to expect that, if advertising were successful in raising the 
demand curve for beef by 10 percent, there would be offsetting decreases of 
about half this amount for competing farm products . 
It seems quite reasonable to me that, inasmuch as food manufacturers and 
distributo11s have been advertising their products for many years, and paying 
in the aggregate around 2 billion dollars per year recently for such efforts, 
many food manufacturers and distributors may have arrived at a sort of 
equilibrium level of advertising expense. Walsh1 s figure suggests that food 
advertising expense is equivalent to about 3 percent ofthe retail price o'f food 
(see Taple 6). ·If this is an average, the marginal advertising cost of 
expanding sales by the last unit is probably higher than 3 percent. If I relate 
this figure to, for example, Holdren 1 s estimate of 14 to 17 percent as the 
gros s:r:pargin taken by supermarkets, I find it hard to believe that an increase 
of one percent in total advertising expense for food will be likely to increase 
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gross farm income by more than 1 or 2 or 3 times the cost of the additional 
advertising. 
This is not to say that advertising of food products is worthless or could be 
abandoned with impunity. S'uc~h "unilateral disarmament" might well see 
expenditures for automobiles and other things expanding at the expense of 
an absolute reduction in expenditures for food. 
4. Programs with nutritional objectives. Wetmore presents data on the 
incidence of deficiencies of particular nutrients among particular income 
and residence groups of the population as of 1955 but does not estimate the 
costs of eliminating such deficiences ~ It is hard to conceive of an effective 
national program for remedying the specific dietary deficiencies of individual 
consumers, particularly consumers who have plenty of money to buy the foods 
in question but may not happen to like them. Perhaps the nearest approach to 
such a program would be fr:ee distribution of vitamin and mineral tablets to 
the entire population, assuming that no dangers were likely to result from 
overconsumption of such ·nutrients .1 2 I Wetmore does, however, estimate 
the effects on food consumption of achieving various dietary levels each 
of which satisfies minimum nutritional requirements. If all consumers 
followed a "liberal cost'' diet plan, the net increase in aggregate food con-
sumption would be about 2. 3 percent. A "moderate cost" diet would 
result in a net decrease of 5. 5 percent, and a "low cost" diet in a net 
decrease of about 22 percent! 
These estimates suggest that, where food is concerned, in the United States 
we are indeed members of an "affluent society . 11 There are few compelling 
moral values or even slogans supporting our attempts to induce people to 
consume more food. We cannot reasonably advocate overeating to the point 
of obesity. We cannot press for much increase in food consumption by the 
higher income groups without appearing to advocate gluttony and conspicious 
waste. The "one-third of a nation" that was ill-fed in the mid-1930 1 s has 
shrunk to 5 or 10 percent of a nation; if we use the same real income standard 
to define poverty as was used in Roosevelt's famous statement. This under-
mines both the economic potential and the political attractiveness of special 
programs for low-income groups. 
12/ This assumption may not be justified. Recently there were newspaper 
reports of research tending to show that calcium intake substantially above 
National Research Council requirements could have undesirable consequences. 
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Table 6. Advertising expenditures for food relative to retail food prices, 
profits and other food costs, approximate 1956-1957 percentages. 
Item 
Retail price of food 
Profits (before taxes) 
Advertising expense 
All other costs 
Net farm value 
Transportation (inter-city) 
Processing and trade 
Percent of 
retail food 
price 
Percent 
93 
40 
7 
46 
1/ Based on corporate profit figure for 1956 in Table 6 of Shepherd's 
AAC Demand Seminar paper. 
2/ Based on figures cited on pages 2 and 3 of Walsh's AAC Demand 
Seminar paper. 
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It has been pointed out by Wetmore and others that increases in consumer 
income tend to reduce deficiencies in the consumption of particular food 
nutrients. Hence, special price and income plans for low- income families, 
or general food subsidy programs for all consumers, would contribute 
significantly to reducing the incidence of nutritional deficiencies . The 
soundness of these latter measures as targets for public policy depends 
to some extent upon the size of the "safety factors" built into the minimum 
requirement figures of the Natibnal Research Council. It seems reasonable 
to believe that these figures were not absolute minima and that the welfare 
loss resulting from a 10 percent "shortage" of Vitamin A relative to the NRC 
standard might be rather small. 
In discussing programs for low-income families, we s.aid practically nothing 
concerning costs of price and income programs to non-participants in their 
roles of consumers and taxpayers. However vaguely and inadequately, 
effects upon these groups are weighed by the Congress along with benefits 
and costs to farmers themselves. 
III. Expanding Domestic Non-Food Uses of Domestically Produced Farm 
Products. I can add little to Morton Smutz 1 s paper on agriculture and the 
chemical industry. The main categories (in Table 1) in which the chemical 
industry might increase domestic use of farm products appear to be fibers 
and leather, industrial oils and soap, and "other non-food use. 11 Table 2 
indicates that domestic consumption of the first two categories decreased 
somewhat from 1950 to 1956 while the third remained about constant. Dr. 
Smutz points out that some of the more familiar chemurgic programs (such 
as conversion of grain into alcohol for use as a motor fuel) really involve 
taking rather cotnplex molecules, produced at considerable expense, and 
breaking them down into simpler and inherently less valuable components. 
Some of these simpler components can be synthesized from petroleum, 
natural gas, or "coal, air, and water" at much lower cost than they can be 
grown on the farm. Corn would have to priced at less than 50 cents a bushel 
to qualify as a "commercial" raw material for industrial alcohol. I form 
the impression that during the next generation or two, we may make more 
progress in finding industrial uses (most of them of small volume relative to 
the total farm surplus) for the more complex and expensive molecules de-
rivable from farm products than for the "lowest common denominators'' 
alcohol and starch -- that have received most attention in the past. 
The equivalent farm value of fibers and leather, industrial oils and soap, and 
"other non-food use" as of 1956 was on the order of 2 billion dollars, compared 
with a total farm value of all products utilized (other than feed and seed) of 
about 29 billion dollars. Over the next few years, positive effects of the 
chemical industries in finding new uses for farm products will, in my opinion, 
probably not offset the effects of new and fiercer competitors based on materials 
of nonfarm origin. 
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Iver Johnson in his AAC seminar paper presented some encouraging 
statements, as well as some discouraging ones, with respect to the possibility 
of expanding domestic industrial uses of new or improved crops. However, 
it appears that one of the chief criteria used in classifying crops for possible 
introduction is the fact that they or their derivatives are imported. Some of 
these imports may be strategic to us from a military standpoint in the event 
of war; if so, we may be justified in growing some quantities of these crops 
in the United States (subsidized if necessary) or at least in assuring ourselves 
of supplies of adapted seed so that, in an emergency, we can be growing our 
minimum requirements of these strategic crops withing a year or so. 
Apart from military cons ide rations, which I believe would involve crops 
using a very small total acreage, there are some dangers in concentrating 
our research efforts upon crops that are currently imported. These imports 
are important sources of dollar exchange for friendly foreign countries who 
in turn import other farm products as well as non-farm goods from us . 
Sherwood Berg in his AAC seminar paper stated that the United States imports 
less than 37 million dollars worth of farm commodities that are regarded as 
strictly competitive to our agriculture. "These products account for only 
about one percent of our total imports of foreign agricultural goods." While 
this figure leaves out one or two items such as sugar, dorre stic production 
of which could be expanded at less than fantastic prices, Berg's statement 
suggests that we should not pin high hopes on relieving domestic surpluses by 
exCluding imports and "growing our own." On page 93 of his paper, Iver 
Johnson listed acreage potentials for new crops aggregating 2 1/2 million 
acres, equivalent to about 0. 7 percent of our current total crop acreage. 
Dr. Johnson also pointed out that a number of years are required for adapting 
new crops to growing conditions in appropriate regions of the United States. 
It seems to me that most research and experimentation in this area has a 
relatively long-term payoff, the value of which is largely independent of the 
short- run problems of agricultural adjustment o 
IV o Expanding Exports. Drs. Witt and Berg had important messages for us 
but it is difficult to quantify their effects. Both emphasized that the United 
States could and should make important contributions to the economic develop-
ment of friendly foreign nations. Dr. Witt in particular appealed to us to 
make some value judgments concerning our role in economic development 
and stop thinking of our food export programs as temporary devices for our 
own immediate convenience. I believe it was the Seminar Committee's intent 
that Dr. Witt would deal primarily with short- run effects of food export pro-
grams and Dr o Berg with the long- run effects of economic development in 
foreign countries upon our own agricultural situation. 
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1. Short-term effects of export programs. We have little difficulty in 
recognizing the existence of competition between states and regions within 
the United States. If Iowa increases its production of hogs by 20 percent, 
we know that almost all of the increase will be "exported'' either live or 
processed to other states and that our "exports" will depress the prices of 
hogs and pork in all parts of the nation. While we may suspect on an 
intuitive basis that the same thing happens in international markets, few of 
us (including myself) are familiar enough with data on world production, 
consumption, and trade in agricultural commodities to have a ..-eal "feel" 
for the effects of our special export programs. (However, they have 
brought serious complaints from Canada and from other nations that export 
famr products). 
Even a very rough order of magnitude may be of value. As I recall the 
figures on world production of wheat, rice, and cotton, and the approximate 
calorie intake levels of peoples around the world, it seems to me that the 
quantities of wheat, feed grains, cotton, rice, tobacco and other products 
exported from the United States currently amount to less than 10 percent 
of the total consumption requirements for these and similar commodities in 
the rest of the world. Ten percent, of course, is by no means a negligible 
quantity. As suggested in the lower left hand section of Figure 1, an increase 
of exports from the United States, if production in other countries remains 
constant, necessarily results in a decline in world prices of the exported 
commodities in the absence of government intervention of various kinds. 
For example, unless there are food price ceilings and food rationing pro-
grams in a foreign country, it seems to me that any increase in the volume 
of (say) wheat made available for sale inside the country must lead to 
price reductions for flour and bread at retail and for wheat grown inside 
the country in question. (Some of these countries, of course, do have 
domestic price support programs, food subsidy programs, and other forms 
of intervention to cushion any undesired shocks that might result from our 
export programs). Also, it is difficult to increase United States exports 
without having some effects OJ:} the prices obtained and the quantities sold 
by other exporting nations . 13 1 The demand curve in Figure 1, lower 
left-hand section, assumes a wor~d demand elasticity of about -0.2, 
13/ An exception might arise in the case of a country that was extremely 
short of foreign exchange and could buy little or no more wheat even to 
relieve famine. Here the effeCts of a gift or foreign currency sale of wheat 
upon other exporters might be small -- and the reCipient government would 
take responsibility for any adverse effects within its borders -- for example, 
lower prices to its own wheat producers. 
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measured at the United States farm price level, for the sorts of products 
we export. If we supply only 10 percent or less of the total consumption 
requirements of the rest of the world, the apparent elasticity of the demand 
for our own exports may be greater than - 1 {in absolute value) but probably 
no higher than -2. 
Table 2 of Dr. Witt's paper indicated that the cost to the Commodity Credit 
Corporation of commodities shipped under P .L. 480 agreements signed 
through June 30, 1958 was 4, 004.4 million dollars, whereas the amount paid 
(in local currency) by the importing countries was 2, 842. 3 million dollars --
about 70 percent of the CCC cost. This 30 percent "subsidy" is of about the 
order of magnitude that might reasonably be required to obtain such an in-
crease in United States exports of farm products as has actually been achieved 
under P .L. 480. 
This increase in the volume of exports since 1950 has enabled us to siphon 
off a sizeable fraction of the surplus that would otherwise have piled up still 
higher in CCC bins. However, I believe we are already pushing our food 
exports hard and will have difficulty increasing them very materially under 
current types of programs. If we are to increase them materially without 
alienating friendly foreign countries, I believe we must, as Drs. Witt and 
Berg imply, tie them in with the economic development programs of particular 
foreign countries arid also recognize some of the legitimate complaints of other 
commercial exporters of farm products. However, if we are to contribute 
most effectively to the economic development of friendly countries, for 
humanitarian, military, and other reasons, we are confronted with a sudden 
reversal of the ends and means of our present export program. Most of us 
have been preoccupied with the surplus disposal aspects of P. L. 480. One 
might argue that we have, in effect, looked at impoverished foreigners not 
in terms of their needs as human beings but in terms of their probable capacity 
to consume surplus food. If we value people for their own sakes, for their 
moral support around the international bargaining table, and for their military 
support in case of dire need, not only must we view our surpluses {at least 
some part of them) as things of value but we must be willing to insure the 
continued production over a number of years of agricultural products needed 
to support economic development programs in friendly countries. 
I would not pretend to estimate the long-term effects of our technical assistance 
programs upon our exports of farm products. Dr. Berg did not give us any 
help here of a quantitative nature. It seems to me that the possible gains to us 
in terms of world leadership and national security are so great as to over-
shadow any possible long-term consequences, good or bad, that they may hold 
for agricultural adjustment in the United States. 
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V. Recapitulation. It may be helpful to members of the seminar to have a 
quantitative statement of some of the possible demand expansion effects 
suggested above, even though some of them are based on judgment rather 
than real research. 
1. Programs for low-income families might have a ''one-shot" effect on 
demand equivalent to as much as one percent of farm output. Theywould offset 
perhaps 1/6 or 1/8 of the current imbalance b-etween supply and demand at 
"satisfactory" prices. The cost of achieving a one percent increase in demand 
through "low- income programs 11 would range from $0. 5 billion to $2. 0 billion 
a year. 
2. A general food price subsidy to all consumers of $5 billion a year could 
increase food consumption by about 2 percent -- depending on how the $5 
billion was obtained. Unless it was obtained through perpetual deficit 
financing, part of the $5 billion expense would be paid by consumers, so that 
the net increase in food consumption would probably be less than 2 percent. 
And the increase would be a "one- shot" affair. 
If a general price subsidy were used, the potential additional effects of 
programs for low- income families would be reduced. 
3. It seems to me that the potential increase in aggregate demand resulting 
from quality improvement efforts can hardly exceed 0. 1 percent a year 
though in principle gains from this source are cumulative. 
4. If advertising is on a self-help basis by producer groups, it is hard for 
me to anticipate an additional advertising budget of more than about $0.1 billion 
(equivalent to less than 0. 5 percent of the net farm value of food products) or 
a net benefit to farmers of more than $0.1 billion. The full potential of such 
producer-financed advertising programs by the end of a 10-year period might 
approach a one percent increase in utilization at the farm level, accumulating 
at the rate of not more than 0.1 to 0.2 percent a year. 
It is difficult to visualize a program under which food retailers and processors 
would make a coordinated effort to expand food consumption as such rather than 
to achieve individual competitive advantage. In fact, farmers and consumers 
may be better served if retailers and processors simply continue to concentrate 
on competitive advantage, which in some contexts is an effective spur to 
marketing efficiency. 
5. As to special export programs, our P .. L.480 programs are already a source 
of considerable friction with other countries, and it is questionable whether 
such exports can be expanded or even fully maintaiQ,ed. 
152 
To give a rough notion as to the orders of magnitude that could be involved 
in exports to aid economic development in friendly foreign countries, the 
following arithmetic may be useful: 
a. Our exports of wheat from the United States in the 1957-58 crop 
year amount to 400 million bushels" This would provide enough 
calories to maintain about 60 million people at the consumption 
levels prevailing in Southeast Asia 0 
b. The population of India is expected to grow at the rate of about 
10 million a year during the next few years -- or by 60 million 
people between 1960 and 19660 
c. Our 1957-58 wheat exports of 400 million bushels were equivalent 
to about 3 percent of the value of our total farm output of all products 
or equivalent to 3/8 to 1/2 or our surplus production. While most 
of the increased food requirement in India should come from her 
own production, the increase in total need between 1960 and 1966 
would be equivalent to another 400 million bushels of wheat (annual 
consumption rate). 
The increase in needs during a siK-year period in all friendly or 
neutral underdeveloped countries could hardly be more than double 
the figure for India alone. Thus, if underdeveloped countries having 
a combined population of about a billion people were to get all of 
their increased calories from the United States during the next 
six to eight years, the increased exports would probably not wipe 
out our surplus problem, though they might bring total demand very 
nearly in line with total supply. 
d. The main points of this exercise are as follows: 
(1) Exports (over and above, say, the 1950 level) were our 
biggest potential outlet for farm surpluses, but we may already 
have achieved two-thirds or more of the potential actually 
existing as of 1959 o The remaining potential that might 
be developed over the next 5 or 10 years is perhaps com-
parable in size with the remaining rate of surplus production 
in this country. 
(2) The marginal calorie :requirements of the peoples of under-
developed countries would not provide a "bottomless pit11 for the 
abs"orption of United States surpluses even if there were no 
economic, political, transportation, or storage problems 
involved. 
153 
6. It is hard for me to visualize domestic industrial uses of farm products 
expanding by more than $100 million a year ( 0. 3 or 0. 4 percent of net farm 
output) over the next five years as a result of special subsidies or newly-
discovered uses. The net effect of chemical discoveries over the next few 
yeats may well be to reduce industrial utilization of farm products somewhat. 
7. I doubt that strong military reasons could be found for increasing domestic 
farm output in the form of new crops by more than 0. 2 or 0. 3 percent within 
a 5 or 10 year period. A net expansion of domestic farm output as a result of 
restriction of imports on "economic" grounds could hardly exceed 0. 2 to 0. 3 
percent during such a period. 
8. Of the domestic programs discussed, a general food price subsidy would 
have a bigger initial "bite" than any other, but it would involve a tax cost of 
$2.5 billion or more for each one percent increase in total utilization of our 
farm output. 
A program of exports geared to economic development would have a comparable 
or conceivably even larger "bite", and might cost only $0. 5 billion or so for 
each additional one percent of total farm output exported. It would have, there-
fore, a much lower tax cost than would a domestic price subsidy and a greater 
humanitarian (and national security) value. 
9. In the first seminar paper of this series, Harold Breimyer enjoined us not 
to leap-frog over the problems of the 1960r s for the deferred pleasure of long-
range economic projections. There is no guarantee that population growth and 
rising standards of living will overtake farm production by 1970, 1980 or any 
other set time. In the short-run -- say the next 5 years -- the most promising 
prospect for purposeful demand expansion appears to lie in using some of our 
output to aid in the development of economically backward nations. 
